A

TREATISE

of the Nature of God.

Psal. 18. 11.

He hath made darkneſſe his ſecret place.

LONDON

Printed by Tho. Creede for Raphe Iackſon, dwelling in Pauls Church-yard, at the ſigne of the Swanne.

1599.

A TREATISE of the Name of God.

LONDON
Printed by Tho. Creede for Raphe Jackson, dwelling in Paules Church-yard, at the Signe of the Swanne.
1592.

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TO THE READER.

HEreis (good Reader) a litle Treatiſe of a great Argument, in the which (if euer in any) that may be ſeene, which doth daily come to paſſe, that the Booke it ſelf doth nothing leſſe then performe that which the title doth promiſe and prëtend: as we ſee and find often that the countenances of men do make a faire ſhew of many ſinguler vertues and excellent parts, which in triall are not to bee found in any part eyther of their ſoules or bodies. How then (may any and will ſome man ſay) do you of purpoſe go about to deceiue vs with gloſing titles, which haue vnder them no ſubſtance of matter? or were you your ſelues deceiued in taking in hand that which you were not able to accompliſh? Surely whatſoeuer

we were, he hauing the truth plainly told him, and the fault reuealed, need not now be deceiued vnlesse he will himselfe, and then VOlenti nō fit iniuria: *but for our parts wee did enterprise this conference, not in hope of soũding the depth of this bottomeleſſe mysterie, but onely purposing to content our selues with that knowledge of it which is reuealed in the word of God. The which no doubt is most needfull, and also comfortable to all Christians: for what eyther is or shall be our happines but the true knowledge and continuall contemplation of God? To the which purpose, if this Treatise do any whit further thee, we are glad: otherwise take our good will in good part. And so we commend the (good Reader) as we desire to be commended by thee, to the gracious assistance of Gods holy spirit, to be by him instructed and preserued in all truth.*

THE EPISTLE Dedicatorie.

SIr, my dutie remembred vnto you, desiring of God your welfare, as heartely & more earnestly, then I either do, or euer did mine owne. I had once purposed not to make any dedication of this litle pamphlet, that so none should need to be troubled with it, saue only they (if there were any such) that wold trouble themselues with it. But the perswasions of some friends wishing that this litle bodie going abroad, might haue some head to direct it, haue preuailed so far, that I began to thinke of some friend with whom I might make so bolde as to vse his name (at least vnderstoode the whiche may serue for once, vnlesse wee haue imitated that vnskilfull painter, who must needs set this epigramme ouer euery thing ẏ he painted: This is such a thing) *the forefront of this treatise, to giue to these fewe*

beetes of paper, the name and title of a perfect booke, the which they doo so earnestly affect. Whereupon while I did bethinke my selfe of the reasons and respects which vsually men follow in dedicating bookes, among the rest (for there are diuers besides) yet aboue the rest (for they are the chiefe) these three came to minde, the first is necessarium, the second vtile, and the third honestum. Necessitie maketh men (writing of matters not only greatly controuerted, but euen flatly contradicted, yea perhappes spightfully oppugned) as is almost euery trueth by one or other) shrowde themselues vnder the authoritie & countenance of some great personage, that so they may haue shelter against the stormes and tempests, which their malitious enemies raise against their persons, and the trueth which they do professe. But this seemed not needfull for this treatise, which beeing rather a Philosophical then a Theological discourse, of the nature of God in general, wherin, not only all Christians, but also the Iewes, yea the very Turkes and all other infidels doo agree, may safely trauel into any country without a safe-conduct, or arriue on any coast without a conuoy. The second motiue is vtile, a Planet that now adaies raigneth by his powerfull influence in the very wils of men, (the which God himselfe cannot compell) and is the Cynosura or North-star, by whose aspect most men lay their plats & courses.

And

And surely men are not to bee blamed, if by this officious kinde of saluting and acknowledging the vertues of woorthie men (it beeing done without flatterie) they labor to procure vnto them deserued fame & renowne, & to purchase to themselues some lawfull fauor, as a recompence of their good affection. This may be done, yet it is more lawfull then commendable, for it is better to giue then to take, and (in the opinion of some men) to want then to craue. The third respect, is the most honest and praise woorthie, for it hath an eye not to present safetie, or to future profit, but to benefites past and gone, and in a maner worne out of mind, the voluntarie acknowledging whereof, especially before so many witnesses, sheweth a good nature, and a most ingennous minde. Here I did set down my staffe, as minding out of this companie to make my choise, yet was I not as yet come to my iourneyes end: for as wee all haue many benefactours, to whom wee are much indebted, so it may bee doubted, which of them may by best right challenge this dutie to himselfe. Our best benefactour is hee, from whom onely commeth euery good and perfect gift, who hath enriched vs both with temporall and with spirituall blessings, and therefore doth most woorthily deserue to bee honoured aboue all others, with the first and best of all the things we haue.

And without question, the zeale and good affection of those men, who (euen in this our age) in thankfulnesse to God the giuer of all knowledge and wisedome, haue made him and no other, the Patrone of their bookes and labours, yea though they were not directly written of his nature, deserueth highly to bee praised: yet me thinkes as it is not lawfull to giue to man the honors which are due and proper to God, so it soundeth somewhat harsh (though in trueth it bee not euill, and to bee condemned as simply vnlawfull) to giue those honours to God, which are commonly bestowed on men: and therefore euen the godliest men haue thought it most meete to dedicate their bookes to men like to themselues, and themselues both bodie and soule to God. So then we must descend to humane benefactours, of all which wee must acknowledge the publick Patrons & fathers of our countrie, to bee as most beneficiall to vs (howsoeuer the enuie which men beare to the good one of another, maketh common benefites not to bee esteemed) so most worthie, to whom in the first place all honour, loue and dutie, should bee performed both by this, and by all other meanes whatsoeuer. Yet wee are not to stay here, for the publicke persons be to be preferred, yet priuate duties must not bee neglected: the which thing the very heathen did see by the light of nature, and therefore assoone as they had ended their publicke

seruices

seruices and sacrifices to the publicke Gods of their countries and cities, they did without faile look homewards & carefully (though superstitiously & foolishly) honor with due rites and ceremonies their deos penates, their houshold Gods. Neither did they herein think their publike gods to bee iniured or dishonoured: for being (though fondly) perswaded that they receiued much good men from their priuate Gods, hereupon they inferred as a most vndoubted truth, which no man endued with common sence would deny, that whosoeuer was sufficient to bestowe benefites on men, the same was sufficient to receiue honor and thanks at the hands of men. And in very truth, he that would make a separation & diuorce betwixt the bestowing of benefits, and the receiuing of thankes, hee should go about to take heate from the fire, light from the sunne, and all sence of humanitie out of the hearts, and from the societies of men. But howsoeuer this dutie of thankfulnesse ought most religiously to bee performed, yet wee see that none is more prophanely neglected: especially towards those, to whome in respect of neare coniunction of nature, we owe double loue and dutie: but they what good soeuer they doo to vs, seeme thankelesse Maisters, whereas wee knowe that Idolatrous and vniust Laban could say to Iacob, Though thou bee my neare kinsman, yet it is no reason, that thou shouldst serue for nought

nought, and be defrauded of the wages due vnto thee. And now at length to come to our purpose, I do most willingly confesse (as I would more willingly haue done long ere this, if it had pleased you to accept that homage, which I thinke you could bee content still to spare) that if euer any man might of an other, then may you of me expect and require all thankefulnesse of minde, all thanksgiuing in word, and all actuall testification of it by this or by any other meanes, what soeuer is or may at any time lie in mee to performe. Your title is as good as is his (who hauing with great expence purchased the feesimple of a faire and fruitefull Orchard, and enioying it in quiet possession for many yeares together, no man making any claime to it, or to any part or parcel of it, or once offering to set either foote or face into it: yea planting it with the best trees that could be had, and not suffering them to growe wilde, and to bring foorth sower fruite, but pruning and lopping them (yet almost so as it is said of Dauid, 1. King. 1. 6.) and grafting them with the best sciences that could be had (either at home or in forrein countreys) to take and taste an apple of some tree in this his own Orchard. If you should say, the which I am perswaded you did neuer thinke, that this were a deare apple, and a sory recompence for so great cost and care: Indeed I must confesse, that you might haue bought ten thousand such bookes

with

with leſſe charges, yet we ſee this to be the courſe of the world, that when as men haue moſt extreamly both charged and toyled themſelues in planting Orchards & ſetting Gardens, yet if they do but taſte of the fruite of the one, and ſmell of a flower of the other, they thinke that they haue enough for their mony, and are better apaid, then if they had had giuen thē a thouſand cart-loads of any other (though farre better) eyther fruite or flowers. For all things are not to bee eſteemed by profit, or to bee numbred by Ariſhmeticall, but rather to bee waighed by Geometricall proportion, which is the better: and truly I haue alwaies thought, and ſo it may be, that many others thinke, that you do make more account of a publicke good, (the which happely euen theſe ſmall treatiſes may procure more or leſſe) then of a great deale of your priuate profit: As I haue often heard you ſay, that you thought it meete that the firſt borne ſhould bee dedicated to the ſtudie of Diuinitie and the ſeruice of God according to the equitie of Moſes *lawe made to that effect, the which ought ſtil to remaine in ſome ſort, though it do not neceſſarely binde.*

And therefore inſtead of a better teſtimonie of a thanking, yet more thankfull minde, I am bolde to ſend vnto you, togither with a little treatiſe of repentance, *for the which you wrote in your laſt letter, another of the ſame pitch and ſtature, beeing*

ing his younger brother, to accompanie him. It is needlesse I knowe, to vse many or any wordes, in commending them to you, Nepotes suis, quam filij patribus charioresse solent: Admit them I pray you into your familie, as did olde Iacob, Ephraim and Manasses, the sonnes of Ioseph, and let your name bee named vpon them. Yea, if you please, lay your hands vpon them, in perusing them as your leisure will permit. Yet do not imitate him in crossing his hands, and in preferring the latter before the former, (for hee was by the extraordinarie spirit of prophecie, priuiledged to crosse his hands, and with all the lawe of God, yea which is more, because they are more the lawes of God, the lawes of nature, and of nations) for the former is fitter for your purpose, and will bee more profitable for you, so much as the true practise of Christianitie, set downe in some sort in that treatise of repentace, is to be preferred before naked speculation, to the which kinde I must needs confesse that this latter treatise doth more properly belong. I do heartely wish and earnestly desire of God, that as you haue been the means of existing to them, so they may returne vnto you in way of thankfulnesse, some spiritual good, the one for practise, which is the better part, and the other for knowledge, which is not to bee neglected. Neither do I doubt, but that God wil in some measure heare my prayer, with whom nothing is more

righteous

righteous and pleasing, then that every one should reape the fruites of his labours, especially of their godly indeuours which do directly tend to the good of his Church: you haue sowen the seede, and therfore may wel take the crop into your barne, you haue both planted and grafted the tree, and why then should another plucke away the fruite? It would (perhappes) haue been more profitable, if according to the common course of the world, I had by this dutie worshipped the sunne, not occidentem (for who regards the sun any longer then they see the light and feele the heate of it) but Orientem, whose benefits are not in the past but in the future tense. And yet as it hath pleased God hitherto to make you the onely meanes (in a maner) of profit vnto me (I speake of priuate benefactours) euen from my cradle and first infancie to this present houre, yea so that you doo not yet faile or faint, (as you might well haue done since you began, without any blame) but that your last & late benefits & bountie do exceed the former: so if I were so minded as to vse maister vtile for my Pilot, and the director of my ship and course, I know no cause why I might not hope to haue as good a Chapman of you, as of another. So then, both honestum and vtile haue giuen their voyces to this choice, to the which if necessitie could be brought to giue his assent, then it were done vnanimi consensu, without any gainsaying: and

surely

ſurely in my minde he is not hard to be intreated. Pompey *ſurnamed the great, for his great conqueſts and triumphs, (although hee might more truly be ſo called for the greatneſſe of his minde and vertues) being ſent by the Senate into one of their Prouinces, would needs take ſhippe and ſea in a great tempeſt, ſaying: It is needfull that I ſhould go, becauſe it is needfull that I ſhould diſcharge my dutie, but not that I ſhould liue: and ſo wee are to account it more needfull to auoyde the foule crime of ingratitude, then to haue eyther our writings, or perſons ſafely protected. I may not though I would, trouble you any further: it remaineth onely that I deſire God to returne ſeuenfold into your boſome, as I doubt not but that hee will doo, eyther in this or in a better life) all that good which you haue done vnto me: and ſo leauing you in the moſt ſure protection of God, in whom I am perſwaded that you truſt, I take my leaue till further occaſion bee offered, eyther of writing or of comming vnto you. The Lord bee with you.* London *this* 7. *of February.* 99.

A TREATISE OF THE NATVRE OF GOD.

CHAP. I.

That there is a God.

Sect. 1.

Gent. WELL ouertaken Syr.

Schol. You are welcome Gentleman.

Gent. No great Gentleman sir, but one that wisheth well to all that meane well: I pray you, how farre doo you trauell this way?

Schol. As farre as *Yorke*.

Gent. I should be glad, if I might haue your company thither.

Sch. And I, if my company might stand you in any steed: but howsoeuer it be, you may command it: and by vouchsafing me the benefit of your company, make mee much beholden to you.

Gent. Not so sir: but without question, the company of men of your profession, is both pleasant and profitable, & much to be desired for the attaining of knowledge & wisdome.

Sc. I pray you sir, whō do you take me to be?

Gent. Surely, it should seeme by your apparell, that you are a Scholer, or some Minister.

Sch. Indeed, if you call a learner a Scholler, I do confesse my selfe to be of that profession: but if (as I suppose) you meane by a Scholler, not a learner, but a teacher, or Doctor, one able to instruct, and direct others, you take your markes amisse: for (as we say in the Schooles) *Cucullus non facit monachum.*

Gent. I meane by a Scholler, not one that learnes his A B C, or his Accidens, but a Student, one that hath bene brought vp in learning in some Vniuersitie: able with a little labour, and in a short time, to do much good to vs that are ignorant. In this sence I am perswaded, that you are, and may be both called and accounted a Scholler.

Sch. It

Sch. It pleaseth you sir, of your gentlenesse, to thinke and speake of me, farre better then I do deserue: but if it were, as you do weene, and with, yet I know no cause, but that I both may and ought, looke for profit and encrease of knowledge, as well at your hands as you at mine. *Gen.* Why that cānot be: you giue your selues continually to reading, and all other meanes of attaining knowledge: whereas we follow other matters, and spend our dayes about worldly profits or pleasures, as our callings, places and degrees do require.

Sch. The more is the pittie if it be so: you (for the most part) haue leisure inough to seek knowledge: yea you are of abilitie to prouide for your selues, all things belonging vnto studie, the which Schollers do often wāt, to their great grief and hinderāce. And surely (in my mind) it were far more commendable and honorable, for men of wealth, place, & accoūt, to pursue and hunt after knowledge and wisedome, by the which they might benefit much their countrey, both Church, and Commonwealth, then to spend their time and goods, in vaine and vnprofitable pleasures.

Gen. You say true sir, in the opinion of the wisest: but for this time, we will rather take it as we find it, thē dispute how it ought to be: if you looke for any great learning at my hands,

you are deceiued, and will in the ende be disappoynted. Yet I pray you, let vs passe the time and way in some good conference, and giue me leaue to aske your opinion and help in some poynts of diuinitie, whereof I either am altogither ignorant, or else doo greatly doubt, and would gladly be resolued. It wold without question bee a great ease, and make that wee should neither feele the wearisomenesse of our tedious trauell, nor yet complain or crie out of the length of these *Northumberland* myles: yea I do not doubt, but it wil be profitable to vs both: for I shall be instructed, and you by calling to remembrance your former reading, shall imprint it more deeply into your minde, and haue it more readie against an other time.

Sch. Indeed conference is alwaies good, and especially in trauell: yea, and for the matter of our conference, you haue chosen the better part, in that you had rather bestow the time in some poynts of diuinitie, whereby we may be edified in religion, and in the knowledge of God, then spend it in other matters, which are either vaine & needlesse, or at the least, not comparable vnto it, either in vse or excellencie. Yet I must needs tell you plainly, that you are too careful of your owne ease, in

in that you would laye the whole burthen of answering all questions, and resolving all doubts vpon my shoulders, and shift it wholly from your self. You know that it is the custome, and as it were a lawe among trauellers, not to put any one continually to the trouble of seeking and leading the way, but to do it by course. And therefore I may not agree to this motion which you haue made, vnlesse it please you to accept these two conditions: first, that you giue me the like libertie, in propounding to you those doubts which trouble me, and be content to shewe mee the like fauour, in helping mee out of the brits wherein I shall stick. Secondly, that in hard and intricate questions, that answere bee accepted for the time which may bee had: for it is a plain case, that any one mā may moue moe questions in an houre, then all the learned men in the world can answere and resolue, all the daies of their liues.

Gent. Your conditions are very reasonable, Sealthogh my answering of your doubts will be, as the prouerbe is, *Sus minervam*, (in the which respect, and not in any partiall fauour of my self, as you do charge me, I referred the matter wholly to your disposition) yet for so much as you giue others beside Schol-

lers, leaue to haue knowledge, I will doo my best to satisfie your desire, and rather shewe my ignorance and follie, then seeme iniurious and vnthankfull.

Sch. You may speake your pleasure: but by all liklihood you are a Scholler, according to your owne acception, howsoeuer it pleaseth you to make your selfe for the time, one in my sence: and it may be you are so by your calling and kinde of life, howsoeuer your outward state seemeth better then vsually Schollers attaine vnto: yea, I am perswaded, by this great desire to increase in knowledge, which appeareth in you, that you haue already attained to a great measure of it, and know what belongs vnto it, as wee see that vsually the richest are most couetous.

Sect. 2.

Sect. 2.

Gent. WEll, well: let vs leaue these things, and come to the purpose: yet for all this haste, one thing I must needs desire of you, and it is this. That you would not bee offended, nor yet thinke scorne to answere and resolue me, euē in those questions, which are most certaine, manifest, and without all question, as if I should desire to bee resolued of this poynt; that there is a God, that made and ruleth, and gouerneth all things. Not that I doubt of this, or of any other maine poynt of Christian religion, but that I may knowe and hold that more firmly, which I doo alreadie both beleeue, and also know in part.

Sch. Wee cannot, if wee speake properly, call this a poynt of Christian religion, for all the heathenish religions that euer were, or that are at this day in the world, agree in this, as in the foundation and ground whereon they rest, that there is a God, for otherwise there could be no religion. Yet you say verie true, that our knowledge both in this, and in all other poynts concerning God, is imperfect: and therefore we may lawfully, yea we must

necessarily labour for an increase of it, and for that *Pleerophoria*, that is, a ful knowledge and certaine perswasion, mentioned in Scripture. Yea, if you please, we will beginne with this poynt, for that (if it must needs be handled, as it is seldome, it being seldome called into question) it ought to haue the first place assigned vnto it.

Gem. Indeede it is straunge, that this blockish Atheist the should bee in any that hath a reasonable soule: yet hee that doth consider the liues of many, led without any knowledge, feare, loue, hate, or any regard whatsoeuer had vnto God, may see that verified, which is spoken Psal. 14. 1. *The fool hath said in his heart there is no God.* yea I haue heard of such as would openly professe themselues to be of that iudgement, and as farre as they might without danger, defend it by argument against any whosoeuer. The which shamelesse impietie, although I doo from my heart detest, and shall (I trust) while I liue, yet (to tell you plainly) there haue often such doubts risen and runne in my minde, as I should bee ashamed, and therefore would be loth to vtter.

Sch. Nay, it is a shame to conceale & cherish, not to declare and abandon them: but

what

what I pray you, hath at any time made you doubt of God?

Gent. Surely, to deale plainly with you, me thought there was no order of gouernement, but rather extreame confusion in the world, that things came to passe not by any prouidence or power of God, but partly by the force and efficacie of naturall causes, working according to the ordinarie and set course of nature, and partly by the inclinations, deuises, consultations and purposes of men, proceeding from the free motion of their owne minds and wills: that foolish and superstitious people did ascribe many things, as warres, dearth, famine, plague, sickenesse, pouertie, and many other casualties, to some extraordinarie worke of God, which the wise did plainly see to come by the ordinarie connexion and consequence of naturall causes: that as touching those serue who did wholly depend and relye themselues vpon God, and did daily and hourely call vppon him for such things as they stood in needeof, it happened to them no better: yea, for the most part, farre worse then to the wicked: that for all their faith and prayers, they must either be

take themselues to the ordinarie course of the world, or else vtterly perish and miscarrie: that many who most outragiously blaspheme, yea openly both denie & defie God, (as wee read of a certaine Pope, who said that hee would haue and eate of a meate that hee fancied, in despite of God, and so he did) prosper and fare as well, yea much better, then they that serue him most deuoutly: that there were not to be seene in the world, any arguments of Gods power and presence, nor any thing which might make a wise man wonder: whereas in all reason, it should seeme more possible to hide the sunne, being aboue our horizon, so that it should not either by heate, beames, light, or anie other meanes, shewe it selfe to bee present, then that God should be in the world, and yet no way apparant.

As for the Scripture out of the which we vse so plainly to teach, proue, and demonstrate the being of God, as out of his onely euidences, that there was no certaintie could bee had of anie thing contained in it: that euerie Kingdome, Countrie, and Citie, yea almost euerie priuate man, did gather out of it a diuers and different forme of religion and seruing GOD: that

that many things in it might bee prooued to be false and fabulous, as of the flames of Purgatorie, the fire of Hell, and the light of heauen, prepared and appoynted for the soules of men departing from their bodies, according as they had liued in this world, either well or else wickedly: that all these doctrines, and infinit others of the same kinde, were but counterfeit, and both deuised and vsed to keepe people in some awe and order: yea (which seemed woorst of all) that the Scripture was contradicted not onely by others, but also by it selfe in many poynts and places, whereas in truth, there is not any discord or harsh iarring, but a most sweete and full consort and harmonie. So that for these reasons and diuers other, that I will not trouble you with, me thought I might say of God, as *Eliat* saith of *Baal*, that in all likelihood hee was either a sleepe, or in bat tell, or about some waightie affaires, or (as he thought and ment indeed) no where existing, yet these doubts were but as flying cloudes in my minde, which the glorie, maiestie, and truth of God, shining both in his word and worke, as clearely as the sunne doth at noone day, did soone dissolue, yet not so, that you should thinke it lost labour to speake somewhat to that effect.

Sch. I may for fashions sake, but I am perswaded, that it is in a manner needlesse, and that you are not now to learne, how that God, having reuealed himselfe sufficiently by diuers euident meanes, doth now in a manner hide and absent himselfe from the world, yea euen from his church and chosen people, and that vpon good ground, in respect both of the elect, and of the reprobate. First for the elect, we know that in the first ages of the world, God did reueale himselfe vnto them by many meanes, which now he hath laid aside, as first in sensible apparitions, visions, voyces, and dreames, yea sometimes in as plaine and familiar manner, as men vse to talke and conuerse with their friends, face to face, without any colours, shewes or vizards. Secondly, God did vsually bestow vpon his seruants many temporall blessings, and powre forth vpon the wicked, grieuous plagues and punishments. This was done in respect of the infancie and weake estate of the Church and the godly, who being as yet inducted but with a small measure of knowledge and faith, (the time beeing not come, wherein the mistery of eternall saluation in Christ, was to be vnfolded) would soone haue fallen into distrust and forgetfulnesse of God, if that he had beene straunge with them: and

therfore it pleased him in mercie to visit them often in this sencible maner of bodily apperitions, and of temporall blessings, that so he might (as it were) keep his acquaintance with the, the which otherwise wold soon, by reason of that small measure of spirituall graces which they had, haue beene forgotten and come to nought. But now in this time of the Gospell, wherein spirituall graces are plentifully giuen, and eternall glorie so certainely promised to the faithfull, yea euen poynted at with the finger, as being hard at hand, and almost in sight, should God still dandle them in in his lap with temporall blessings, as with lakings to toy and playe with? and still appeare in visible maner, as if the Gospell could not be, either for doubtfulnesse beleeued, or for obscuritie vnderstood? We see that when as children are growne vp to any stature and strength, they are not onely ashamed, once to thinke of sucking the dug againe, but also are by painfull toyle & labor continually exercised, for the increase both of strength in their bodies, and of patience in their minds, howsoeuer it bee greeuous vnto them, and make them doubt of the loue of their parents, by whom they are tied to so vnwelcome a taske.

In

In like manner is pleased God to deale with his children, not only in withdrawing frō the these temporall toies, (yet not leauing them comfortlesse, who haue both plentie of spirituall graces in present fruition & the instant hope of eternall glorie, wherewith to solace themselues) but also in exercising their faith, hope, patience, and loue, by continuall trials and temptations, crosses and afflictions, as if he had clean forgotten thē, and cast them off for euer. Whereas indeed he doth it onely for the triall and commendation of their faith, which by this meanes is found to be firme and sound, euen as gold is tried by the fire. For if whensoeuer wee are pinched with any griefe, miserie, or want, God were straightway at our elbowes, with comfort and with such things as wee desire, either for necessitie or pleasure, what great matter were it to depend vppon him, and to loue him. The most blockish sot in the world, would trust that which he seeth with his eies: and there is no brute beast in the world of so sauage a nature, but would beare good affection to him, that did daily ply him with good and pleasant things, one in the necke of another, neither is it possible for a man to hope for that which hee alreadie hath.

But

But when as by faith and hope, we take such hold of God and the promises of eternall life, that no temptations can make vs let our hold go: when as in the most bitter afflictions we feele the sweet taste and relish of the loue of God, when as we doo stedfastly beholde that which is far out of sight, then is our faith found to be not baggage drosse, but pure and precious gold, fit for the seruice of the king of heauen. Thus Christ speaketh vnto *Thomas*, Ioh. 20. 29. *Thou hast seene, felt, and therevpon doest beleeue, that I am risen from the dead, but blessed are they that do not see, or feele, and yet beleeue:* that is, their faith is more strong and excellent, and therefore their saluation and blessednesse more certaine. Likewise in respect of the wicked, it is needfull, that God should by deferring those plagues, that their blasphemies and other outragious sinnes do deserue, suffer thē to go on in hardning their hearts, and in filling vp the measure of their sinne. For if they saw a God present in the world in temporall plagues, giuing to euery sinne the deserued punishment, as hee did in olde times, & so standing ouer them with the whip and sword of vengeance, they would then haue some conscience of sinne, and by feare, be restrained from that outrage where-

vnto

voto now they rush headlong: yea, the nearer that the vniuersall iudgement wherin euerie one shall receiue according to his workes, is at hand, the more doth God surcease from temporall rewards and punishments, purposing by eternall retribution, to pay euery one home and to the full. And therefore we cannot impute the confusion and abundance of sin which ouerfloweth the world, to the want of gouernment in God, but to his iust iudgement, who suffereth the wicked to run on in their seuerall courses of wickednesse, to their finall destruction: yet not so, but that he doth plainly shew his power and prouidence in restraining these floods of wickednesse; that they shall not so ouerflow the earth, but that alwaies there is a place left to serue and praise him in, euen as we see, that he keepeth by violence the sea within the appoynted limits, which by nature should and if it were not restrained, very quickly would couer the face of the whole earth. As for the multitude of false religions, and the great diuersitie of opinions among those that professe the trueth, what is that to the purpose? The pathway of trueth is one and the same, by-waies are infinit: the ignorance, errors, and heresies of men, cannot preiudice the substance & foun-

dation

dation of it) safe and sound in the Church. Lastly, for the contradictions and vntrueths wherewith the holy Scripture is charged, if the spirit of God had vsed in penning the Scripture, weake men, who might erre in some circumstance of the storie, or some matter of no moment, as he doth daily vse the ministrie of men, who no doubt, togither with the trueth of religion, haue errors and ignorance: should that make the doctrine and substance of religion it selfe, to bee suspected or reiected? But we know that there is nothing false in the Scripture if be right ly vnderstood: and that all the parts of it haue a most perfect agreement & consonancie with the other, the Lawe with the Gospell, the ceremonies of *Moses*, with the substance in Christ: the Prophets with the Apostles, and each one with other. But I maruell why you ioyne the fire of Purgatorie, whereat now the whole world doth laugh, as at a most ridiculous toy; with hell and heaven, whereby in Scripture is ment the miserie of the wicked, and the happinesse of the godly in the life to come: both which wee cannot doubt, but that God that hath spoken it, will accomplish and make manifest vnto vs.

Sect. 4.

Gen. I Was alwaies (I thanke God) of that minde, & yet you haue resolued me of diuers poynts whereof before I doubted. Now that you haue taken away these doubtes and scruples, and weeded out these bitter rootes of vnbeleefe, which make many depart away from the liuing God, it is meete that you should sowe some new seeds of faith in the minde, by setting downe some manifest proofes, demonstrations, and euidences of God, by the which he may be certainly knowne, yea in a manner seene and felt.

Sch. That is no hard matter to doo, for so much as there is nothing in the world, which doth not affoord vs an euident testimonie of God, who euen in the least things, much more in those which are by nature excellent, is most wonderfull and most apparant. But to auoyde confusion as wel in my speech, as in your memorie, we wil reduce the infinit testimonies of God to these fiue heads: the first are the creatures: the second is the light of nature: the third is the word of God: the fourth is his spirit: and the last are his miracles or extraordinarie workes. All these togither, will be vnto

vnto vs a cloude of witnesses, euen an infinite number compassing vs round about, and so by their huge multitude in a manner darkening the sunne, or rather so inlightning our mindes, that there cannot any darke cloudes of doubting or distrust remaine. First then to beginne with the creatures in the which God did first manifest himselfe, who can either denie or doubt, but that the heauens declare the glorie of God, & the firmament sheweth his handie worke: and that if God made not them, yet they made their maker whosoeuer he were, to be most iustly and woorthily called and accounted God, in that they most plainly witnesse his surpassing power, wisedome, and maiestie.

If the creatures themselues, as namely the sunne, moone, and starres (yea many earthly creatures, which in respect of these are base and contemptible, yet haue been taken and worshipped for gods) are in themselues so glorious, that they haue extorted from many nations, the names, titles, and worshippe of God, it cannot be but that they should euen lead vs by the hand, to acknowledge the glorie and Godhead of him, who was their deuiser and maker, and doth still continue their preseruer.

Nowe if wee descend into this lower

worlde, wherein wee dwell, and there beginne with our selues, called by the Philosophers not without cause, litle worlds, we shall finde both without in our bodies, in the most cunning and curious forme and frame of them, and within in our mindes and soules, in their manifold faculties and effects, so plain and preghant arguments of so great wisedome and power, that wee shall cease to maruell, how *Alexander* the great, and *Nabuchadnezar* the proude, came to that passe, to suppose themselues to be not men but Gods, and shall beginne to maruell why all the men in the world are not of their opinion, vntill we bethinke our selues, that men see plainely both in themselues and in others, that they did not make themselues, but were made by an other. Yet may not man boast or brag, that this prerogatiue of bringing in euidence for the deitie of his maker, is peculiar to himself: he must be faine to admit into the participation of this praise, all the other creatures in the world: not onely those which excel himselfe in greatnes, strength, swiftnes, sharpnes of sence, and in many other respects, but euen the basest & filthiest worme that scrawleth vpon the ground: yea (which may make him lay downe his peacocke taile, and bee quite out of conceit with himselfe) hee must in this

respect

respect giue place euen to senceleſſe things, as to hearbs, trees, and ſtones: the vertues and operations whereof (hidden in the cauſes) to the ſharpeſt wittes of the moſt ſubtile Philoſophers, yet manifeſt in the effects, to the blunteſt ſences of the moſt ſimple idiots: if they bee as duly conſidered as they are daily ſeene, will in a manner turne men into ſtones: ſo amazing them, that they will bee conſtrained to renounce all naturall reaſons, and to acknowledge that it is the finger of GOD.

And ſo for concluſion of this poynt, not onely they that go downe into the deepe ſecrets of naturall Philoſophie, but euen ſuch alſo as do onely ſwimme, and ſhoote aloft in the ſuperficiall conſideration of the frame of the whole world, and of the particular creatures therein contained, doo manifeſtly beholde, and muſt of neceſsitie acknowledge the wonderfull power and wiſedome of God.

And no marueil, when as the very heathen who are purblinde, if not ſtoneblinde in reſpect of God, haue in this deare Chriſtall glaſſe of the creatures eaſily deſcried, and plainely diſcerned the portraiture and image of God. Againſt whoſe teſtimonie, which now in the ſe-

cond place is to bee produced) although there might exception be take, in respect of the particulars, for that in matters of religion, heathen men are of no credit or account, both deceiuing others, and beeing deceiued themselues, by following lies and illusions, yet in respect of the vniuersalitie of it, it hath some waight, and may well bee admitted.

I am sure you haue often heard and read, that *Vox populi* (much more then *Vox murmuris*) *est vox Dei*: many may bee deceiued, but that is taken for truth, wherein all generally do agree: for such things are not deuised by this or that man, but ingrauen in the minde of man by nature herselfe, and therefore are to bee accounted true and certaine, especially by Atheists, who make Nature their God.

Yea besides the ordinarie meanes of the light of nature, by the which all men naturally and generally attaine the vndoubted perswasion of this trueth, it hath pleased God in all ages and places to maintaine it, and put it out of all doubt by extraordinarie workes, of the which all prophane stories afoord plentifull examples.

But wee haue a clearer light to direct vs in this, and in all other ca-

ſes of controuerſie, then is the diuine light of nature, to wit, the word of God contained in the bookes of holy ſcripture, ſo full of diuine wiſedome, that wee cannot once imagine it to haue beene hatched by the braine of man, angell, or other creature whatſoeuer.

To let all other argumentes paſſe, which the ſcripture doth affoord vs for this purpoſe, let vs but conſider in it how God hath deale with his Church from time to time, alwaies preſeruing it in ſome one corner or other, yet neuer ſuffering it to bee generally receiued throughout the world, yet bringing it into euery part of it at one time or other, euen as he ſuffereth his ſunne to ſhine vpon all the parts of the earth, not at once, but ſucceſsiuely and by peece-meale, one part beeing inlightned after another: howe God hath trained vppe his Church from one eſtate to another, from the firſt infancie to the childhood, and ſo on forward to mans eſtate, inſtructing it in his will, and as it were inſtilling his precepts into it by little and little, and line after line: as the capacitie of it would admit, (not regarding the time of their ignorance:) firſt by temporall bleſſings, then by eternall promiſes: firſt by ſencible apparitions,

then by inward assurance, more certaine then
ſonne: firſt by ceremonies, then by the ſub-
ſtance of his worſhip: firſt by tipes, then by
the trueth: firſt by the ſhadow, then by the
bodie it ſelfe: firſt by prophecies, then by ac-
complishments: and laſtly, firſt by the image
and counterfeit, and then by the very perſo-
nall preſence of Christ himſelfe, bringing vn-
to vs in his Goſpel, the ſubſtance of that
yea and amen, euen all in all, and all at once.
For who knoweth not, that in the doctrine of
the Goſpell, we haue vnfolded vnto vs ſuch
endleſſe treaſures of diuine wiſedome, that
(euen by the iudgement of thoſe who are not
affected with any loue towards it, and there-
fore cannot be ſuſpected of partialitie) all the
religions of the heathen are in comparison of
it moſt childiſh, ridiculous, and trifling toies.

4 The fourth meanes by the which God is re-
uealed and made knowne to man, is proper
to the faithfull, to wit, the inward and ſecret
operation of his ſpirit, renewing their minds
and hearts to know and loue the trueth.
This light farre paſſeth all the other, for that
it not onely ſhineth in the eyes, as the other
do, but alſo openeth them, that they may
ſee and beholde the trueth, which thing, the
other are not able to effect.

For

For although wee cannot imagine any more plaine and euident proofes of the deede, then the three aforesaid meanes: namely the creation and preseruation of the world, the generall assent and voice of all the Nations vnder heauen in all ages, especially of the Iewes, who doo generally abhorre this opinion of Atheisme: and lastly, the doctrine of the Gospell, wherein the whole will and counsell of God is fully and finally reuealed, by some or all whereof, many are brought to acknowledge God, and to haue although not a full sight, yet a glimmering of him: yet notwithstanding all these meanes, wee see that many remaine in the palpable blindnesse of Atheisme, neither knowing in minde, nor acknowledging by word, any other God, then the ordinarie and set course of nature, because as yet their eyes are fast shut and sealed vp: so that they cannot see the light, although it be most cleare. But the spirit of God is that oynument, *Iohn.* 2. 20. which openeth our eyes, and maketh vs cleare sighted: so that now it fareth with vs, as with that man, *Iohn.* 9. 1. that hauing beene borne blinde (had no doubt) often heard men speak of the Sunne, and the light thereof, and did beleeue it to bee so, yet not without some doubting, & not at all knowing what to make

of it, or whereunto to resemble it. But assoone as his eyes being opened, he did plainly beholde the Sunne, with the light and beames thereof he did no more doubt of the Sunne, then he did of himselfe, and of his owne being: so men before they bee enlightned by Gods spirit, they see little or nothing of the glory of God, which after regeneration, is as cleare vnto them as the Sunne at mid day, euen as we read, 2. *Kin.* 6. 17. that *Eliseus* his seruant could not see the huge armie of horsmen and chariots, which was hard at hand, till such time, as God, at the prayer of the Prophet opened his eyes. The fift and last means, by the which God is made knowne, are his extraordinary and miraculous works, by the which he hath reuealed himself, not onely to some fewe of his seruants, who haue bin the instruments by whom they haue bin wrought, but also in the eyes of the world, beholding them. And without question, when these are added to the former, they bring with them, to the true beleeuers, euen a huge heape of faith, and assurance, howsoeuer to carnall vnbeleeuers, they are often vaine and of no effect. For if vnto that knowledge of God which we haue by the creatures and the light of nature, by his word and spirit, God should adde such immediate reuelations, familiar

conferences,

conferences, visible apparitions, & sencible visions, such signes & wonders as he wroght in olde times in and by his seruants, we could not but by these meanes bee much more vndoubtedly perswaded of the power, presence, and prouidence of God, then now we are, howsoeuer the wicked did still continue in their vnbeleefe, yea though one should rise from the dead and preach vnto them. To speake any more of this matter to you, were no otherwise then if I should light a candle to shew you who are found and cleare sighted, the sunne shining heere before vs: You see that the creatures and light of nature to the heathen, the scripture and word of God to the Church, the sanctifying and illuminating spirit of God to the faithfull, the gifts of prophecie, reuelation, and other miraculous actions (the which are not now needfull in the Church, as they were before the comming of Christ, and in the first publishing of the Gospell) to all that either haue tho themselues, or behold them in others, are infallible demonstrations of the Godhead, & such against the which no exceptiō can be made: yet notwithanding al this, it is a wonder (but that it is so cōmon) to cōsider how Atheisme doth daily preuaile among men, yea far more then it did amongst either the superstitious papists, or the idolatrous heathen, of whom

there

there were very fewe, which had not their religion and Gods in great reuerence, and most high estimation, whereas now a dayes, fewe do make any account of religion or of the worship of God, but as of a formall and ordinarie matter of course, which for order and fashions sake, is to be performed. And accordingly, it pleaseth God to deale with them in his iust iudgement, for the hardening of their hearts, that for so much as they haue so wilfully reiected so many meanes of knowledge, he doth wholely abstain from any further reuealing of himselfe by any extraordinary meanes, but suffereth euery one to go on and to prosper in their owne deuises and wicked wayes, that so their impunitie may confirme them in their ignorance and contempt of God: the which is more to be wondred at, and to be lamented, many of them that haue had some knowledge and sence of religion reuealed vnto them, and haue made conscience of it in their liues, yet seeing no great matters or effects to come of it, but the ordinary course & fashion of the world, they faint in faith by little and little, till at length they become if not open, yet secret contemners of God & all religion. And so is fulfilled the prophecie of Christ, *Math.* 24. 12. 24. That in the last ages of the world, iniquitie shall

shall so abound, that it shall coole the lukewarme loue of many, in so much, that if it were possible, the very elect should fall away from the faith, and be deceiued: but I doubt not but that you are farre from that fearefull estate. *Gen.* That which you haue said, as touching the existence of God, doth fully satisfie me, and may content any reasonable man: yet because I do sometimes meete with men that are euen rooted and confirmed in Atheisme, and will not sticke to denie that there is a God, I pray you furnish mee with some fewe arguments, wherwith to conuince and to confound them.

Sch. Indeed there are many, which are to be accounted Atheists, for that they denie the doctrine of Gods prouidence, and the truth of his word and promises, made to his Church of eternall glory (the proofe and declaration whereof must bee referred to theyr proper places) wherein we did both agree: but sure I thinke, you meete with fewe or none, that are either so brutish in mind, or so shameles in face, as to denie that there is a God, neither to my remembrance haue I euer either heard or read of any such. The Epicurean Philosophers among the heathen, were counted Atheists, as they might well be, for they exempted God from the care of humane

mane things, and from the the gouernment of the world, but they neither denied nor doubted but that there was a God. And so I thinke of our epicures and Atheists in these dayes, that howsoeuer they might as well denie God to exist, as to contemne and reiect his word, threatnings, and promises, as meere fables, and to be altogither voyd of any care or regard of him, yet if they were examined, I thinke they would confesse, that they think there is a God, tho they haue neither knowledge nor care of him. *Gen.* You may in fauor & gentlenes make the best of their Atheisme, tho to say the truth, the best be bad inogh) but I can assure you of my owne experience, that there are such, that denie not onely the prouidence, but euen the very nature and existence of God, *&c.* They are not mē, but beasts in the likenesse of men, altogither vnworthy of any fauour, neither (if I met with any such) should I either beare or shewe them any, but rather extream, & yet not sufficient hatred: for howsoeuer I vse to be (I know not how) too easie and indifferent in iudging and condemning those that hold euen grosse heresies, as thinking, that either there may be some truth and grace with great errors, or at the least that they may be reclaimed from them: yet when I think of such monsters as you speake of, I feele my heart to rise against them so, that I could

could more willingly teare them in peeces with my teeth, then teach thē with my toong. Yea to tell you plainly, I think that such hauing liued in the Church, and in the light of the Gospell and word of God, are not to bee disputed with, or perswaded by reasons, but rather as men giuen vp to a reprobate sence, and branded with the most fearefull marke of the wrath and vengeance of God, to bee left to his iust iudgement. For if an Hereticke be to be auoided and left after a fewe admonitions, as being wilfull and obstinate, what then should be done to these, that haue reiected a thousand admonitions giuen them, not onely by the testimonie of the whole world in all ages, but also by the creatures, word, and extraordinary workes of God. And therefore I pray you, let vs not trouble our selues any further with thē, but rather go on to som matter, the consideration whereof may be profitable vnto vs: for as you know, *Contra principia negantē, non est disputandū. Gent.* I confesse that they are in a most fearful case, & deserue to be abhorred both of god & mā, yet whē as I am by some necessarie occasion in company with thē, and heare thē protest thēselues to be, not wilfull in gainsaying, but willing to learn the truth, I wish they might be reclaimed, or at ꝑ least, that their mouths were so stopped, that they did no harm to others: & therfore I pray you shew me, how I should deale with them.

Sch. It is impossible to shewe or proove the existence of God, by any other arguments then haue bin brought, for that God hath reuealed himselfe by those onely, and by no other meanes: to wit, by his word and spirit to his Church, and by his workes to the world. Now the first kind of these arguments is to be vsed against the temptations and doubtes arising in the mindes of beleeuing Christians, but not against the horrible blasphemies of these shameleſſe Atheists, and therefore you must insist in the workes of God, the which being sensible, cannot be denied by them. By these you may shew the existence of God, both by the ordinary workes of the creation and preseruation of the world (the which in truth, are most miraculous) as also by the miraculous and extraordinary workes and iudgemēts of God. For the first, you must aske him if he see not in the creatures, to wit, in their greatneſſe and number, proportion and beawtie, force and efficacie, certaine signes and arguments, of some great wit, cunning, wisedome, goodneſſe and power: would he confeſſe this thinke you?

Gent. Surely if hee denied it, I would leaue him as being not a man endued with reason, but a brute beast, or rather a senceleſſe stocke.

Sch. Well

Sch. Well then, if these things appeare in the creatures, they must be confessed to be in some subiect or person, and that either in the creatures themselues, or in some other: but that is all one, for whatsoeuer thing is endued with so great wisdome and power as is necessarely required to the making and preseruing of the world, that without question, is to bee magnified and worshipped as God, and to be accounted God. This demonstration of the Godhead is plaine, as plaine need be, to any that will consider it, and yet the extraordinary works of God do more affect men, although in themselues they be nothing so miraculous: euen as we see, that men do more gaze on and admire a stately house, which they neuer saw before, and think that there is more cunning workemanship and brauery in it, then in the frame of the whole world, which is continually in their eyes. And therfore, you must lay before the eyes of your Atheists, the strange & miraculous things, which haue bin done in all ages of the world (more or lesse) contrary to the course of nature: and if hee reiect all stories, both diuine and prophane, yet God doth neuer leaue himselfe without some of of these extraordinary witnesses. Not that he doth now send his Angels visibly to good men with blessings, for they beleeuing his word,

need no extraordinarie proofes, but for that he ſuffereth Satan to ſhew himſelf to the wicked and vnbeleeuers, not only in ſtrange illuſions, but alſo by fearful plagues & puniſhments, the which I warrant you hee will confeſſe to come, not by the ordinarie courſe of his goddeſſe nature, but from ſome ſupernaturall power, whereof we haue of late had euident examples, to the aſtoniſhment of all men. And if your Atheiſt wil not beleeue his owne eyes, beholding the ſtrange iudgemēts of God in others, but will rather giue his owne ſences the lye, then acknowledge the truth of the Godhead, let him but by ſome iniurious deed, or cōtumelious word, prouoke ſome witch of *Endor*, that hath the temporary power ouer ſome ſpirit, vpon condition, that he ſhall haue eternall power ouer her, and it is like inough (he being voyd of all faith and ſence of God, & ſo out of his protection) that he ſhall feele to his coſt, and confeſſe to his ſhame, that there is a power ouer and beſide the ordinary courſe of nature. *Gem.* Indeed theſe Atheiſts that denie God, do alſo denie that there is eyther diuel or Angel, & I think will confeſſe them all aſſoone as any one.

Sch. And they that will not bee taught by God, muſt, will they, nill they, learne of the diuel, who in my mind, is the fitteſt ſchoolemaiſter for ſuch ſchollers.

CHAP.

CHAP. 2.
What God is, or of the essence of God.

Sect. 1.

Gent. ou haue so fully resolued me, and setled my minde in this poynt, that I trust neuer hereafter to bee troubled with the obiections which Atheists make against the diuine essence: especially, if that I might by any meanes, haue the nature of God declared and described as it is indeed. For this is the cause, why men are so easily brought to doubt of the being and existence of God, because they cannot conceiue or comprehend the manner or forme of his essence, nor haue any true notion of it setled and fixed in their mindes: whereby it commeth to passe, that the imagination of mã, casting god in a thousãd moules, & turning him into as many diuerse formes, as *Proteus* is fained to haue, neuer resting conteted with any, as neuer finding any garment that will sit close on his backe, or any forme agreeing

to the infinitneſſe & ſubtilitie of his eſſence, reiecteth all, and withall, euen the diuine nature it ſelfe: ſuppoſing it not at all to exiſt, which they cannot ſuppoſe how it doth exiſt. And therefore, if I may entreate you to take the like paines in ſhewing the manner and forme of Gods eſſence, which you haue done in prouing the truth and certaintie of his exiſtence, you ſhall make me much beholden and indebted to you.

Sch. Indeed it is impoſsible, as for you to keepe that, which you neuer had, ſo for me, either to declare that to you in words, which I my ſelfe did neuer conceiue in minde, or to comprehend that within the compaſſe of my narrow and ſhallow braine, which is in nature infinit and incomprehenſible: for ſo we are to thinke of God, that his nature and eſſence being euery way infinit, cannot poſsibly be comprehended by any finite creature: no not by the heauenly Angels themſelues, whoſe nature being ſubtile and ſpiritual, doth eaſily pierce into the depth of knowledge: how much leſſe then by men, who in compariſon of Angels, are but dolts and dul-pates, groueling here on earth in the mudde and myre of error and groſſe ignorance: vnable by any art or induſtrie, to finde out the true nature, forme and vertue

of

of the meaneſt creatures, no not of the leaſt Flie or Gnat, how much leſſe then of the mightie *Iehoua*, whoſe ſeate is in the heauen, and whoſe footeſtoole is the earth. But what need I alledge the impoſſibilitie of comprehending fully in our finit mindes and memories, the infinit eſſence of God, it beeing impoſsible for vs, to commence or begin this action, by receiuing into our imaginations or fancies, any true conceit of him. Things ſubiect to ſenſe, are conceited in the minde, by a reſemblance or ſimilitude of them, which the ſenſe doth draw from the things themſelues. But as for things not ſubiect to ſenſe (of the which nature, all men confeſſe God to be) how ſhall they conuey and ſend to the imagination, their picture and reſemblance? ſurely they cannot doo it themſelues, but muſt ſubſtitute in their roomes, that ſenſible thing, which is likeſt vnto them, to repreſent their perſon, as if a man that is far abſent, ſhould will the Painter to draw his picture and counterfait, by beholding the viſage of his ſonne or brother, being not much vnlike vnto him. But what creature ſhall ſit in Gods chayre of eſtate, and repreſent his perſon to our imaginations and mindes?

Whereunto ſhall wee compare or liken

Whereunto shall we compare or liken God? or how can we not thinke it to be vnlawfull, and flatly forbidden by the law of God, to resemble him vo any thing, eyther in, or within heauen? or to frame any Image or similitude of him, eyther by outward action in deed, or by inward imagination in our mindes? Thus God perswadeth the people of *Israel* from making any Image, wherein to worship him; because they had not seene him in any forme, and therefore could not tell after what fashion the Image should bee made: *Deut.* 4. 12.

Besides, it may be doubted, whether it be lawfull or not, to attempt the searching and finding out of the nature and essence of God, which wee haue not in the scriptures reuealed vnto vs. We know that God in reuealing himselfe to men, hath reserued some things secret to himselfe, the which it is his glory to conceale, *Prou.* 25. 2. and therefore his dishonour to haue them knowne. *Deuer.* 29. 29. Let the hidden things be with the Lord our GOD, and the reuealed things to vs, and to our children for euer. But what can bee hidden or secret in GOD, if his very forme and essence bee reuealed?

And therefore we ought to bee rather sober

sober and modest, then hotte and hastie in pursuing the knowledge of the diuine essence.

It is sufficient for vs, that we may enter into the Temple and Church of God, and there behold his mercie and goodnesse, yea his power and iustice toward the wicked: what need we be so presumptuous, as with the mē of *Bethsemes*, to look into the arke of the Lord, 1. *Sam.* 6. 19. or to enter into the holy of holiest? or how dare we set eyther foot or face into that place, which the Lord hath inclosed with glory, and made seuerall for his owne abode, and there to behold, or rather to outface the Maiestie of God, sitting in his Cherubin chaire of estate, the which the Angels themselues neither can nor yet dare behold, and therefore with their wings couer their faces, least that they seeing it, should be confounded, as ouerwhelmed with the greatnesse of his glory? And therfore for this matter, I must desire you to hold me excused, if I do not take vpon me to declare vnto you the essence of God, the knowledge whereof I am sure it is impossible to attaine, and I doubt whether it be lawfull to attempt. *Gent.* You put me into a straunge maze and quandary, in that you would make me beleeue, that I had

had committed some hainous offence in desi-
ring to comprehend the infinit, and know the
secret essence of God. But by your patience
a litle: is it now become a fault to seeke the
knowledge of God, in the knowledge and
contemplation of whom not only the scrip-
ture and (as I haue heard) all diuines with one
assent, but euen *Plato* an heathē Philosopher,
although somewhat smelling of the truth of
religion, do make our whole happinesse to cō-
sist? the infinitnesse of the nature of God
doth hinder the full comprehension, but not
the true knowledge of it selfe to be in the
minde of man: the sight of the eye, no not
the whole eye, is able to containe the body of
the Sun, and yet by it, we do plainly beholde,
and truly know the Sun, Moone, & Starres,
yea the whole heauen. What though it be not
lawfull, eyther to make any Image, or to ima-
gine any similitude of God: yet we may con-
sider of the nature of God, by cōparing it to
the nature of the creature, though there bee
neuer so great inequalitie betwixt them.
Yea the infinitenesse of Gods nature, is
most plainly seene, when it is compared
to a finite and meane creature, as wee
knowe that the chearefull lightsomnesse,
and fairenesse of white, is best perceiued,
when

when a darke and sad blacke is laid by it; that the hugeneſſe of an Eliphant is moſt admired, when wee thinke of the ſmalneſſe of a flie: and a crooked building is beſt knowne by the ſtraight line. The whole bodie and compaſſe of the ſun and moone may bee beholde in a little diſhfull of water, and why not God in his creatures, eſpecially in thoſe which he hath made according to his owne image, and that as I am perſwaded, for this very end and purpoſe? But although the nature of god might be by ſome meanes in ſome meaſure conceiued and knowne, yet you doubt of the lawfulneſſe of the attempt: but your doubting is without cauſe, or rather as I am perſwaded, without trueth, and in ſhewe onely. The propitiatorie is now remooued, and the Arke vncouered, ſo that we may be bolde to looke into it: the vaile of the Temple is rent a ſunder, yea quite broken downe, and therefore wee need not any longer ſtand aloofe, but may with confidence enter into the holy place, & approach vnto the throne of grace. It is not with God as it is with mortall and ſinfull men, who of ſet purpoſe, and in good policie doo (in many caſes) withdraw themſelues from the ſight and view of others, leaſt that by bewraying their infirmities, they ſhuld bring their perſons into con-

tempt: but God is not ashamed of himselfe, neither afraid of beeing knowne, seene and censured. Men, the further they are off from vs, the greater they seeme, and the lesse they are known, the more they are esteemed: the more familiarly that they are acquainted, the more likely to bee contemned: but it is not so with God, who the more he is known, the more he is admired, the nearer he approcheth to vs, the more he amazeth & astonieth with his surpasing glorie and maiestie: so that he may not vnfitly be compared to the cloude, which the Prophet *Elias*, or rather God himselfe raised out of the sea, 1. *King.* 18. 14. which a farre off seemed no bigger then the palme of a mans hand, but when it came neare, it couered the whole face of heauen. I confesse indeed, that the essence of God cannot be fully comprehended by any creature, and that if God should shine vppon vs with the bright beames of his glorie, wee could not but bee confounded, as we see our eyes to be dazeled, and out sight dimmed by gazing on the bright shining sunne. For this, the word of God is plaine, *Exod.* 33. 20. where God saith to *Moses*, My face, that is, my full glorie and maiestie, no man can see and liue, but as for my hinder partes, that is, some part or shadow of my glorie, that I will

shewe

shew vnto thee. Yet this doth not proue, that this great and greedie, yea insatiable desire, which this holy man of God had, of seeing and knowing still more and more of God, yea after that God had many waies reuealed himselfe more fully to *Moses*, then euer hee had done, or did since to any man liuing, should bee condemned as rash and presumptuous, which rather is to be commended and imitated of vs, by hauing a most earnest care and desire to know so much of Gods essence as may bee knowne, yea much more, and euen the whole nature of God, if so it stood with his good pleasure. For this is the onely happinesse which we aspire vnto, & hope for in the life to come, that whereas now we see God but darkely in part, and as it were his image in a glasse, then we shall see him face to face, 1. *Cor.* 13. that is, in farre more ample manner then now wee doo, although not so fully and amply as hee is indeede, vnto the which absolute perfection of the knowledge of Gods essence, I doo easily graunt you, that neither the Saints nor the Angels in heauen can possibly attaine. And therefore, seeing that my request is no other, then both I may wel and lawfully make, and you easily performe, I pray you doo not shift mee off with this excuse, which I am perswaded you made, thinking as it is indeed,

that you Schollers can by your logick and schoole-tricks, perswade vs simple people to think what you list, & make vs beleeue that, as the prouerb is, The moon is made of green cheese: but rather at my request take in hand the explication of this poynt, which of all other is most needfull to be knowne, and most woorthie to bee sought out with all care and diligence, as beeing that whereunto all our knowledge, yea our whole life is to be referred.

Seb. I am glad sir, that I haue by this meanes ferreted you out of this deepe dissimulation, wherein you haue hitherto so closely lurked: although indeed I did thinke so much, whē I first heard you speake, & did suspect you to be the man, who now I finde you to be. I am perswaded, that you who are so cunning in craning, could if you list bee as bountifull in giuing: but seeing the bargaine is made, it is now no going backe: neither will I looke backe vnto the speech which you haue made of the lawfulnesse of attempting, and the possibilitie of attaining the knowledge of Gods nature in some sort: It was true, and therefore cannot be confuted, yet was full and sufficient, and therefore need not bee enlarged. You doo well to confesse that the infinit essence of god cannot be fully comprehended,

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no not by the Angels in heauen, & yet that it may in some sort be knowne euen by men here on earth. For euen as when a trauellor desirous to see straunge countries and fashions, arriueth in some coast towne of any forraine kingdome, hee may euen there gather some coniectures, and get some knowledge of the condition, state and power of that Prince: but when he commeth to the chiefe and mother-citie of the land, where the kings Court is kept, and where there is greatest concourse of people, abundance of wealth, and store of all things, seruing either for the necessitie and vse of warre, or the pleasure of peace, then he saith thus vnto himselfe: Surely now I see and knowe the very state and power of this Prince, as well as I doo that man, whose face I doo fully and stedfastly behold: and yet all this while, he neither is, nor can bee admitted to see the very person of the Prince. Euen so it fareth with vs in respect of God: for here on earth, as it were in *Dan* or *Berſheba*, or some other border-town of the land of Promise, the happie kingdome of *Chanaan*, wee haue a glimmering of the king. But when wee come to the heauenly *Ieruſalem*, the Cittie of the great king, there we see a thousand times more then we did before, and yet all that we see, is but the riches,

power,

power, and glorie of the king: as for his person and verie essence, that is kept secret, and shut vp in his priuie chamber, or closet, into the which none may or can enter, for none but god knoweth God, 1. *Tim.* 6. 16. the king of kings, who onely hath immortalitie and dwelleth in light, that none can haue accesse vnto, whom neuer man saw, neither can see: yet although the nature of god be vnsearchable, & as a bottomlesse gulfe, into the middest whereof whosoeuer plungeth himselfe, in hope of sounding the depth of it, wil without question be soon swallowed vp by it, and confounded in al his imaginations, yea though hee were indued with the wit of all the men and Angels in the world: yet I confesse, that as you say, we may safely wade and swimme in the shallowe brinke of this great *Ocean*, hauing the one hand on the shore or banke, as a sure anchor to hold vs fast, that wee bee not carried too farre into it, by the violent blastes of presumption and curiositie: and the other in the water, wherewith to mooue our minds vp and down, in a sober and modest contemplation of it.

Sect. 2.

Sect. 2.

LEt vs therefore let looſe into this deepe and bottomleſſe ſea of the nature of God, not in any fond hope of attaining the perfect knowledge of it, yet truſting in God, that we ſhall not looſe our labour, and fiſh all night without catching any thing, (as on the other ſide, it were madneſſe to thinke of catching al the fiſh in the ſea) but rather returne to land with our veſſels not emptie, although not ſo full lade, that they be readie to ſinke, by reaſon of the heauineſſe of their burthen. The knowledge (therefore) of the the natures of things, is attained two wajes, to wit, by ſenſe, and by imagination: ſenſe apprehendeth the qualities of things ſenſible, by the which the minde is led to the nature and ſubſtance of the thing. But as for thoſe things which are not ſenſible, wee muſt ſuppoſe & imagine thē to be thus & thus, and ſo coine in our minds, a forme and phantaſtical idea of them, reſembling them to ſomething, which wee haue ſometime apprehended by ſence, and eſpecially to that which is likeſt, and commeth neareſt vnto them.

So that

Sch. That to the ſearching out, and the knowing of the nature of any inſencible thing, theſe three things belong & muſt concurre. Firſt, the obſeruation of the effects or actions proceeding from it, the which being ſenſible, will giue vs ſome light to know the nature of the thing it ſelfe, from the which they did proceed, as we ſee the nature of the father to appeare in the ſonne, of the roote in the fruite, and of the fountaine in the ſtreams iſſuing from it. Secondly, when as by this and whatſoeuer other meanes we haue, wee haue gotten ſome knowledge of the nature of it, and to what kinde of things it is to bee referred, we muſt then as it were, comming nearer to the purpoſe, and bringing foorth into act the conceit of the minde, reſemble it to that thing, the which of all other things in the world commeth neareſt, and is likeſt vnto it. Yet wee haue not attained to that which we deſire, for we haue not the thing it ſelfe, but onely a patterne or example, a likeneſſe or reſemblance of it: and therefore in the third and laſt place, we muſt adde to this example or patterne, that which is wanting, ſquaring it in all reſpects to the idea and conceit which we firſt had of the nature of the thing. For example, a man hearing much ſpeech of the Angels, wold gladly know, what

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and of what nature and essence they are: to the effecting whereof, he is desirous to see, heare or feele one of them, hoping by this meanes to know what they are, as he vseth to bee by his sences taught the nature of other things. But in the triall he findeth, there can no good bee done by this meanes, the Angels being spirituall and insensible creatures, and that therefore hee must go some other way to worke, and search out their nature, by the eyes not of his bodie, but of his mind, and gesse at their natures, by that which he hath heard and read of their effects, functions and actions. As touching the which, hee findeth in scripture that they are Gods seruants, continually attending his pleasure, and praising him, and readily performing whatsoeuer hee commaundeth. Whereupon hee inferreth, surely the Angels liue, for they mooue: and they are not brute beastes, but reasonable creatures: yea, not simple ideots, but of great vnderstanding and wisedome, without the which they could neuer dispatch those affairs aright, about the which God imployeth them: and further, that they are not weaklings, but of great strength, for otherwise one of them could not haue destroyed in one night, an hundreth fourescore and fiue thousand of the Assyrians, as we read 2. *Kin.* 19. 35.

and lastly, that they are not base or contemptible, but most glorious creatures, fit to stand and serue in the presence of God. Thus he conceiuing and imagining them, to bee most mightie, wise, and glorious creatures, to what thing in the world can hee resemble them more fitly, then to the most excellent men in the world, endued with the greatest measure of power, glory, authoritie, knowledge and wisdome?

Now we are come as neare them as wee can in any one thing, for there is nothing more like to an Angell, then is an excellent man, whereof it commeth, that the name of an Angel, is often giuen to men: yet we haue not attained our purpose, for there is yet great difference and oddes betwixt them, therefore to make them euen, wee must take from this excellent man, this grosse body of clay and earth, and giue vnto him a pure and spirituall body, voyd of all mixture of elements and moysture, the which debaseth and keepeth him downe beneathe the Angels, who being not clogged and pressed downe with such heauie lumpes of clay, nor hauing their cleare vnderstandings dimmed with foggie mystes of moysture, excell him farre in nimblenesse, quickenesse of wit,

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and in all other respects. But what need we suppose this Angelicall man, whom we haue truly existing? for we know that in heauen the bodies of the Saints shall bee pure and spirituall, free from all heauie lumpishnesse: yet the faithfull being glorified, shall not become Angels, but still be men, for neither in subtilitie of body, nor yet in excellencie of inward gifts, shall they bee made equall to the Angels.

Thus we haue with much ado, make the humane and the Angelical nature meet together, and vsed the one as a Glasse, to represent and make knowne the other vnto vs.

Now then to apply all this to our purpose, for the finding out of Gods nature, wee must doo these three things: first, we must get an idea, or conceit of it into our mindes, by searching what manner of thing God is, and so to what kinde his nature doth belong, and is to bee referred: in the second place, we must get a patterne, example, or resemblance of it in some thing really existing: and lastly, we must by adding and detracting, make them euen or equall. For the first, seeing that the nature of God cannot bee knowne, eyther by any essentiall causes of

by sensible qualities, we must imagine it by the effects, actions and workes, whether they be ordinarie, or extraordinarie. *Rom.* 1. 20. The inuisible things of God, that is, his eternall power and Godhead, are seene by the creation of the world, beeing considered in his works. For so it hath pleased God (to the end he might make himselfe knowne to man, and man happie by knowing him) after a sort to take vnto this his inuisible and insensible nature, this visible and sensible shape, and to couer himselfe with the creatures, as with a garment, that so he might discouer and reueale his hidden nature to man, as we know, that both he himselfe, as also his Angels, haue shewed themselues to men, by putting on the nature and shape of man. Not that we imagine, as some haue done, that God is the soule or life of the world, and the world the body of God: for God is not in the creatures, either as their matter, or as their forme, but onely is to them the efficient: but because the creatures make Gods inuisible nature to be knowne, therfore we call them, the shape or forme of God. For by this meanes it is brought to passe, that although God *Iehoua*, as he existeth in himselfe, and as he did exist before the creation, be inuisible, yet God the Creator of heauen and earth, is as visible, as

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are the Starres by night, or the Sunne at mid-day in the heauen, and as palpable, as is the grosse earth whereon we tread: as it is, Act. 17.27. God hath made the world, that in it men might seeke him, yea grope after him and feele him. Thus both the creatures, and also the extraordinary workes of God, done both within and also without the Church, and recorded both in holy Scripture, as also in other true Records and Histories, teach vs what God is: yea thus they preach to the whole world, as touching God their maker & Author, that he is a liuing and working, yea a mightie and wise nature, excellent, yea infinit in all goodnesse: to wit, in knowledge and wisdome, in truth and iustice, in loue and mercie, in power and strength, in glorie and maiestie. Thus hauing conceiued in our mindes an idea or imagination of Gods nature, we are in the next place, to bring it forth into the world, by getting an example or resemblance of it, in some thing not vnlike vnto it. But against this patterne or resemblance it will bee obiected (the which you touched before) that both it is impossible to finde any thing in the world, that is like to God, or fit to be a resemblance, and also, that if there could any such thing be found, yet it were Idolatrie, to resemble God to any creature.

Whereunto we answere, first to the former part of the obiection, that although the vnlikenesse to God, be farre greater in the creatures, then the likenesse, yet that there is no creature, which is not more or lesse in one respect or other, like vnto him: for whatsoeuer is good, commendable, or excellent in any creatnre (as all the creatures are good, yea euery one of them endued with a proper and peculiar goodnesse) that commeth from God, who is the fountaine of all goodnesse, and maketh the creature to bee like to God. So then if the meaneſt and baſeſt creatures haue some likenesse to God, without doubt the excellent creatures cannot but haue a great likenesse and resemblance vnto him: the which wee knowe, that GOD himselfe in the Scripture doth graunt vnto them, calling man his owne similitude. God made man in the likenesse of GOD. *Genes.* 5. 1. Yea, although there were no manner of likenesse or resemblance betwixt GOD and the creatures, but rather all contrarietie and flat repugnancie, yet they might profitably bee vsed for the illustration of his nature, as wee knowe that all contraries doo argue and illustrate each other. The which way of teaching, although it bee not the readiest to attaine

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the truth: for that doctrine and knowledge, are positiue not priuatiue, consisting not in the negation of that which is not, or is not true, but in the affirmation of that, which doth truly and really exist, yet it is alwaies an helpe, and sometimes the onely meanes.

To the other parte of the obiection, wee answere, confessing that it were flat Idolatry, and vtterly vnlawfull, to make or suppose God to be simply like or equall to any creature, for that were to pul him downe from his Throne of maiestie, and to place him among the creatures: yet affirming it to be very lawfull, to resemble him to any creature, the difference which is betwixt them, being obserued and mentioned. Thus *Act.* 17. 29. the Apostle *Paul* resembleth the diuine natute to the humane, prooving against the Idolatrous Athenians, that God is not like to those stocks and stones, wherin the heathen did worship him, because hee is like vnto man, who is of a cōtrary nature to sencelesse things. We men (saith he) being the kind of God, it cannot be, that God being like vnto vs, that he should be like to siluer, gold, or to any sencelesse thing: where tho he make these two natures of God & man like to each other, yet he maketh them not equall, but putteth

the difference, in that hee maketh man to come and flowe from God, as a little arme or creeke of the sea, from the great Ocean. Yea thus God hath throughout the whole Scripture reuealed himselfe vnto vs in the forme and shape of a man, ascribing to himselfe the parts of his body, as his eyes and eares, his hands and feete, yea all the faculties, affections and passions of his minde and will, and that both seuerally, sometimes one and sometimes an other, and also altogither, assuming to himselfe, the whole shape and forme of a man, as namely, *Ezech.* 1.26. vpon the similitude of the Throne, there was as it were a similitude of a man vpon it: whereof is said, Vers. 26. This was the appearance of the similitude of the glory of the Lord: and when I saw it, I fell vpon my face: so *Dan.* 7.9. I beheld till the thrones were set, and the ancient of dayes did sit, whose garment was white as snowe, and the hayre of his head like the pure wooll. Likewise, *Esa.* 6.1. the Prophet saith: I sawe the Lord sitting vppon a high throne. By the which sitting vpon a Throne, although signifying royall glorie and maiestie, God doth not exalte or aduance, but rather debase himselfe, and that for our sakes, that we by this meanes might get some conceit and knowledge of him into our

minds:

minded: yet if we should continue and rest in these formes, without adding the difference vnto them, wee should not helpe, but hurt and hinder our selues, and get not the knowledge, but the ignorance of God.

Sect. 3.

NOw let vs go on, and see what creature in all the world is to be accounted likest vnto God, and fittest to resemble his natvre vnto vs, as wee gathered it to bee by the consideration of his workes. The question is not hard to be answered: for this being taken for granted, that God hauing made al things, is far more excellent then any or all of them, it will follow, that that creature, which of all other, is most excellent, is the likest, and commeth neerest to the nature of God, and doth more fitly resemble him, then any of the other: as we know that among men, not any of the rascall sort, but some great Noble man or Prince of the blood, is most fit, in the absence or nonage of the king, to hold his place, and represent his person. For although euery creature bee good in his owne kind, as (wee reade in *Genes.* 1. 31.) yet looke how many diuers kindes of creatures there are, so many diuers degrees of goodnesse there are, the

highest whereof are to bee accounted excellent, as we see all the starres to be bright and glorious, yet the sunne, moone, and some other, to bee the most excellent in light & glorie, as they were in the beginning, called by God himselfe by the name of great lights.

Thus no man will denie but a common peeble stone, is better then a raw lumpe of clay, or a handfull of earth: that a tree is more glorious then a stone, that a liuing beast excelleth a tree, that a reasonable man is better the a brute beast, an Angell then a man, and an Archangell then one of lower degree: and so will any man confesse that God, whose infinit knowledge and wisedome, appeareth in the creation of the world, is not to be placed among the senceless and brutish creatures, but to be referred to the kinde of reasonable things. And so indeed throghout the whole scripture, we see that God is content to take a place among his reasonable creatures, to be accounted to be of their nature and kind, as hath beene shewed out of *Act.* 17. 26. to call them, to wit, both men and Angels, his image and similitude, and in that respect, his offspring, sonnes and children, yea to appeare and shewe himself, in the forme and shape, sometimes of the one, & sometimes of the other. But to come as neare the marke, we ayme at,

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as we can, although both the humane & the angelicall nature, be notable images, & militudes, and resemblances of God, yet as the Angels are farre more excellent then men, so they are (in themselues) farre more fit tipes and examples of the diuine nature, then men are, for that they haue many properties of the diuine nature which man wanteth. For man is mortall and corruptible, but both the Angels and God are immortall and incorruptible: hee consisteth of a medley of contrarie qualities, continually iarring and fighting togither, vntil at length one destroy another: but their nature and substance is vniforme, not wasting it selfe, or wearing away, but stedfast permanent, and the same for euer: he is visible, yea grosse and palpable, but they are inuisible, insensible, subtile, pure and spirituall: hee hath a litle strength with much weakenesse, they haue great power and might without impotencie or infirmitie: hee hath knowledge with ignorance: truth with error: wisedome, with folly: will with peruersenesse and obstinacie: affection with passion and perturbation, loue with lust: abundance with many wants, contentment with complaint: day with night: ioy with sorrow: glorie with shame and happinesse with miserie: but they are perfectly wise, vertuous, mightie, glorious and happie.

Yea,

Yea, by this excellence about man, the Angelical nature is proued (against those who will not beleeue the word of God, vnlesse their owne sences say amen) to exist as a meane betwixt man and god, although farre neater the lower, then the vpper extreame. For if there were no nature existing betwixt God and man, the distance and downfall would be greater then is meete, in respect of that dependance & cohærence, which should be betwixt the creature & the creator, closely conioined together without any such wide and abrupt gappe, in order and due proportion. The which wide gap betwixt God and man, the angelical nature doth fill vp, participating somewhat of each nature, as it were hanging and houering in the middle region betwixt heauen and earth, hauing had a beginning with man, and now being immortall with God: voyde of all mixture as is God, and yet consisting of matter & forme, as doth man: subsisting in some matter, subiect and substance as doth man, yet being incorporeal as is God: able in a moment to bee any where, as God alwaies is euery where, yet locall, and circumscribed by place as is a man: being of wonderful capacitie & knowledge, as is God, yet ignorant of some things, (as namely of the essence of God) as is man: & in

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one word, being euerie way iuſt as is man, yet perfect in al reſpects as is God. Thus we haue by the degrees of the creatures, as it were by the ſtaires and ſteppes of *Iacobs* ladder, climbed vp to heauen, and leauing men with the reſt of the earthly creatures, groueling heere in the duſt belowe, by the wings of Angels ſoared aloft to the diuine nature, or rather (to ſpeake more properly) toward it. Neither is it poſsible for vs to goe any higher, or to finde more of God in any thing, then wee haue alreadie found in the angelical nature. Wherevpon our Sauiour Chriſt doubteth not to put on Gods backe, this glorious robe of the angelical naure, hauing amongſt all the formes and ſhapes in the world, none more excellent wherewith to inueſt him, and therefore he ſaith, *Ioh* 4. 24. God is a ſpirit, as he is elſewhere in ſcripture called an Angell, and an Archangell. But this ſaying is warely to be taken, and wiſely vnderſtood, leaſt that in ſtead of true doctrine, wee gather out of it a blaſphemous hereſie. For in trueth, God is no more a ſpirit, or an angell, (the which two words, are in diuinitie to be accounted of the ſame ſignification and compaſſe) then he is a ſoule or a bodie: whas then may you ſay, is the ſignification of theſe words? Surely, they are not poſitiue, but priuatiue: they ſhew not what

what God is, but what he is not, namely, that hee is not a formall, visible, and sensible bodie. For so they containe in them, a refutation of that grosse opinion of the carnall and hypocriticall Iewes, who thought that an outward and bodily worship, voyde of the spirituall sinceritie of the heart, would well ynough fit and please God: as if a man having to deale with those heathenish idolators, that thinke brute beastes or senceleese stockes to bee Gods, should say vnto them, you are fouly deceiued in this point, for God is not a dead stocke, or a brute beast, but *rather to be resembled to* a liuing man. So then, the meaning of Christes words is this, God although in trueth hee bee not a spirit or an angell, yet because that nature commeth nearer him, and doth more resemble him then any other, therefore hee may fitly for your capacitie be so called.

Sect. 4.

Sect. 4.

YOu remember I doubt not, that it was said, that there are three things required to the searching out of Gods nature: first, a conceite of it in the minde, gathered by the effects of it: secondly a reall example or patterne, wherein that conceit doth exist, and may be seene: and thirdly, the difference betwixt the conceite & the example the one being in *abstracto*, the other in *concreto*, the one existing onely in the imagination of the minde, the other in some creature and reall subiect. The two first wee haue alreadie gotten, the one out of the creatures, which haue taught vs the nature of God in generall, the other we haue found in the angels, who are a liuely resemblance of the said diuine nature: the third remaineth, to wit, the difference betwixt the patterne and the thing it selfe. For although we haue alreadie ascended, and come to the highest steppe of *Iacobs* ladder, for that it is impossible to find any more of the diuine essence in any creature, then wee haue alreadie seene in the angelicall nature, yet wee are not at our iourneyes ende, nor yet halfe waye

for

for although there be as great difference betwixt Angels and men, as there is distance betwixt the heauen and the earth, yet there is tenne times, yea ten thousand times greater odds betwixt the Angels and God, and the space is infinitely greater from the heauen of the Angels and saints, to the heauen of heauens, where God dwelleth. And therefore we are now in the last place, to seeke out the difference, which exalteth the nature of God thus farre, or rather that infinitly aboue the Angels: this is the verie true essentiall forme of God, the which if it could bee once named, the matter were at an ende, the case cleare, & much labor might be saued, which must be spent, or rather most profitably and happily bestowed, in gessing, coniecturing, & imagining that, by many properties, attributes, actions, and effects, which by this meanes might be fully knowne all at once. But it is not the will of God, neither were it profitable for vs, that so inestimable a iewell should bee so easily gotten: who would esteeme the most precious pearles, if so be that they lay in the streetes for the vptaking? and if the nature of God were once fully known, how could it afterwardes bee so earnestly sought and desired as is meete? Yet we are not to thinke that this impossibilitie of finding

ding out the true forme of God, commeth of God, as making daintie and daungerous of the knowledge of his nature, to make vs eager & earnest in desiring to know it, although it bee true that hath beene said, that it is better to haue our appetite whetted and sharpned, by the hardnesse and impossibilitie of attaining it, then our stomackes cloyed with the full fruition of it: neither are we to think that God doth enuie and grudge vs so great a good, and so sweete a pleasure, or that in pollicie hee keepeth himselfe close, not daring to shew himselfe for feare of being censured or condemned by vs: But this commeth of the shallownesse of our braines, and the the weakenesse of out capacitie, the which making it impossible for vs to conceiue it, maketh it impossible for God to reueale it.

Gent. I was in good hope to haue heard at the next word, the very true essential forme of God declared, and indeed that had beene woorth the hearing: but now I perceiue you will reserue that for another time, or rather giue it ouer for euer: wherein you deale wisely in my minde, for what follie were it for a man to beate his braines in pursuing that, which it were more then madnesse once to hope to attaine. But I pray you, how will you

do, to make your proude Lucifer a God.

Sch. We will doo as we may fit: and if all ſhould faile, I hope that you will helpe at a dead lift, according to your promiſe: but to proceed. Seeing that the true forme of gods nature cannot be had, we muſt take in ſtead of it, ſome eſſentiall propertie flowing from the forme, the which will make thoſe things which are attributed to God, differ from the ſame things as they are in the Angels. For example, knowledge, wiſedome, might and maieſtie, haue place both in God, and alſo in the Angels, yet they are not alike in both: for in the Angels they are, although great and perfect, yet finit, but in god they are abſolute and infinit. So then, if we adde this difference of infinitneſſe to the Angelicall nature, there will come forth a diuine nature, which may not vnfitly be deſcribed an angelical nature euery way infinit: and ſo God be defined an infinit Angell, as an Angell may be ſaid to be a ſpiritual man. For as ſurpaſsing excellencie doth diſtinguiſh the Angelicall nature from the humane (for although they bee both of one kinde, to wit, reaſonable, indued with wit, knowledge, wiſedome, and will, yet they differ, in that the Angelicall nature hath all theſe in farre greater meaſure then hath the humane) in like manner infi-

nitneſſe doth diſtinguiſh the diuine nature from the angelicall, for they both being reaſonable or vnderſtanding natures, indued with wit and will, and with all things belonging there vnto, differ in this reſpect, that the one is excellent in vnderſtading, knowledge, wiſedome, will, power, puritie, and glorie, but the other is infinit in all theſe reſpects: the one hath all theſe things in an excellent meaſure, the other hath them without meaſure: the one hath much, the other hath all. And thus by gathering the nature of God out of his workes and word, by finding out a patterne of it in the Angelicall nature, and laſtly, by adding vnto this angelicall nature that wherein it commeth ſhort of God, we haue in ſome ſort made vp the diuine nature, or rather indeuoured to do that, which it is impoſsible to performe: for in this caſe, the leaſt glimſe of the truth is to be eſteemed knowledge.

Sect. 5.

Gent. I Thanke you for this paines which you haue taken, in vnfolding this deepe and darke poynt of religion, the ground of all the reſt: Indeede I confeſſe, that as hee that goeth vppe to the toppe of the higheſt mountain in the world,

may farre better see and consider the whole course and order of the starres and heauens, then hee that lieth in the low valley, hauing his sight hindered by trees, hils, cloudes, and other impediments: so he that hath his cogitations fixed on the celestiall Angels, the highest and excellentest of all creatures, may in them behold the diuine nature more clearly, then he that looketh onely vpon man, and other earthly creatures, in whom, although there bee some resemblance of God, yet the grossenesse, corruption, and mortalitie of their bodies, beeing betweene our sight and the image of God in them, doth hinder vs from the cleare and plaine beholding of it. Yet for so much as fewe can clime vp to the toppe of this high hil, for that fewe off vs that are vnlearned, are so well acquainted with the angelicall nature, as to haue any certaine idea or notion of it setled in our mindes, I doubt that his demonstration of the diuine nature by the angelicall, which indeed, and to those that are learned, is the most fit and direct that can be imagined, will to vs (who for the most part either doubt whether there bee any such thing as an Angel in the world, or if we beleeue the scripture, telling vs that there are such spiritual creatures, yet we know no further of them, then as we haue seen them painted

painted on signes with a paire of wings) will seem *obscurum per obscurius*, if not *per obscurius*; for that it will be as hard for the to suppose what an Angell is, as what God is. And therefore mee thinkes I could wish, that the diuine nature could be declared and shadowed out vnto vs, by some other nature better known & more familiar vnto vs. *Sch.* It were dangerous, as that which might be an occasion of idolatrie vnto vs, to take so great liberty in imagining the nature of God, as to resemble him to any visible thing, neither were it agreeable to the nature of God, who is inuisible: & we know, that of all bodely creatures, there is none by nature inuisible, saue onely the ayre. And surely if we must needs in respect of the vulgar capacitie, or rather dulnesse & want of vnderstanding, haue some familiar and easie example & resemblance of the diuine nature, in my mind there is no elementarie creature so fit for this purpose, as is this, which wee haue light on. For first, as no man doubteth but that this element of ayre doth truly & substantially exist, although it cannot possibly be seene, no more are we to doubt, but that God doth most certainly exist, although he cannot possibly be visibly seen. Thus doth Christ *Ioh.* 3. 8. by the inuisibilitie of the winde, teach *Nicodemus* the secrecie of the spirit of God.

The wind bloweth whither it listeth, thou hearest the sound of it, but knowest not whence it commeth, nor whither it goeth: euen so is euery one that is borne of the spirit, or so secret is the operation of Gods spirit in renouing men. And without question, it is the safer and the better course, whensoeuer we thinke of God, and therfore must of necessitie coin in our minds some idea or forme of him, to resemble him to this inuisible bodie, then to any beast or man, to the sunne, moone, starres, or any other visible creature. Againe, this element doth, (the which neither Angell, man, beast, nor any other creature can) very notably represent vnto vs the vbiquitie of God: for it is euery where, in euery open place & secret corner, in the towne, in the fields, and in the wildest deserts: in the bowels of the earth, and in the bottome of the sea: within & without vs, yea inseparably closing and compassing vs about. So that if we doo but stretch this element vp to the heauens, supposing them to be made of this matter, (as sure the matter of the̅ is not much vnlike, neither can we more probably compare it to any thing, then to a pure and firme kind of ayre) & so in imagination aboue the highest heauens (although in truth, there be there neither ayre, bodie, nor place) we shall truly & plainly conceiue of the vbiquitie of god. A point of doctrine very need-

needfull to be plainly declared & truly learned, for that most men doo greatly and in truth very grossely erre in it, by tying god to one certaine place, and shutting him vp in heauen, as it were a Bee in a Box, for that the Scripture doth often assigne vnto him that place: not meaning that he in essence is there, more then in this inferior world, but that there his glorie and maiestie do more clearly shine. From this foule error, another farre woorse doth spring, for by this meanes they exclude both God and his prouidence out of the world, & cast off all feare of offending him, whom they thinke to be far absent, & by the wals, doores, and windowes of their closets and chambers, kept from seeing or knowing their doings: whereas on the other side, if they were perswaded of his vbiquitie & presence in all places, that he doth immediately compasse them about, as doth the aire, & sitteth as closely to them, as their shirts doo to their backes; yea that he hath place euen in their minds and hearts, as certainly as they do continually drawe the ayre into their brains, and bodies, it could not bee but that they should continually stand in awe of him.

So then, (to let passe without any inlarging,) diuers other respects, in the which this Element doth not vnfitly represent

vnto vs some properties and attributes of the diuine nature, as that it is most mightie, making the verie earth to shake, and rocking it too and fro like a little childe in a cradle, that it is most subtile, pearcing into euery place, and passing through the least cracke and narrowest crannie or chinke: that it is the beginning of things, if we thinke as some Philosophers haue done, that it is the first matter whereof being thickned and compacted togither, the water and other things were made: that it is the preseruer of our life, for that without it we cánot continue any space, but do presently perish: so that we may truly say of it, as the Apostle saith of the diuine nature, *Act.* 17. 28. In it we liue, we moue, and haue our being. But to let these things passe thus briefly) if wee suppose a thousand worlds one aboue another, all of them replenished, with this primarie, pure, simple, subtile, pearching, inuisible, yea insensible, (for of it selfe, not affected or distempered by any accidentall qualitie, it is neither seene, heard, tasted, smelt, nor felt) this mightie, large, & vniuersall creature, we shall haue a pretie patterne and resemblance of the infinitnesse, vbiquitie, inuisibilitie, pure simplicitie, and pearcing subtiltie of the diuine nature: for as I haue often told you, we doo not make any com-

comparison betweene this or any other creature, and God the Creator, but onely a resemblance, which may bee, where there is no shewe of equalitie. As in this instance the ayre is to our sence and capacitie, and in respect of other creatures, subtile, simple, pearching, insensible, mightie, large, and vniuersall: but in comparison of the diuine nature, it is more grosse, confused, blunt, palpable, weake, narrowe, and wanting, then can bee said. And therefore in resembling God in word or in imagination, either to Angels, or to the ayre, wee must remember to adde the difference, for otherwise wee commit grosse and hainous idolatrie. For there is no creature in the world, which howsoeuer it be perfect in the owne nature, yet if it be vsed as a resemblance of God, will not bee found wanting in many respects. Man is indeed the image of God, yet he is too little and weake, to fill his chaire of estate, yea indeede too grosse for that purpose, how soeuer it hath pleased God sometimes to reueale himselfe to *Moses*, *Daniell*, *Esay*, *Ezechiell*, and other of his Prophets, in the likenesse of a man, for some respect and signification. The Angels are not little, weake, and grosse as man is, yet before we can make them a fit type of God; we must stretch them far beyond their owne

compasse, euen throughout the whole world. The aire is large and vniuersal, but it wanteth life, sence, and an internall beginning of motion: howsoeuer it moue as nimbly as if it had a thousand liues: annd therefore to make it a fit resemblance of God, wee must inspire it with life, or rather (if we thinke that life is not properly attributed to God) with reason and vnderstanding, the which without question doth most properly and essentially belong to God. And so we may for the weake capacitie of the vnlearned, describe God, supposing him to bee a reasonable element of aire, as before to the vnderstanding of the learned, wee made him to bee an infinit Angell. Thus to make vp and finish this patterne and picture of God, we are constrained to imitate *Apelles* that famous Painter, who going about and enterprising by the curiositie of his art and cunning, to counterfaite, yea to surpasse the perfection of naturall bewtie, would not insist in any one particular, but out of diuerse persons, made choise of that, which in each one of them seemed most excellent: taking from one the complection and colour of the eye and haire, from an other the forme and straightnesse of the nose: from the third the broadth and largenesse of the forehead, & so forth, in all the other parts of the visage, vntill at length, with much ado, he got toge-

ther

ther into one face or countenance an exquisit and absolute, idea of bewtie. In like manner we are not to thinke that any one creature is able to affoord sufficient matter, whereof to make this infinite Image, that doth fill both heauen and earth, or that the shop of any creature (how excellent so euer) hath sufficient varietie of colours, wherewith to set it forth, as the dignitie of it doth require: it is well, if that all the perfections of all the creatures in the world, brought togither into one picture, do make but a resonable resemblance of him. *Gent.* Indeed, I must needs confesse, that you haue now fitted me a penney worth, & serued me in my kinde: and as I cannot truly call my selfe either learned or altogithe vnlearned (for I went long to the Grammer schoole and I was a yeare or two at the Vniuersitie, before I went to the Innes of Court) but rather a mungrell betwixt both, so now I may chuse, of whether side and sect I wll be: and so worship, either the ayre with the common people, or with the learned your asspiring Lucifer, climbing vp to the throne of god. Yet by your patiēce, as touching your ayerie god, although I confesse that element to bee fitter then any other of these elementarie bodies, yet me thinks, ꝑ the element of the fire wold haue serued your turne better: considering that it is both far larger, as beeinghigher, as also

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also farre more subtile and simple, more piercing and forceable, then is the misty and foggyre, as all men know and confesse. Neither can you take exception against the visibilitie of it, as you make it very dangerous, and a great occasion of Idolatry, to resemble God to any visible thing: for although our fyre here below, being composed of all the other elements, bee visible and sensible, yet the element of fire as it is in the proper place and sphere, we see to be invisible.

Eph. The same reason that would not suffer you to rest contented in the similitude of the Angels, because as you say truly, their nature is greatly doubted of among the ignorant people, and in a manner vnknowne to the wisest, and therefore, it being darke and obscure in it selfe, is not fit to giue light to any other thing: so I say of your fierie element, that although the Philosophers proove by good reasons, that howsoeuer it were neuer seene, yet there is some such thing truly existing: for that otherwise there cannot bee that perfect quaternitie and correspondency of primarie qualities, which is needfull in the mixture of these inferiour bodies: yet for as much as it is not so certain, but that some who thought themselues to be Philosophers, haue doubted of it, and much more the common people,

people, who do not weigh reasons, nor admit any other euidences for the proofe of the true and lawfull tytles of assertions, saue onely their owne sences, I thought, that I should fit your humour, and fulfill your request: which was, to haue a plaine and popular demonstration of the nature of God, not so well by this vnknowne and insensible element of fire, as with that other of the aire, with the which, as with a daily companion and friend, that will not be kept out a dores, nor yet out from our hearts, we are so familiarly and so entirely acquainted.

Sect. 6.

THere I confesse, you haue answered me to the full, and giuen me as good as I brought: yet seeing I haue begun to picke a quarrell with these discourses and definitions of the diuine nature, so litle learning as I haue, I doubt not but that I could find a fault in them, that you should not wipe away so easily, as you haue done this, but I dare not be so bold with you.

Sch. I will be so far from thinking it boldnesse, that I shall thinke my selfe much beholden to you for so doing: yea it is a thing which both I may and do challenge of you,

and

and you are bound by promise to performe: for I did not take vppon mee to deliuer the whole truth of this doctrine as it were to speake vndoubted oracles, but rather in hope that by our mutuall helping one another, where eyther of vs should chaunce to go astray from the truth, to sifte out some part of the truth of this vnsearchable mistery by our familiar reasoning too and fro of matters: and therefore, I can bee well content, to bee admonished, where I go astray.

Gent. Then to tell you plainly, me thinkes that although these definitions which you bring, may haue in them some substance of trueth, and also some plausible shewe of popular facilitie, which I wil not denie, yet they haue no Art in the world in them, and for that cause are not onely not curious, but euen confused and obscure, and want that euidencie, which you seemed in framing them wholly to affect.

I haue heard and read many discourses of this matter, yet neuer knew I any take such a course, as to define one thing by another, and to inmble vp into one definition, things of diuers natures, as you do in defining god, to bee an infinit Angell, or a reasonable aire: for thus you make a mōster of him, as it were

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an Hermaphrodite, halfe of one nature, and halfe of another, halfe reasonable, and halfe vnreasonable. You deale with me as men do with naturall fooles, when they cannot make them conceiue that three and foure make seuen, but by a mathematicall demonstration, setting seuen leauen horse loaues one vppon another: so you heap vp diuers particulars in stead of one generall. It had beene a better course, if according to the olde and ordinarie manner of handling and defining, in the first place you had sought out the generall kinde or nature: (which you in the Schooles call the *Genus* in definition) to the which the diuine nature doth belōg, & is to be referred, & thē to haue addedeither the proper form, or (if that could not be found, as I think that in this case it cannot) som formal proopertie, pointing as it were with the finger at the vnknowne forme. As in this example, you haue found out of Act. 17. 29. the *Genus* or kind of God, to wit, that hee is of the same kinde and nature that man is, in respect not of his bodie, but of his soule: and indeede so hee is. God is of a reasonable nature, for hee hath knowledge, wisedome, and will, the which cannot haue place but in a reasonable nature.

Now

Now this is but the genus of the definitiõ, for both men and Angels are reasonable natures, and therefore you must adde the difference, which distinguisheth God from all other reasonable natures: but how can you make this infinitnesse to containe in it, all the attributes of Gods nature I see not as yet: and so you define God infinit reason, or the infinit reasonble nature. But I pray you proceed in declaring it, and pardon my boldnesse in telling you my foolish opinion thus plainely.

Sch. It is not so easie for a man to doo right himselfe, as it is to finde fault with an other, as it may bee you will confesse anon, when we chaunge places, and you become the speaker, and I the censurer. I know that definitions should consist of one generall notion, not of diuers particular instances, yea I could haue done thus much my selfe, for it is nothing: but vpon your motion and request I tooke that other course, which if it be rude and voyd of art, blame your selfe, who were the procurer of it: yea I did meane to bring at length, the proper and true definition, void of all metaphoricall similitudes, as namely, that God is as you say, infinit reason, or rather an infinit vnderstanding, the which is the fittest definition of him, that I can now think of. Yet surely for my owne part, I doo not so much

much trust my owne wit in conceiuing aright of the nature of God, but that I should bee glad in learning it, to haue the helpe of a type or particular example to direct me. But in one thing, you do me manifest wrong, in that you say, that I make a monster of the diuine nature, compounding it of the Angelical, humane, and elementarie natures. I dare warrant you, that the difference which was brought, to wit, infinitenesse, being put to the definitions, or to the aforesaid natures, will so purge them, that there shall not be one dramme of the drosse of any created nature left in them. Yea, try it when you will, and you shall finde it to bee the right Philosophers stone, which turneth all mettalles into golde, and that one dramme of it being put, not onely to an Angell, or to a whole element, but euen to the least flye in the world, or the least mote in the Sunne, is of force to make it true and very god.

For first it maketh it to bee the primary and authenticall nature, or (if this word import generatiō to the eare of a curious grammatist) the first essence deriued from none other, for then it was contained in that other, and then it was finite, for the thing containing, is the limit and bounds of that which is contained.

Secondly, this infinitneſſe maketh it to be but one, becauſe there cannot be two infinits: for wher there are two, there is diuiſion of ỹ one frō the other: & where there is diuiſion, there is the end of the one, and the beginning of an other, and ſo no infinit. Thirdly, infinitnes maketh the ſubiect to be immateriall, and incorporeall, for no matter or bodie can be infinit, for a bodie is of neceſsitie contained and circumſcribed by a place, but if it be contained, then it is not infinit: whereof it followeth, that the infinit thing being without matter, is alſo without paſsion, for *ſola materia patitur*: and ſo it becommeth alſo immutable, for there can be no change without paſsion. Fourthly, infinitneſſe maketh a thing to bee immooueable, for whatſoeuer mooueth, hath *terminos, a quo & ad quem*, that is, it mooueth hither and thither, but in *infinito non ſunt termini*. And laſtly, the infinite thing is ſimple, voyde of all manner of compoſition: for in compoſition there is diuiſion and qualitie, and ſo by conſequent, there are limits. And thus we are to thinke of the diuine nature, that although it be of the kind of reaſonable natures as ſome creatures are, yet in that it onely is infinit, it is ſufficiently diſtinguiſhed from them all: and is made firſt primarie or authenticall, without cauſe or beginning, but exiſting abſolutely in himſelfe,

and of himselfe. Yea as he is himselfe without cause, or beginning, so hee is to all the other things, the cause and beginning: hee is the roote and fountaine, from the which all natures and beings, do spring and proceed: comming from him, yet not diminishing him, having all their essence, but no part of his essence from him. For this also is a proper effect of the infinite, to be the originall of all things, the which if they came from any finite thing, they should at length draw it drie, and so the nature or beeing of all the things in the world should perish, or beeing preserued by mutuall transmutation, yet they want an omnipotent agent to begin them. For (by the confession of all men) the first creation of the world, requireth a power not limited, but infinit, for that it is impossible to any finite power, to create: that is, to make something of nothing: & if the power be infinit, the subiect wherein it is, must be of the same nature. Again, God is one and but one, because he is God, to wit, that infinit nature, which is sufficient of it self, to occupie, & fill ten thousand worlds: neither can abide to be iustled by a pewfellow, but must sit and raigne alone: this point of doctrine the whole world, euen the Iewes and Turkes do hold, abhorring all sound or shew of any pluralitie of Gods.

Again, God is immateriall and incorporeall, not existing as we do in earthly and corruptible bodies, or as the Angels doo in some more pure, solide and firme subiects, which may in some sense bee called bodies, or in the most subtile and pure matter that can be imagined, but as a pure actuall and substantiall forme, subsisting of it selfe. And therefore we are (interpreting euery doubtfull thing, in the best sense) to thinke that *Tertullian* giuing a body not onely to the Angels, but euen to God himselfe, ment him to be not a phantasticall imagination, or an accidentall qualitie of some other thing, but a true, real, substantiall, and essentiall nature, subsisting as truly and really as doth a body which we see and feele. Otherwise, by giuing God a body, we take from him his infinitnesse, & so his diuine nature, making him local, mutable and mooueable. The which are in no case to bee admitted: for God is not contained in any place, but containeth in himselfe all places, bodies and natures whatsoeuer, 1. *King.* 8. 27. How shall God dwell in this house, when as the heauen of heauens cannot containe and comprehend him? Neither is he subiect to mutation, passion or alteration, as he should of necessitie bee, if hee were materiall, but is the same this day, and yesterday,

yesterday, now and for euer.

Lastly, we are not to admit motion in the diuine nature, for that in motion, there is a possibilitie of good, or some degree of perfection, which is not yet in act, nor attained vnto, and so there would be imperfection in God: but the diuine nature is not in any moouing possibilitie tending to any other state, but is euer in complete act and in absolute perfection, and resteth and remaineth in it selfe without motion, far more firme, and stedfast, then is any Rocke in the sea, or the earth or whatsoeuer can be imagined most immooueable: mooving all things, yet hee himselfe resting, for all things tend to him, but he to nothing. Lastly, the diuine nature is most simple and vniforme, all alike throughout all: voyde of all mixture, composition, combination, diuision or dissimilitude.

It is not compounded of matter and forme, for it is a forme needing no matter, wherewith to be vpheld, or wherein to exist, but vpholdeth it selfe, and subsisteth in it selfe: In it there is not cause and effect, for it is an efficient without an effect, and of that which is no effect, euen of it selfe: It is a *totum*, a whole without parts, for it is euery where

the ſame, and like it ſelf, or rather it ſelfe, and therefore cannot bee diuerſely diuided, or diſtinguiſhed into parts: and if our finite cogitations muſt needs make him haue parts, & conceiue him by peecemeale and parts, becauſe wee cannot take the whole, then muſt wee needes make euery part to bee the whole: and laſtly, it is a ſubſtance without accidents, for nothing can either accidere or accedere to that which already is all and infinit, neither doth it, as other ſubſtances do, extenuate it ſelfe into accidentall qualities, but whatſoeuer it ſendeth foorth from it ſelfe (or rather to it ſelfe, for from it ſelfe it cannot go) that is it ſelfe, not any way extenuated, but remaining in the ſame plight, which it had before.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Of the faculties of mans soule attributed to God.

Sect. 1.

Gent. HItherto you had my cõpany, and I was glad of yours, but since you entered into the handling of this infinitnes, which you make the difference of the diuine nature, distinguishing it from other reasonable natures, you haue flowen so cleane out of my sight, that I haue no hope of ourtaking you. For if you thus exempt Gods nature from all logicall relation of substance and accident, of subiect & adiunct, of essence and attributes, by the which distinction, it is (as you know) vsually declared and laid opē, you will take away all meanes, eyther of teaching, or of learning and conceiuing it.

Sch. You mistake my meaning, which was not to exempt God from all logicall relation, and the groundes and rules of reason, without the which, I confesse, that

neither the diuine, nor any other nature, can bee either declared or learned, or in truth exiſt in it ſelfe. For reaſon and logicke, which is the act and operation of reaſon, ſtretch themſelues ouer all things that exiſt, howſoeuer they exiſt whether finitely or infinitely, although (in vs) it cannot fully comprehend, that which is infinite, yea and a little further too, euen to thoſe things, which doo not exiſt. As for the diuine nature, it is as hath bene ſaid, an eſſentiall and infinite reaſon, or vnderſtanding, euen the fonndation and fountaine of all reaſon: and therefore, wee cannot thinke that it ſhould aboliſh or deſtroy reaſon, for ſo it ſhould deſtroy it ſelf: but rather are to acknowledge that it doth eſtabliſh it, and agree vnto it. Indeede the grounds and principles of naturall Philoſophie, as they haue bene laid downe by heathen Philoſophers (who hauing little or no knowledge of God, had the more leiſure to looke into naturall things) doo fight with the grounnnds of duinitie, and by not admitting any actuall infinite, do deſtroy the nature of god, as in other points we know, that the beſt Philoſopher that euer was, was but a ſory diuine, yet we may not in any wiſe thinke, that reaſon and diuinitie doo iarre or croſſe each one the other, the which indeede are both

both one in effect: and therefore neither I, nor any other (vnlesse he be voyde both of naturall & also of artificial logick) can doubt or denie that God hath substance, essence, nature, forme, yea his proper attributes and effects: and the distinction of essence and attributes, which all Diuines make in handling the nature of god, is good & true. They deny indeed, that there are any accidents in God, and say that whatsoeuer is in God, is the essence of God, but then they meane by accidents, separable and mutable qualities, and by essence, essentiall and inseparable properties.

So there are no accidents in God, as in a man or an Angell are knowledge, wisedome, puritie, holinesse, strength, and happinesse, which are no part of their nature or essence, not yet essentiall properties, for they may be remoued and separated from their subiects, as we know that many both men and angels are ignorant, foolish, wicked, vile, weak and miserable: but nothing that is in god, or doth belong vnto him, can be augmented, diminished, or any way altered, for as hee is once at any time, so is he alwaies at all times. Yet it cinot be denied, but that god hath his essentiall properties or attributes, and that they are and may be truly and really distinguished

from his substance, essence, or forme, and some things (I confesse) are attributed to God, in respect of our weakneſſe, which are not proper, but rather contrarie vnto the nature of God, as namely, the parts and sences of mans bodie, as hands, eyes, feete, going, seeing, and likewise the passions and perturbations of men, as anger, furie, hatred, reuenge, repenting, forgetfulneſſe, and diuers other: all which are as farre discrepant from the nature of god, as darkneſſe is from light: and therefore they are to bee vnderstood as improper, and metaphoricall speeches, borrowed from our nature, to represent & make knowne vnto vs, the diuers actions of God. Againe, God is the Creator, Preseruer and Redeemer of the world: these attributes and many others of the same kind, are truly giuen to him, yet they are not to bee accounted his essential attributes, because they are not coeternall with God: therefore not inseparable, although creation import omnipotencie, and so an essentiall attribute. Besides, there are diuers other things attributed to God, but the true and essentiall attributes of God, are those which arise and spring from his essence and forme, as naturally, necessarely, directly, continually, and immediately as the beames, light and heate issue from the sun,

yea

yea as do the ſtreams from a fountain, & the twigges and branches, from the roote and bodie of the tree: as namely, vbiquitie, eternitie, vnitie, ſimplicitie, & omnipotẽcie, theſe are ỹ eſſential attributes of god, ariſing neceſſarely from his eſſentiall forme: to wit, from an infinit vnderſtanding and reaſon, (the which we are conſtrained to make the ſubſtitute and vicegerent of the eſſentiall forme of God) the which muſt of neceſsitie (as hath been ſaid and ſhewed) bee eternall, illocall, one, ſimple and omnipotent, yea omniſcient and infinit in many other reſpects: yet theſe attributes are not the eſſence and forme of God, for they are diuers one from each other, as vbiquitie is not vnitie, nor vnitie eternitie, but the eſſence of God is not diuers.

Gent. The difference which you make betwixt the eſſence and eſſentiall properties of God, as I take it, is this: that the eſſence is as it were the foundation, fountaine, ſubſtance, head, beginning, and roote, and the attributes, the top, ſtreames, exiſtence, inferior members, end, fruite and in briefe, they come from the eſſence of God: is not this your meaning? *Sch.* You ſay true, and I thanke you for explaining it more fully then I could haue done: but what of that?

Gent. Then

Gem. Then I pray you let me aske you this question, why may you not make some or all of the attributes, the essence and forme of God, as well as the infinit vnderstanding of God, or at the least, why doo you not make the vnderstanding of God one of his attributes, as I am sure that vsually Diuines doo, who put the knowledge and wisedome of God in the forefront of his attributes? I might trouble you with other obiections, for by this distinction of Gods essence from his attributes, you seeme to make *prius* and *posterius*, one thing before an other in God: and also to take away the vniformitie and equalitie of Gods essence, for that the beginning, roote, and head, is more essentiall, then the progresse, fruites and members: but I knowe you would say, that I doo but cauill and trifle with you: for that it is no absurditie to say, that in God one thing is before another, in order, though not in time, as the vnderstanding is to the will: and to the other you may say, that a head is no more essential to a man then is the foote, nor the roote, then a little twig, and therefore I pray you, resolue me for that other matter, and let these passe.

Sch. You might haue let that passe too, for any great hardnesse that is in it: as will plainly appeare, if you consider the same distinc-

on

on in men, or rather in Angels, for they haue essentiall attributes proportionable (though not comparable) to these in God: for they haue successiue vbiquitie (for they can be any where in a small space of time: and for the eternitie, or rather sempiternitie of god, they haue immortalitie: for his simplicitie, they haue great subtiltie: and for his omnipotencie, great power and might: yet the beginning and foundation of their essence is in none of these, but in their reason or vnderstanding, the which onely giueth the denominatiō of a persō to the subiect in the which it is, whether it be in the creatures, or in god. Yea, it doth more properly make the subiect excellent, then doth any other respect: as namely, a man indued with vnderstanding, hath more of the image and similitude of God, and is in that respect more excellent then is the whole earth, being but a dead and senceleſſe lumpe of clay, as it is said *Eccles.* 9. 4. That a quick dog is better thē a dead Lyon, and as wee know, that the least bird that flyeth in the ayre, is more admired, & counted more excellent, then the hugest mountaine in the world that standeth stone-stil. So that liuing things excel those which wāt life, as reasonable men excell brute beasts, as wise men excell fooles, as much as light doth darkneſſe,

neſſe, *Eccleſ.* 2. 13. as Angels ſurpaſſe men, as farre as the heauen doth the earth, in puritie and ſubtilitie; ſo doth the infinitneſſe of Gods vnderſtanding, (not of his quantitie, time or power) extoll God aboue all things, and in the firſt place makes him God. As for the methode which diuers Diuines vſe, in putting the knowledge and wiſedome of God among his attributes, in that they put them in the forefront of them; as you ſaye truly, it is plaine that they make them the beginning and foundation of the reſt: yea, I could ſhewe you ſome of the lateſt of them, which make the knowledge and wiſedome of God to be his liffe: and by life wee knowe that all things are ſaide to exiſt. And therefore, howſoeuer it bee impoſsible for vs to ſound the depth of the diuine eſſence, and to ſhew fully and plainly, wherin the formof it doth conſiſt, yet forſomuch as wee need not doubt, but that of all that is in ſcripture attributed to God, and ſaid to be in him, his infinit vnderſtanding hath the firſt place, both in excellencie, and alſo in order of nature, we may be bold to make it the roote, fountaine, and foundation of his eſſence, and the reſt of his attributes the branches, ſtreames, and progreſſe of it. For in the firſt place God is a ſubſtance, nature or eſſence, truely ſubſiſting:

ſiſting: then he is to be accounted, not a dead and vnreaſonable, but a reaſonable and vnderſtanding nature: thirdly, not a finit, but an infinit vnderſtanding, whereof it followeth, that he is eternall, illocall, ſimple, one and omnipotent.

Gent. Now I do perceiue your meaning, neither will I gainesay it, or deny but that God is to be thought to be an vnderſtanding nature or eſſence, and that infinit, hauing the aforeſaid attributes belonging vnto it: But whether ſhall the vnderſtanding, or the infinitneſſe of God haue the firſt place aſsigned vnto it?

Sch. Theſe two can no more be ſeuered, then can the fire and heate, neither is the one before the other in time, nature, or beeing, both exiſting togither eternally: yet in the order of logicall relations and reſpects, as god is an eſſence before hee is an vnderſtanding eſſence, ſo is he an vnderſtanding or reaſonable nature, before he is infinit. Neither are we to thinke, that the eſſence of God conſiſteth ſimply in infinitneſſe, but in an vnderſtanding, or (if any other thing can bee named, which commeth nearer to the eſſence of God) in ſome other thing, that is infinit: for the eſſence of God is not priuatiue onely, but moſt truly and properly poſitiue.

Sect. 2.

Sect. 2.

Gent. YOu haue satisfied me fully, and I thanke you heartily for your paines, in explaining vnto mee that poynt of religion, which of all other I haue alwaies desired to haue som insight into: nether do I know what now to desire of you, vnlesse it please you to go on in the particular explication of these attributes of the diuine nature, and to beginne with the vnderstanding which you make not an attribute, but rather the very essence of God, or at the least, that which commeth nearer vnto it, then any other thing doth that we know.

Sch. Indeed the first place in the treatise of Gods nature, is woorthily assigned to his knowledge, or rather to his essentiall vnderstanding, the which must either bee made Gods essence, or else wee must confesse that we knowe not what it is, or wherein it doth consist: but to declare the true nature & manner of it, is as farre aboue my reach, as the heauen is aboue my head. Yet some little knowledge of it, the scripture doth affoord vs, to this effect, that the knowledge, reason, or vnderstading of god, is his infinit essence, knowing all things actually alwaies.

Gent. Do

Gen. Doo you make the knowledge and the vnderſtanding of God, to be all one, or is there ſome difference betwixt them?

Sob. I doo meane but one thing by them both, to wit, that part (for ſo I may ſpeak tho improperly) of Gods eſſence, which in order hath the firſt place: and I thought it beſt to vſe diuers words, to ſignifie one thing for plaineſſe, and the greater euidence of the matter: for the one, to wit, knowledge, is the more vſuall terme, and yet the other ſeemeth to be the more proper and ſignificant. For as in a man or Angel, knowledge is one thing, euen a ſeparable or accidental qualitie, which is often wanting, as wee ſee in many men, who are (in a manner) altogither deſtitute of knowledge: and the minde, vnderſtanding, or reaſonable ſoule, another thing, to wit, the very eſſentiall forme: ſo in God we may ſay that the ſame thing is both his vnderſtading, as it ſubſiſteth in it ſelfe, and alſo his knowledge, as it hath relation to other things, namely to the creatures: and ſo knoledge as it is in the creature a ſeparable or accidentall qualitie, ſo in God (in whom there is no mutation) it is an eſſentiall attribute ariſing from his vnderſtanding, which is his eſſence. For if the world had neuer beene made, nor to haue beene made, wee could not in proper

speech haue saide that God had the knowe-
ledge of it, for so he shuld haue known that
which was not: but that cannot be: for things
which neuer exist, are neuer knowne in
particular, howsoeuer they might and should
haue beene knowne in abstract and generall
notions. So that the knowledge of God pro-
perly taken, & precisely distinguished from
his vnderstanding, is his vnderstãding actua-
ted or broght into act, yet not so large as is his
vnderstanding, which is infinit, wheras gods
knowledge of the world or of the creatures,
neyther is nor can bee infinit, for that God
neyther hath alreadie created infinite parti-
culars, neyther yet in trueth can doo it, be-
cause so there should bee two infinits, one
created or made, and the other the maker of
it: for howsoeuer to our weake vnderstan-
standings, not onely all the particulars which
haue happened or shall happen in the world,
but euen a small part or portion of them,
seeme infinit, yet to God, they altogither are
finite and numerable.

Gent. You seem to make the knowledge
of God to be his vnderstanding, not as it is
subsisteth in it selfe, but as it is actuated
and hath relation to the things that are
knowne.

But

But by this meanes you incurre two great inconueniences: first in making it finite, the which you confesse, although in my minde it is not to bee admitted, for all Diuines make the knowledge of God infinit: and secondly, in making it to bee accidentall, and not of absolute necessity in God. This will plainly follow, if the knowledge of God be limitted to the things in the world which are knowne: for although it was necessary that the world should be created, God hauing so decreed, yet this necessitie is not absolute, because God might haue existed, though hee had neuer made the world, and then hee should haue wanted this knowledge of things, because the thinges themselues were wanting.

This supposall is not altogither vaine and friuilous, for God as hee did exist without the world, before the creation of it, so wee cannot doubt, but that hee might haue done so still and for euer: otherwise wee should fall into that grosse absurditie of some Philosophers: who to make the world eternall, make it essentiall to God, and to follow him as necessarely, inseparably, and as wee say, as hard at heeles, as the shadow doth the body, the which I doubt not, but you condemne as most absurd.

We are rather (in my mind, & ſo others alſo thinke and write) to acknowledge not onely the vnderſtanding, but euen the knowledge of God to be infinit, in that it ſtretcheth it ſelfe not onely to the creatures, but euen to God himſelfe: whereof it will followe, that it is both infinit, (for whatſoeuer knoweth and comprehendeth that which is infinit, is it ſelfe infinite) and alſo eſſentiall to God, becauſe it is not onely eternall, as is the knowledge of the creatures in God (although it bee not of abſolute neceſsitie) but alſo abſolutely neceſſary, becauſe it cannot bee ſuppoſed, that God could exiſt without the knowledge of himſelfe. Yet I will not wholly reiect or deny this deſtinction which you make of the vnderſtanding of God from his knowledge: for although of all Gods attributes, his knowledge doth moſt properly and immediately flow from his vnderſtanding, yet me thinkes that there is a difference to bee put betwixt God and his knowledge, as well as betwixt God and his power: yet for ſo much as through ignorance of Gods true forme, wee are not able to declare the nature of his eſſentiall vnderſtanding, (the which we are conſtrained to put in the place of his forme) heereof it cōmeth, that we are not able to diſtinguiſh this eſſentiall vnder-

ſtanding

ſtanding of god from his actuall knowledge. And therefore leauing the knowledg of gods forme, eſſence, and (as wee make it) of his eſſentiall vnderſtanding to himſelfe, who only eyther doth or can knowe it, let vs I pray you, proceed in conſidering this his actuall knowledge.

Sch. I like well of that you haue ſaid, and do thanke you for ſhewing me wherin I erre: yet this I may ſay for my ſelf, that vnleſſe you had in a manner compelled me to imagine or coyne this or ſome ſuch diſtinction, I ſhould not haue mentioned it: but to proceed. It was ſaid of God, that he knoweth all things actually, alwaies. For the firſt, it is plain and not greatly doubted of by any, that all the actions of the creatures, and whatſoeuer doth any way happen vnto them, is as manifeſt vnto God, as is the ſunne at noone: he doth ſee with eyes, which need no light, for darkneſſe and light are all one to him: the heart of man is deepe and deceitfull aboue all things, yet hee ſounderh the depth of it, ſeeing and perceiuing his moſt ſecret thoughts, as plainly as if they were things done in the ſight of the whole world: the which things although it ſeeme moſt impoſsible, and bee incredible to many, yet wee knowe aſſuredly the truth of it, both by the word of God, and

also by manifolde experience: and no marvell, seeing that he hath framed and fashioned them, hee hath made the eye and eare, and therfore must of necessitie both see & heare. Neither doth the infinitnesse (as it seemeth some) of the particulars which happen in the world, hinder this vniuersall knowledge of God: for they all are to him, not onely not infinit, but a fewe in comparison of those which he might & should know, if they were to be knowne, that is, if they did exist. It hath beene admired in some great men, that they haue bin of such capacitie & readinesse of wit, as to be able at one instant to mind diuers matters, and to endite to two or three Secretaries as fast as they could write: for why? as we, our outward sences and inward faculties, are not many, but one particular, so they cannot well stretch themselues at once to many diuers obiects, for then *Pluribus intenti minor ad singula sensus.*

But it is not so with God, who although in trueth he be but one particular nature and essence, not many or diuers, yet hee is more large & vniuersall, then the whole, yea then a thousand worlds. And so if we consider the proportion of his infinitnesse to all things existing, wee shall finde, that it is farre easier for God to know and minde at once, all the particulars

particulars which eyther haue beene, are, or are to bee, then for one of vs to thinke on any one particular thing or matter. As if (that wee may vſe the ſimilitude of the diuine eſſence which was brought before) wee ſhould ſuppoſe a man or an Angell to bee of ſo large a braine and vnderſtanding as is the whole element of the ayre, the which we know to be euery where, if it be not kept out by ſome more ſolide bodie, and that euery part of it were of ſufficient vertue to conceiue and knowe: we then ſhould not maruell, if at one inſtant hee did know and conſider of all the things in the world, and that without any confuſion of wit: how much more then ſhall we graunt this vniuerſall knowledge to God, who is far more vniuerſall thē the ayre, he being not onely about things, but euen in the middeſt alſo of the moſt hard and ſolide ſtone, and not excluded by it, or by any bodie out of any place: yea hee being wholly euery where with euery man, yea with euery pile of graſſe on the earth, and with euery corne of ſand on the ſea: and how then can wee maruell, that hee ſhould bee able to know all things at once? In the ſecond place we are to conſider, that God knoweth himſelfe, and alſo the whole courſe of all things actually, that is, hee doeth not

attaine to the knowledge of it by doubtfull reaſoning, diſcourſe and conſequence of one thing frō another, but ſeeth it exiſting as certainly as if it were actually exiſting and preſent with him. Otherwiſe, if God did attaine to the knowledge of things, by way of vncertaine diſcourſe, it would follow, that his knowledge is ſometimes potentiall and imperfect, not hauing as yet attained to the thing it aymeth, but being onely in the way towards it: whereas we are to thinke, and hold for a moſt certaine truth, that the whole courſe, order, beginning, progreſſe and end of the world, is and hath beene alwaies from euerlaſting, ſeene and knowne by him, and that without ſucceſsiue diſcourſe, & by one perfect and complete act of knowledge: the which we ſay in the third place, to be eternall in God, not that he needed ſo long a time for premeditation, how to deuiſe and diſpoſe things, ſo as they ſhould all agree together in tending to one & the ſame end for the which he decreed them: for in this reſpect, ꝑ whole frame and courſe of the world, may be ſaid to be extēporall, & as we vſe to ſay, *naſci ſub ſtilo*: that is, to be penned and made without any premeditation: for to him, the leaſt time is as good as a thouſand yeares for deuiſe: yet we are to thinke, that the frame of the world

was

was not deuiſed when it was made, nor a litle before, but that the idea and patterne of it, hath plainly & fully exiſted in God from all eternitie, as the ſpirit of God witneſſeth almoſt euery where in the ſcripture, ſpeaking of the eternall loue and purpoſe of God toward his elect. *Gent.* You ſay, that god knoweth all things actually alwaies, and I thinke you ſay true: yet I am ſure you know the olde exception & obiection, which hath been alwaies made againſt this doctrine, not onely by heathen Philoſophers, but alſo by Chriſtian Diuines, who graunt this to bee true in all thoſe actions which God worketh, either immediately by himſelf, or by the means of thoſe creatures which are not indued with libertie of will: in all which they graunt that there may be an appoynted order & courſe, which ſhal certainly come to paſſe, becauſe the things thus diſpoſed, are not at their own diſpoſition, ſo as they might breake the order ſet by God, but are wholly gouerned by God, who neuer changeth his purpoſe or determination in any thing which he hath apponted: but as for the will of man, the which they ſay, is in it ſelfe moſt free, yea as free as the will of God himſelfe, becauſe otherwiſe it is not wil, that they ſay muſt be exẽpted from the fore-knowledge, (at leaſt from the neceſſarie fore-knowledge) & fore appoyntment of god, for

that it is wholly at the owne diſpoſition, and not controlable by any other, howſoeuer it may be hindered by a ſuperiot power from bringing it ſelfe into perfect act, yea or from exiſting alſo: yet as long as it doth exiſt in his place and ſubiect, that it cannot be barred of free choyſe in any thing that is propounded vnto it. And that for this cauſe it wil not ſtand, and therefore cannot be placed in any ſet and conſtant order, it beeing ſo ſlipperie, vncertaine, yea as it were altogither lawleſſe, vnruly and exorbitant: what thinke you of this poynt?

Sch. Surely I haue alwaies thought it to be very hard and intricate, and that it was no maruell to ſee many ſo troubled and grauelled in it, that they could not poſsibly ſee how the will of man could be yoaked by any neceſsitie of Gods decree, and yet left in the naturall freedome. But that which is impoſsible with man, is poſsible with God, who hath taught vs in his word, as touching the foreknowledge of things contingent, as are the iſſues and elections of mans free will, that not onely the ſenceleſſe, but euen the reaſonable creatures with all their actions are ordered by him: and that for that end and purpoſe, not onely the perſons, wordes, and deeds, but euen the moſt ſecret thoughts of

their

their mindes and inclinations of their willes, are both ſeen and alſo foreſeene of God, who doth accordingly direct and diſpoſe of them, as ſeemeth beſt vnto him: yet the freedome of the will remaineth (as indeed it cannot bee taken away vnleſſe the will it ſelfe, yea the creature it ſelfe, wherein the will reſteth, bee aboliſhed) not hauing any kinde of violence offered vnto it, but mouing it ſelfe of it ſelf, which way it pleaſeth: euen as we ſee a man ſitting on his horſe, doth not carrie the horſe hither & thither, but is carried by the horſe, who goeth on by his own free wil, yet guided and ruled by the rider, and directed to that place which hee hath appointed. As wee plainely ſee in *Adam*, tranſgreſsing Gods commaundement giuen as touching the forbidden frute: the action was voluntarye and contingent in reſpect of *Adam*, who might haue abſtained if hee hadde would, for GOD did no way compell him or impell his will to eate the forbidden frute, but did both by promiſes and by threatnings diſſwade him from it. Yet there is no queſtion to bee made of it, but that GOD hadde as certainely foreſeene and foreappointed it, as if hee hadde reſolued to compell *Adam* by

by outward violence, or by inward compulsion of his minde and will, to eate it. And so we are to thinke of all other the like cases, that God doth plainly foresee, that this or that without faile will be the issue and effect, though the causes be ambiguous, cõtingent, and as like in our eyes to bring forth the contrary effect: for he seeth easily, what motiues are in the minde to moue the will, and what force each of them hath to sway it hither or thither.

Gent. Yet you haue not so fully resolued this doubt, as I do desire. For euen *Cicero* himselfe, or whosoeuer other is most perẽptorie in exempting mans will from Gods prouidence, will confesse, that contingent things may bee foreseene in the causes (though not in the effects themselues) when they doo plainely preuaile, and ouersway the one side the other: yet they affirme, that the will of man, setting it selfe of purpose to the full vse of the naturall freedome & nimblenesse, may dispose it selfe, to a mere contingencie, which cannot possibly be foreseene, because it will chuse and worke, not by the meanes or inducement of any motiue whatsoeuer, which would bewray the intent and issue, but freely of it selfe, and to no other intent, but to shew the absolute soueraigntie of it owne

power.

power.

Sch. I haue already tolde you, what I haue gathered out of Gods word, as touching this point of his foresight of contingent things. I for my part, doo rest heerein, and so I wishe that you would doo without any curious inquisition into their needlesse questiõs, whereof it is best to let them dispute, while they list, and to determine when they can: In the meane time we wil proceed, and speake somewhat of the wisedome of God, the which is, besides his knowledge, vsually attributed vnto him.

Sect. 3.

Gent. INdeed, I haue often heard, that in men knowledge and wisdome may be not onely distinguished, but euen quite separated the one from the other, as it is vsually said of you schollers, that the greatest Clarkes are not the wisest men: yet I thoght that in God, knowledge and wisedome were all one, and not to be distinguished.

Sch. I haue heard as much my selfe, but I neuer thought him of whom I heard it, eyther more learned, or the more wise for saying so if he spake as he thought: and yet I know that they are diuerse, and different things, as are

are ſpeculation and practiſe. But (to come to the matter) in God they are not two diuerſe things, but one and the ſame thing diuerſely conſidered: for knowledge is a generall notion and ſpeculation, which when it commeth to bee put in practiſe in the making, ordering and diſpoſing of the creatures, is called wiſedome, to the which the counſels and decrees of God (whereof hereafter) are to be referred: and ſo knowledge is of ſimple, but wiſedome of compound things, ioyning togither in perfect order and agreement thoſe things, the natures wherof, were before fully knowne. *Gent.* You fall againe into the ſame error you did before, in limiting and reſtraining the knowledge of God to the creatures, which doth infinitly ſtretch it ſelfe abroad euen to God himſelfe, and ſo ſheweth it ſelfe to be infinit: ſo now alſo you tie his wiſdome, which in my minde, you may more rightly extend, ſo as it may belong alſo to God himſelfe. For howſoeuer as he exiſteth eternally himſelfe alone, he needeth not to be ordered by any wiſedome, neither can properly bee ſaid to be ordered by his owne wiſedome: for that order hath place, not in one ſimple nature exiſting in it ſelfe, both immutably and alſo immoueably, without any poſſibilitie of variance, diſcord, or confuſion, but rather in diuerſe things, whoſe natures being different,

are by wisdome conioyned togither in good agreement: yet in that it pleaseth God of his goodnesse so to debase himselfe, as to haue any dealings with his creatures, in this respect euē God himselfe and his actions are to bee ordered disposed and guided: that as the creatures are made to agree among themselues, so they may agree with God also their Creator, to their owne happinesse and his glory.

Sch. You are too curious to be pleased, & too cunning to be taught: I speake of things after the common and vsuall maner, according to the which, the obiect of Gods wisdome, are his creatures, and not himselfe: yet I confesse that this distinction which you bring, is true and not to be reiected. But as touching this wisdome of God, shining euery where in the world, it is highly extolled in the scripture, as being most wonderfull and pleasant to behold. And no doubt, but that it is a great happinesse, that a man hath this grace giuen him of God, and his eyes opened to consider and acknowledge it in any measure. For if the Queene of *Saba* were so rauished with the report, and much more with the sight of *Salomons* wisedome, appearing in his fit & sound answeres, sayings, sentences, and prouerbes, containing in thē great depth of knowledge, and also in the practise of his life (whereby hee turned his speculatiue knowledge into

practicall wisdome) in the orderly constitution of his house and kingdome, and the right contriuing of al matters belonging therunto, that shee thought her trauell in comming to heare, see and behold it, well bestowed, and the seruants of *Salomon*, most happie men, for that they making their daily attendance in his Court and presence, had singular opportunitie of knowing and considering it: how much more happie a thing are we to esteeme it to haue the wisdome of God reuealed vnto vs: from the which, as from the sunne shining in the firmament, this dimme candle of *Salomons* wisedome receiued light. If *Salomons* house and kingdome were so well appointed and so wisely ordered, that it wrought in the beholders admiration, yea astonishment and vnspeakeable pleasure, how much more excellent shall we think the orders of Gods house to be, whether we consider the world in generall, which is the outward court, into the which, all both holy & prophane are admitted: but much more, if we consider the Temple it selfe, to wit, his Church, wherin he is serued and worshipped, and wherein hee doth reueale his glory in Christ & his Gospell, after a speciall maner: but most of all, if we consider his glory in the holy of holiest, to wit, in ỹ heauens, & in the

heauens

heauen of heauens, where the Apostle durst not, and we may imagine, things not to be vttered. First then, when as wee come into the outward Court of his Pallace, and consider either the whole frame of the world, or the particular creatures therein contained: how euery thing is so curiously contriued in it selfe, so correspondent to the rest, we shall see how truly wise *Salomon* doth acknowledge the incomparable wisedome of God, in the creation of the world. *Prou.* 3. 19. 20. *The Lord through wisedome, hath laid the foundations of the earth, and hath established the heauens through vnderstanding: by his knowledge the depthes are broken vp, and the Cloudes drop downe the dewe?* If wee should enter into particulars where should wee beginne, or how should wee euer make an ende? what profession is there in the world, which would not thinke it great madnesse, not to mention that about the which it is conuersant, as a most pregnant witnesse of the infinit wisedome of God? how doth the Astronomer with endlesse admiratiō and astonishment, gaze vpon the starres, and neuer satisfied with beholding their brightnesse, counting their number, demonstrating their greatnesse, obseruing their vertues and influences: not to take care of those, as not worthy to be mentioned? who with the heathen

worship the Sunne, Moone and Starres, by ascribing all operations and effects vnto them: neither yet to roue abroade in these large fieldes, which yeeld as many arguments of Gods wisedome, as the earth doth piles of grasse, but to keep at home in our owne houses: how infinitly, and yet how worthely do Phisitians extoll the frame of mans body, how euery part is so wisely and warely deuised to auoide all harmes and inconueniences, which might happen: neither do our bodies alone that, but euen the lowest flower, that groweth out of the earth, (the which if it can be but rudely counterfeited in wood, stone or colour, workmen think their cunning, and Princes their Pallaces highly aduanced,) yea the silliest worme that creepeth on the ground and the least flie that floteth in the ayre, declare the same. For the which purpose the studie of naturall Philosophie is to bee accounted, as pleasant so also very profitable, and worthy to be followed by Christians, as their gifts and callings do permit: for without question, they that go downe into the depth of it, see the wonderfull wisedome of God. But if we enter into the inner Court of Gods Pallace, to wit, into his Church, and there consider his dealings with it from time to time, the small begin-

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nings, the slowe progresse, the meane knowledge which it had in the first ages, as it were in the infancie of it, and how in these latter ages, it hath so mightely preuailed & so stretched it selfe so far abroad into the world, still fleeting and mouing as doth the Sunne in the outward Court, from the Easterne to the Westerne countries and kingdomes: But if we step a little further into it, and there consider the deepe misteries of knowledge, and wisedome, contained in the bowels of the scripture, the vnsearchable obscuritie of ænigmaticall Oracles mocking the sharpnesse of all humane wit, the agreement of ceremonies with the body, of the types, with the things signified, of punishments with sinnes: but especially, if we consider in the three folde state of man himselfe, first the stately building of this Pallace, begun in *Adam*, then the miserable ruine of it in his fall and lastly, the glorious repairing of it in Christ the second *Adam*, it cannot bee but that we shall burst forth with the Apostle into admiration of it, and say *O the depth of the knowledge and wisdome of God, how vnsearchable are his iudgements, and his waies past finding out?* and agree to the truth of that, *Eph.* 3. 10. that *the wisdome of god, shewed in the church is so great, that the Angels in heauen do & may well admire it;*

and as it is *Col.* 1. 3. that *in Christ* and in the matter and mistery of the Gospell, *the very treasures of Gods wisedome are both hid and reuealed.* Lastly, if we should draw a litle nearer, and with confidence enter into the glorious presence of God in heauen, where there are no cloudes or mystes, to keepe from vs the cleare sunshine of his wisedome, all his counsels, decrees, deuises and dealings, beeing vnfolded, and fully accomplished, we should the say as the Queene of *Saba* said of *Salomons* wisedome, and the vnspeakable pleasure conceiued by the beholding it, that the report which goeth on earth and in the church of the wisedome of God, yea the conceit which we haue in our mindes of it, how great soeuer it be, is as nothing to the thing it selfe. But I wil not be so presumptuous, as to take in hand this argument, or to attempt to set forth the wisedome of God, as it shineth in the world, and in the Church, and much more fully, (although as yet not so plainly to vs) in heauen: It were an argument fitter for the tongues or pennes of Angels then of men, and whereof we may say, that if all should bee written, that might bee brought to that purpose, the whole world would scarce suffice to hold the bookes which would be written.

Sect. 4.

Gent. WHat followeth to bee conſidered in the nature of God?

Sch. Surely euen that, that followeth the vnderſtanding in the nature of man, from the which we borrow al theſe attributes, as types and ſimilitudes of the nature of God, and ſo we do after a ſort put our own coat on Gods backe, or rather put our whole nature both the body and eſpecially the ſoule vppon his diuine nature, as he himſelfe did in the incarnation of Chriſt, that ſo we may ſee & know that, which otherwiſe and of it ſelfe, is inuiſible, and not to be knowen, and therefore as in the humane, ſo alſo in the diuine nature, we muſt to the vnderſtanding, ioyne the facultie of will, the which cannot poſsibly be ſeuered from an vnderſtanding, for that there is no vnderſtanding, which if it be not actuall, or in complete act of it owne nature and eternally, as is the vnderſtanding of God, yet it is potentially actual, that is, it tendeth to action, whereof this facultie of will is the fountaine and beginning.

Gent. Nay ſurely, you need go no further in declaring what is the wil, or any other thing

in the eſſence of God, if it bee ſo as you ſay, that theſe attributes are not truly in God, but onely reſemblances and ſhadowes of his nature. Belike we haue al this while bin conferring about moonſhine in water, & ſtriuing about ſhadowes, altogither voide of the ſubſtance of trueth. I did verely thinke, that the vnderſtanding, knowledge and wiſedome, whereof you haue ſpoken, had beene truly & really in god, and not only ſhadowes of his vnknowne nature. I may well vſe the ſimilitude of the Prophet, and compare my ſelfe to a man, who beeing hungrie and thirſtie, dreameth that he eateth and drinketh according to his owne apppetite, but awaking on a ſuddaine, hee findeth himſelfe drie and emptie: ſo I did all this while imagine that you did feed, and in trueth euen fill my hungrie and thirſtie ſoule with the knowledge of God, the which I do farre more earneſtly and greedely deſire thē euer I did meat or drinke, and behold, on a ſuddaine you awaken mee out of this pleaſant dreame, and tell me that all is nothing but mere imaginations.

Sch. You take mee at the worſt, and farre woorſe then you ſhould do: I haue not fedde you with winde or vaine dreames, as you inferre of my words, but the trueth is this. The nature of God is ſo vnſearchable, and ſo faare

aboue the reache of any created wit, than when we haue come as neare it as we can, and haue to our thinking, gotten some hold of it, yet the very remembrance of our owne weaknesse in comparison of the infinitnesse of it makes to vs to distrust and suspect our selues as beeing deceiued with a false conceit of that which cannot possibly bee truly conceiued & comprehended: hereof it commeth, that although we be verily perswaded that vnderstanding, knowledge & wisdome are in God, not onely truly and really, but also most properly as in the naturall subiect or rather substantially without any subiect, but being to themselues an vpholding subiect, yet we doubting the worst, and thinking that the diuine nature, is something more, and more excellent then an infinit vnderstanding, although in truth there cannot bee any nature more excellent then an vnderstanding, or a resonable nature, nor any thing more then that which is infinit: and also thinking that for so much as these things to wit, vnderstanding, knowledge and wisedome haue place in the nature of man, whom wee see and feele to be a most weake and silly creature, that therefore they cannot be truly in the nature of God, hereof it commeth, that wee rather call them the attributes or resemblances

of his nature, then his very essence or nature is selfe, the which in trueth they are.

Gen. That is an other matter, but then we must not foster in our selues this vaine feare and doubting to affirme him to bee that which we learne and know out of his word, that he is indeed, but rather boldly without any wauering or doubting, affirme him to be, that he is, knowing most certainly that wee are not deceiued: and if we be deceiued, that then God himselfe hath deceiued vs, with whom it is better to erre, then to holde the trueth in our owne conceits. But I cannot but laugh to my selfe, when I thinke of one thing that you said, that wee doubted, least that vnderstanding, knowledge and wisedome, were not truly in God, because they are truly in the nature of man, whereas you should haue inferred the cleane contrarie: to wit, that wee know assuredly, that God is an vnderstanding or reasonable nature, because man who is reasonable, is the image or similitude of God, yea, and made for this end, to shew & represent to vs the nature of god: but, how I pray you, can a reasonable nature bee an image or similitude of that which is not reasonable? Now proceed I pray you, and shewe me, how and what you make will to be in God?

Seb. Will

Sch. Will is very fitly and truly, yea eſſentially giuen to God: for as in the ſoule of man, will is not an accidentall qualitie, which may be ſpared without the diminiſhing or abolishing of the ſubiect, as may knowledge or wiſedome, but an eſſentiall facultie iſſuing properly and immediately out of the vnderſtanding, and cleauing inſeparably vnto it (for that it is impoſsible that the conceits receiued into the mind, ſhould reſt ydly there, and not rebound backe againe into action, euen as the beames of the ſunne lighting vpon a ſolide bodie, cannot but reflect, and ſo make heate): ſo we are to thinke, that the eſſentiall vnderſtanding of God doth naturally, neceſſarely and eternally, bring forth the eſſentiall will of God, the which may bee defined, the eſſential act of his vnderſtanding, the fountaine and beginning of all his actions which are ſimply good.

Sect. 5.

Gent. HOw doo you make the will of God to bee the beginning of all the actions of God?

Sch. Euen as it is in all other things which haue will, the which is of this nature, that in what ſubiect ſoeuer it be, it will there domi-

nere, and haue the ſole and ſupreme authoritie of doing all things: and therefore may truly be called *Primus motor*, the firſt mouer and beginning of all actions, for euery thing that hath wil, doth that onely (or at the leaſt tendeth to the doing of it, wich it willeth. As for the vnderſtanding, although it be in order & nature before the will, yet it is not ſaid to be the beginning of actiō, becauſe it onely moueth, perſwadeth, and directeth, but doth not inforce or compell: for as wee vſually ſay, counſel is no commaund: whereof it commeth, that although in God there be no ſuch diſagreement, yet in ꝑ creatures it doth ofte come to paſſe, that the will reiecteth the counſell and direction, which the minde giueth, and worketh without or againſt reaſon, according to the owne inclination. But the will is followed and obeyed by the actions in all things poſsible, euen as the commaundements of a ſoueraigne Monarche within the compaſſe of his kingdome, are put in execution by loyal ſubiects, without any reſiſtance. And indeed will may very fitly be it compared to an abſolute & mightie Monarche, for that it cannot either be controled, cōmanded, or compelled by any ſuperior power without it ſelfe, or yet reſiſted by any inferiour within his owne dominions: it being impoſ-

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sible euen to God himself, to inforce or constraine the will of the least of his creatures. He may indeed abolish & destroy al the wils and all the creatures in the world, or enforce thē by outward violence to whatsoeuer pleaseth him: yea he may (as hee doth in regeneration) by changing & inlightning ỹ minde, make that the will shall incline it selfe to that which it did before abhor: yet he cānot compel any thing to be willing, it being of it selfe vnwilling. Wherof it cōmeth, that this soueraigne monarche hath place in those creatures only, which are intire & absolute in thēselues, not depending vpō any other without it self whatsoeuer, for abilitie of motion & action. And therfore trees, which haue not in themselues sufficient power of natural heat, wherby to mooue thēselues at their own pleasure; but do depēd vpō the sun, by whose heat they are helped, cānot be said to haue will. But as for those things which do perfectly liue and mooue, as do all things which haue life and soule, for they do as freely moooue or rest, and performe any naturall action, as any man or gell. *Gent.* I like wel, that you make the wil of god the first beginning of al his actions: but to make this cōmou vnto the creatures, as if they wer so absolute, that they did not, nor neded to depēd on god, me thinks it is harsh,

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and ſoundeth ſomewhat to the diſgrace of God, to whom (me thinkes) you ſhould not deny this royall prerogatiue, that his will ſhould bee the firſt mooner and beginning, not onely of his owne actions, but alſo of all the actions of all the creatures, rather then to make euery liuing creature, as it were a priuiledged place, exempted frō his iuriſdiction.

Seb. Wee are rather to account it to bee a great praiſe and glorie to God, that as hee himſelfe is moſt perfect, ſo he is able to make other things alſo, not onely imperfect (as ſome of the creatures, to wit, thoſe which wāt ſence, may bee called, although they alſo be perfect in their kindes) but alſo perfect and abſolute in themſelues, able to mooue themſelues (within the compaſſe of their naturall power) when and as it pleaſeth themſelues, without any out ward helpe whatſoeuer. Let vs ſuppoſe (for wee may reaſon of ſuch a matter) that ſome cunning Mathematican made a doue of wood, or ſome ſuch matter, which could flie out, and returne to him home againe: ſhould hee thinke it a diſgrace vnto him, that this doue needed not his helpe, or that hee ſhould carrie it abroad, when as it could flie of it ſelfe: and not rather thinke it a matter of incomparable praiſe, that hee could make ſuch an abſolute and admirable

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peece of worke? yes surely, for the perfection and absolutenesse of the worke, doth not detract, but addeth to the praise of the workman: as no doubt but that it is a great glorie to God, that all the creatures in the world moove, preserue, and increase themselues, by the sole means of that vertue & strength which hee put into them in the beginning, without any other supply or strength, although without question, they do many waies both need & feele his helping hand. Yet hath not the creature hence any matter of boasting against god, for that all that absolutenesse and perfection, which it hath, came not of it self, but from God: who as hee gaue it, so hee is able to take it way, and as hee made all the creatures of nothing, so also to consume them all to nothing, if it were his will. Besides, if wee did make the will of God the beginning and fountaine, not onely of his own actions, but also of the actions of the creatures, wee should admit many inconueniences and absurdities: for then all the enormities, monstrous confusions & sinnes, which are in the world, should bee ascribed and referred to God, as to the fountain from the which they sprang. Yea, wee should fall into their heresie, or rather extreame madnesse, who imagine the whole world, and all the creatures

obtained in it, to be the bodie of god, & god to be the soule of every living thing, the the which nothing can be imagined more grosse and impious. So then in this comparison of the will of God with the will of the creature, we see in the first place, that as God, so also the perfect, that is, all living and mooving creatures, haue their proper wils, not onely distinct and divers from the will of God, but also free and absolute in themselues, and exempted from being constrained or enforced by the authoritie or power of God, yea it may be said truly, if it can bee so taken and understood, that the will of the creature is no lesse free in the own kinde, then is the will of God, for nothing can bee added to that which is in the highest degree. Whereof it commeth, that this freedome of will is alike in all things, in the brute beast as in the reasonable man, in men as in angels, in the creature as in the creator, yea (*si parvis componere magna liceret*) in the least flie or weakest woorme, as in the mightie God of heauen and earth. Not that any creature hath so effectuall a will as God hath for there is no comparison between the power of God, and of all the creatures in the world ioyned together in one: as a poore man is not of so great abilities as is a great Lord, yet his freedome

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may bee as great. The creature can doo nothing, but it may will any thing against the will of god: the mightiest creature is not free to doo what it list, yet the weakest is free to do what it list, as can be imagined, euen as the prisoner that lieth bound in chaines in the corner of a straight prison, is as free in will, as the king that sitteth on his throne. Freedome therefore is so inseparable and essentiall a propertie of the will, that it cannot possibly by any meanes or power whatsoeuer, be taken away eyther from the brutish, the reasonable, or the diuine will. Will may be taken from the creature, & the creature out of the nature of things, yet cannot freedome be taken from the will, for it will follow it, either existing or at the least desisting with it. Lastly herein agree the wils of the creature with the wil of God, that all of the, whither created or uncreated, tend & inclyne to good, not all to that which is in trueth good, yet al to that which is in appearance good. For as it is the nature of euery thing to preserue, & to delight it selfe, so for that purpose it escheweth whatsoeuer seemeth euil, and inclineth it self towards that which iudgeth good & pleasant. And as euery nature is diuers from all other, so euery one hath a particular good to the attaining wherof it moueth it self, and also the subiect which it hath in subiection,

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and in the fruition whereof, it resteth and pleaseth it selfe, as in happinesse & the chiefe good. Thus the nature of God hath a proper kinde of good belonging to it, the which is simply and chiefly good: to wit, his owne glorie, whereunto the will of God in all the actions of God doth ayme and incline for in it, rising out of it selfe before the creation, & since gotten, or rather continued by meanes of the creatures, it doth rest and please it selfe for ever.

Sect. 5.

Thus farre the will of God agreeth with the will of the creature: now followeth the difference, the which cannot but be great. First they differ in that respect, which hath already beene named, to wit, that the will of God is alwaies effectuall and actuall, alwaies bringing it selfe into act without faile, or any difficultie, and therefore is never in vaine, whereas the creature doth often incline and moove it selfe inwardly towarde some object, but cannot goe forward in accomplishing and bringing foorth into act that inward motion: being hindred either by the impotencie of the subiect wherein it is, or by some greater power, but nothing can resist

reſiſt the will of God, or make his purpoſe fruſtate. This is the firſt difference, and yet to ſpeake properly, and to ſay the truth, this is not a difference of the wils, but of the perſons and their power: For the wil being hindered from putting it ſelf into execuciō, may be as ſtrong, yea vſually is more ſtrong then when it hath outward power ioyned vnto it. Secondly, the will of God is immutable and the ſame for euer, that which he willeth once, hee willeth alwaies, but the will of the creature is more variable then is the winde neuer conſtant, but continually altering it ſelf from one obiect to another, yea often to that which is cleane contrary to the other: & that not onely in particular obiects, but euen in regard of the general kinds of good, reiecting the true good for a falſe appearance, & with all true happineſſe, for a vaine and tranſitorie ſhadow of pleaſure. Neyther is it any maruell, that the will of the creature is ſo variable, when as it is ſo eaſily deceiued, and ledde out of the way by error and ignorance, or elſe ouerruled by headſtrong affections, fro both which the nature of God being free, admitteth no manner of alteration in will. The reaſons which may ſeeme to inferre alteration of will in God, are drawne out of thoſe places of ſcripture in the which it is ſaid, that

God hath not performed, that which hee hath ſpoken and purpoſed: as when he being mooued either with the ſinnes and vnthankfulneſſe of the wicked, or by the prayers and repentance of the godly, doth confeſſe himſelfe to repent of that good which hee hath done to the one, or of thoſe afflictions which he had threatned to the other. But the trueth is, that God neuer repenteth himſelfe eyther of the one or of the other. but taketh to himſelfe the perſon and manner of men, who not foreſeeing what will follow, do often repent themſelues, and are ſorrie both for benefites beſtowed on vnthankfull & vnworthie perſons, and alſo for too great ſeueritie and raſh anger vpon thoſe whom they loue.

Gent. You haue made one obiection againſt the immutabilitie of the will of God, & haue alſo fully ſatiſfied it: I pray you do as much to one that I will make.

Sch. I know not whither I can or no, but I will do my indeuour.

Gent. You need not feare it, for I knowe you haue often both mooued and aunſwered it ere now: it is this. If the will of god cannot be altered in any thing that he hath determined, and that he hath determined all things whatſoeuer, what need wee vſe any meanes for the attaining of any good, or what will it

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auaile to labor to eſchew euill, when the determinate will and purpoſe of God, cannot be by prayer, or by any other meanes auoyded, but muſt of neceſſitie ſtand and take place. *Sch.* The anſwere is as you ſay, eaſie & ordinarie, for God willeth and worketh (ordinarily) nothing but by the ordinarie means effectuall for that purpoſe, the which he hath commanded vs to vſe: and therefore we are to thinke & hope that our endeuours are the meanes which hee hath appoynted for our good. If our endeuors take not effect, we are to acknowledge thoſe wants & harmes to be ſent from God, the which (otherwiſe) we could not haue denied to haue happened through our owne default: and therefore we are to be carefull in vſing all good means effectuall for any good purpoſe, and eſpecially of prayer, which you bring for an inſtaunce: for to imagine that God hath ſo tied himſelfe to a ſtoicall fate and neceſſarie courſe of things that hee can not, though hee would, grant our deſires, is moſt fond & fooliſh, cõtrary to the whole courſe of ſcripture, and in truth, the vtter ſubuerſion of all godlineſſe. You might in like maner obiect, that it muſt needs be graunted, that God doth ſometimes change his wil, ſeeing that he willeth contrary things, wich cãnot come to paſſe: for exãple,

God would haue all men to be ſaued, and come to the knowledge of his trueth. This is true, for it is the word, yea the very words of god, 1. *Tim.* 3.4. Againe, it is his wil that ſom ſhould periſh, for it is certaine that ſome do periſh, and that neyther without nor againſt the will of God, but by his will & purpoſe, as the ſcripture doth plainly teach vs euery where. Likewiſe it was the will of God, that *Adam* ſhould not eyther taſte or touch the forbidden fruite, for hee forebad him: and yet wee cannot doubt, but that God had foreappoynted, that *Adam* ſhould fall by eating the forbidden fruit, and ſo in infinit other inſtances: for anſwere of all which, wee are to diſtinguiſh the commaundements of God giuen to vs from his will, which hee keepeth to himſelfe: he commaunds things impoſsible, to ſhew vs what we ought to doo and to endeuor, as is the fulfilling of the lawe, and the conuerting of all men, as farre as we can, to the obedience of the Goſpell: both which are good, and to be endeuored by vs, and therefore commanded by him, but both of them impoſsible, and therefore not to be thoght to be willed by him. Againe, God cōmandeth ſometimes to this end, to giue occaſion of ſin, for the which end he forebad *Adam* to eate of the fruite of the tree of good and euill, and ſo

the Apostle saith, that the law was giuen to make sin abound: yea God sometimes commãdeth that he wold not haue done, to make triall of our faith, as he commanded *Abraham* to sacrifice his sonne *Isaac*. But these commandements are not to be accounted the wil of God: yea if hee command any thing contrary to his written word, this argueth no change or contrarietie in his will, but onely, that God is not nor will bee bound to any law. Lastly, the wil of God differeth from the will of the creature, in that it onely inclineth it self naturally and necessarely to that onely that is good: whereas the willes of the creatures althogh they do incline to good only as we see in the elect angels, yet it is not of nature & necessitie, but of grace, & so of contingencie. For naturally their wil is free as wel to euill as to good, neyther is it possible, that the wil of any creature should be otherwise, howsoeuer by grace & the assistance of God it continue, in affecting only that which is good. But the wil of God doth necessarely mooue to good onely, because whatsoeuer God willeth, it is therfore good, because he willeth it, his wil being the square & rule of good, so that whatsoeuer agreeth to it, that is good as contrariwise, if it dissent from it, it is to be accounted euill. Hence it cõmeth that

God when he willeth and commandeth any thing contrary to the morall law, as when hee did bid *Abraham* kill his ſonne, the Prophet *Hoſe* to company with a harlot, and the Hebrewes to ſpoyle the Egyptians, or in that he decreeth that their ſhall be ſin in the world, yet in ſo doing, he willeth nothing but that which is good, for by willing it, he maketh it good. Yet in proper ſpeech, theſe actions of men, although commaunded by God, are not to be accounted the proper obiect of the will of God, the which we muſt needs thinke to haue a larger ſcope and obiect, yea a more excellent obiect then are a fewe particular actions of mē. For the proper obiect of gods will, is that whereunto it doth totally, eternally, and naturally incline and tend as wee knowe the obiect of mans will, to bee apparant good and pleaſure, this beeing the ſcope wherat our nature doth wholly ayme, to preſerue it ſelfe in a good and pleaſant eſtate. In like manner the good whereat Gods will doth wholly ayme, is his owne glorie, the maintaining, aduancing and inlarging of it is that which he doth deſire aboue all things, to this end and purpoſe are all his counſelles, creatures and actions to be referred, & in this being obtained, as in his chiefe good, pleaſure & happineſſe he doth delight and reſt contented.

CHAP.

CHAP. IIII.

Of the attributes of God called his affections.

Sect. 1:

Gent. WHat is therebeſides in the faculties of the ſoule attributed to God, fit to expreſſe & reſemble his nature vnto vs, or what other faculties of ꝑ ſoule haue wee in common with God? for ſo you will needs haue vnderſtanding, knowledge, wiſedome and will, to be not typically attributed, but truly and eſſentially belonging to God.

Sch. I am ſo perſwaded, and I hope you are ſo too by this: there is not any thing in our ſoules, that is ſo truly in God, as are the vnderſtanding and will, which make the ſubſtance of them: but there remaine yet many things to be conſidered in the nature of god, the types whereof wee fetch from our ſelues, as namely from our affections, the which are diuers motions of the will,

arising of the diuersitie of particular obiects, making an impression into the wil according to their seuerall natures, and stirring it vp to desire.

Secondly, our morall vertues arising of the due moderation of the said affections: and lastly, diuers morall duties, comming from these vertues as from their rootes are attributed to God.

Gent. Haue all these things place in the nature of God?

Sch. Some of them are truly in God, the rest are onely attributed to him, as types and similitudes borrowed from our humane nature, fit to declare the manner of Gods working, and the diuersitie of his actions, by the which we must ascend to his nature, as neare as we can.

Gent. What affections are attributed to God?

Sch. Loue, hatred, lenitie, anger, pleasance, ioy, sorrow and pittie: all which, the scripture doth vsually giue vnto him.

Gent. What morall vertues or duties?

Sch. Iustice, bountie, magnificence, care of credit and honour, truth, fidelitie, thankefulnesse, friendship, indulgence, patience and such other, euen whatsoeuer is good, and commendable in the nature, manners,

manners, behauiour, life and actions of men.

Gent. I pray you thinke it not yrkesome to make a particular declaration of them: for I do not see, how these things & especially the affections that you speake of, will eyther bee truly found in God, or can fitly be attributed to him.

Sch. If you meane by affections, sudden and vehement perturbations, such as we see vsually in men rising and ceasing, as occasions and obiects are offered, then there are no affections in God, for thers is nothing in him at any time, that is not alwaies in him, and that hath not bene in him from all eternitie. But if (as we may) we meane by affections, constant continuall yea eternall acts, motions, and inclinations (for euen these two latter termes (although improper) must for wãt of better be vsed) of his will, not stirred vp on a sudden, like a tempest, by this or that particular obiect, but setled & permament, arising of the diuerse natures of things and agreeable thereunto, in this sense wee may truly say, that there are affections in GOD, for hee doth truly loue and embrace good and likewise hate and abhorre whatsoeuer is euill.

Gent. You make a strange distinction of

affections, ſome ſudden and momentanie, others permanent and eternall: thus you make them no affections but habituall diſpoſitions, and morall vertues.

Sch. You neede not meruell ſo much at this diſtinction, for it hath place euen in humane affections, as wee know that hatred is an habituall and inueterate anger, and loue alſo may bee ſetled and fixed for euer: but it muſt of neceſsitie be admitted in GOD, for that his will being eternall and immutable, ſendeth ſoorth affections of the ſame nature, as the little twigges and brauuches of a Tree are of the ſame nature with the great boughes and bodie of it, and the ſtreames with the fountaine from whence they flowe: yea, in truth they are ſo ſetled and conſtant in God, that wee cannot diſtinguiſh them from his will, mooving it ſelfe without any alteration, too or fro the obiect, as the nature of it is good or euill.

In men they are like to the flames of fire, blowne vp by the impreſsion of the obiects, as by a great blaſt of winde, and make ſuch ſtraunge alterations in them that you would ſcarce ſay, they were the ſame men which they ſeemed before. But no obiect of what nature or force ſo euer it bee

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can make the leaſt alteration or impreſsion into the will of GOD, whoſe nature is immutable, yea impaſsible. For hee is not materiall as are the creatures, yea euen the Angels themſelues who muſt needs be granted to conſiſt of, and in ſome matter, which may ſuffer and bee altered, whereof it commeth that not onely men, but euen the ſpirituall Angels, are ſubiect to affection, paſsion and perturbation: but God is a pure and mere forme, and therefore altogither actuall, hee is immateriall, and therefore impaſsible.

Gent. Belike you make all affections to be acts, motions and inclinations of the will, but with this difference, that in God they are eternall, generall, conſtant and quiet (and indeed, acts of the will, but neither motions nor inclinations) but in man, momentanie, variable, euident, raging & particular, ſtirred vp not by the generall conſideration of the diuerſe natures of things as they are in God, (whoſe affections in that reſpect muſt needs be conſtant, becauſe the generall natures and notions of things, are eternall, and immutable) but with this or that particular obiect, and therefore variable and vncertaine.

Gent. I perceiue your meaning, ſaue only that

that I doo not ſee, why Gods will ſhould be ſaid to be mooued with generall obiects onely, and not alſo with particular perſons & actions: for we know, that he is diuerſely affected towards particular men and hateth euill not onely in abſtracto and in the vniuerſall idea of it, but alſo in particular men, in whom ſoeuer he findeth it.

Sch. Affections and will in God are not blinde, nor yet peruerſe and rebellious to reaſon, as they are in men, but wholely agreeing vnto it, and therfore they follow the generall grounds of it euer in particular obiects, whereas in men they follow the impreſsion of the particular obiect without, yea contrary to the grounds of reaſon.

Sect. 2.

Gen. WEll, I pray you ſhew mee the particular poynts of doctrine in the loue of God: for as I remember, you put that firſt of the affections which you ſay are attributed to God.

Sch. Loue is moſt fitly and truly attributed to God, who for that he excelleth in this affection, is defined by it as if it were his very eſſential form, for ſo we read, 1. *Ioh.* 4. 16. *God is loue.*

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But that wee may knowe the particulars of this loue of God, it is needfull that wee first ſearch out, and conſider the nature of loue in generall, the which may thus after a ſort bee deſcribed. Loue is an inclination of the will to a pleaſant obiect for the fruition of the pleaſure of it: the which breedeth a deſire of doing good vnto it, if it be capable of it.

This deſcription is to be explained by alleadging the ſeuerall obiects of loue, or of thoſe things which men do vſually loue, in all which it will appeare that the cauſe why they are loued and ſought vnto, is ſome ſweetneſſe or pleaſure, which may be ſucked out of them, & that nothing is loued, which doth not bring with it ſome delight and pleaſure: thus *Iohn* reaſoneth, 1. *Ioh.* 4. 20. *How can he that loueth not his brother whom he hath ſeene*, that is, with whom hee hath conuerſed, and ſo might haue taken delight & pleaſure by him, *loue God whom hee hath not ſeen?* and wee read *Gen.* 25. 28. that *Iſaac* loued Eſau *becauſe his veniſon taſted ſweete in his mouth*, and *Leah* ſaith, *Gen.* 29 32. *Now my husband will loue mee, hauing borne him a ſon.* By theſe and infinite other examples it appeareth, that all men incline to that wherein they finde and feele ſome pleaſure and ſweetneſſe

neſſe, and this inclination is called the loue of that thing. Yet this is not all in loue, and therfore we muſt adde the ſecond part of the deſcriptiō, which ſaith, that the pleaſure in true loue procureth a deſire in him that loueth, and enioyeth the pleaſure, to return pleaſure, delight and any good whatſoeuer can bee done vnto it, to the thing loued. For without this mutual relation of pleaſure, it is not to be called loue but rather luſt: as the inclination which men haue to thoſe meates, drinks, and ſuch other things, the which they loue, is not true loue but rather luſt, and thoſe things are properly ſaid to be loued, to the which wee may returne that pleaſure and delight, which wee receiued from and by them, and procure their good, as well as they procured our pleaſure. For example, the inclination which a man hath to an harlot, and to the pleaſure that may bee hadde by her, is not true loue, but onely luſt, becauſe heerein a man hath reſpect onely to himſelfe, and to his owne pleaſure, not caring what become of her, when his luſt is ſatisfied. But the affection which a man beareth to his wife, is of an other kinde, and is true loue, becauſe he doth not reſt in that pleaſure which hee enioyeth by her meanes, but addeth thereunto

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an earneſt deſire and indeuour, by all meanes poſsible to procure her good, beeing farre more deſirous to pleaſe and profit her, then to pleaſe himſelfe by her: otherwiſe it is not true loue, but ſelfe loue, for true loue hath a hand to giue; as ready yea more ready then one for to take.

And therefore meates and drinkes, and ſuch other pleaſant things, although they doo greatly delight vs, yet they cannot bee ſaid to bee loued, becauſe they periſh with the vſe, and though they did remaine, they are not capable of any pleaſure or good to bee done in way of requitall, which is the cheefe part of loue. But men are truly ſaid to loue theyr friends, wiues and children becauſe as they doo many wayes receiue pleaſure, comfort, ioy, delight and profit by them, ſo theyr whole deſire is, to returne all that good backe againe into theyr boſomes with double intereſt.

Gent. You ſay that it is not true loue, but luſt to take pleaſure in any thing, without returning, and as it were repaying the ſaid pleaſure to him from whom it was taken, and, as it were, borrowed.

Indeed this is good honeſt dealing, and

to be commended, but if I be not deceiued, I can ſhew you a more true and excellent loue, then this which you haue propounded, to wit that which Chriſt preferreth farre before this your loue, the which may be called a kind of traffiquing and exchanging of one good turne, or benefit for an other. But the loue which he commendeth vnto vs, is not procured, and as it were bought or hired by precedent pleaſure, but commeth from a mere deſire of dooing good vnto them which haue not onely not deſerued it at our hands, by louing vs, but contrarely, haue by hating and harming vs, prouoked vs to requite and repay them with the like hard meaſure: *Math.* 6. 43. *You haue heard that it hath bene ſaid, loue thy neighbour, and hate thine enemie: but I ſay vnto you, loue your enemies: for if you loue your friends onely, what great matter is that? do not the Publicans ſo?* And as this loue is farre more excellent then yours, ſo it doth farre better agree to your purpoſe and ſerue for the explication of the loue of God: for if wee ſhould make the ground of his loue towards vs to bee the fruition of ſome pleaſure in vs, or by our meanes, we ſhould make a faire peece of work of it, or rather marre all the ground of our ſaluation, which relyeth it ſelfe vpon the mere loue of God, not procured by any deſert, or

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any occasion whatsoeuer on our owne behalfe.

Sch. If you thinke that our Sauiour Christ meaneth, that wee should beare as great loue to stragers & to our enemies, as to our friends, you are farre deceiued: for so he should destroy nature it selfe, which hath with her owne finger written in our hearts this description of loue, which I haue brought: to wit, that our loue should be greater towards them, at whose handswe haue receiued pleasure and comfort, then to them who are strangers or enemies vnto vs. But his meaning is, that to our enemies wee should not bee full of anger and reuenge, but patient, gentle, yea louing and helpful, labouring by good to ouercome their ill: and that by doing good to straungers, from whom, or from any in their name, we are neuer like to receiue any retribution, we should shewe the faith and loue which we beare vnto God, in obedience of whose commaundement we do that, which of it selfe is hurtfull vnto vs. But that a man should loue a malitious enemie as earnestly as a louing and faithfull friend, a strange and vnknowne woman as well as his owne wife, other mens children as well as his owne, it is not onely not commendable, but euen monstrous, and contrary both to the light of nature, & to the

law of God. For so we should be vniust and iniurious to our owne friends, to whom our loue and the duties of it do belong, in bestowing it vpon others, and in suffering them to to reape the croppe where they did not sowe any seed. yea then Christians should endeuour to procure to themselues, the good will of their brethren, not by duties of loue, but by iniuries, then the which what can bee said or supposed more absurd. Now as touching the loue of God towards vs, the which you affirme to come of the free motion of his will, not prouoked, caused, or occasioned by any good or pleasure, which he getteth by vs, I confesse that GOD electeth to saluation without any motiue of goodnesse foreseene in vs, euen of his mere will and good pleasure: and that it were mere madnesse to imagine, that there is any thing in vs or in any creature, by the which we might eyther pleasure or profit God: yet I answere you, first that we are to distinguish betwixt the election, and the loue of God, for God chuseth and predestinateth to loue of his owne mere will, but hee loueth not, but for some cause. For as his loue is in the generall notion inclined to good, & not to euill, so he loueth nothing but that which is good, yea and hee loueth it be-

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cause it is good, and for the goodnesse sake. If you say what is our goodnesse to God, that he should loue vs for it, what doth it profit or pleasure him: indeed he standeth in no need of it: yet he taketh pleasure in it, the Lord delighteth in the righteousnesse of his Saints, their sins are as eyesores, & vnpleasant sights vnto him. For why God delighteth in himselfe, and euery thing in that which is like it selfe: he taketh pleasure to behold his own Image in vs euen as the greatest ioy & pleasure that a mã can haue in any worldly thing, is to behold his owne fauour and fashions, his owne countenance and conditions, in his son. And therefore the more that a man in holinesse resembleth god, the more he is beloued of him, as being so much liker to him, as it is said of *Dauid*, that he was a man according to the heart of God.

Gent. This doctrine soundeth very harsh to me, and so I think it wold do to others, if they should heare it, as that which giueth a great blowe to Gods free election: I am sure you haue read, *that Christ loued vs being his enemies*. *Rom.* 5. and that you do not doubt, but that God loued the Apostle *Paule*, euen in his infidelitie, and when he in great furie did persecute the Church.

Sch. It may bee, that it would seeme

ſtrange to them that haue not conſidered of it: but the doctrine is, as I thinke, good and ſound, that God neither hateth any but for ſin, neither loueth any but as they are holy. Yet our foreſeen holines is not the cauſe why God doth elect vs to ſaluation: for firſt he electeth vs to loue & to life, & then afterward by ſanctifying vs, he maketh vs capable of his loue and of eternal life. The proper obiect of Gods loue, is the holineſſe of the reaſonable creature, vnto the which, as being agreeable to his owne nature, God doth encline himſelf by dooing good vnto it, as hee receiueth a kind of contentation in it, and from it. As for the eſtate of the elect before they bee called and ſanctified, we know that whom God loueth once, he loueth alwaies: and *Paul* euen in the heate of his furie againſt Chriſt, was beloued of God, as one whom hee had choſen and predeſtinate to beare at the appointed time his owne Image of holineſſe, and ſo the foreſight of holineſſe in him may be ſaid to be the the cauſe of Gods loue, though not of his election, For God may chuſe to loue whom he liſt, but hee cannot loue, but according to his owne nature, neither any thing, but that which is in ſome ſort agreeable to his nature: for he cannot loue or like, but muſt of neceſsitie hate and abhorre euill, as well in concreto,

concreto, as in *abstracto*: in particular subiects, as well as in generall notions: that so hee may be alwaies like himselfe.

Sect. 3.

Gent. I Will not contend with you about it at this time, because I will not hinder you from other matters: now that you haue laid the foundation of the description of Gods loue, I pray you go on with the rest of the building.

Sth. We will: and first, we may out of that, that hath bene said to this purpose, define the loue of God to be, the motion, or rather the act of his will, enclining it selfe by dooing good, to good preuailing in the reasonable creature. In this discription wee are to obserue these three things: first, that the loue of God belongeth onely to the reasonable creature: secondly, that the motiue or inducement stirring vp in God this loue, is goodnesse preuailing in the creature: and lastly, that the manner, or rather a proper and necessary effect of this Loue or inclination of God to the creature, is by dooing good vnto it. The first point being plain inough of it selfe, needeth no further explanation: for although all the creatures in theyr seuerall

kinde and degrees, haue in them a speciall goodnesse, in respect whereof, God may bee said to loue, and ſo your them, as we read *Gen.* 1.31. *that God hauing finiſhed all the creatures, looked vpon them: and ſeeing them all to be good, bleſſed them*: and ſtill to extend his gracious prouidence ouer them, preſeruing and vpholding them, not onely by the ordinarie force of their natures, but euen by extraordinary meanes vnknowne to vs, as hee is ſaid to heare the young rauens, when they call vpon him (although this may be aſcribed to naturall meanes) yet in proper ſpeech hee is ſaid to loue the reaſonable creature onely, whom hee hath picked out of the whole bunch, whereon to ſet his heart, wherein to delight and take pleaſure.

This choiſe of his loue, it hath pleaſed God to make for two cauſes: firſt in reſpect of the excellent goodneſſe, as it were the ſurpaſſing beautie of the reaſonable creature, the which being framed according to the likeneſſe of God, maketh a kinde of ſympathie and naturall agreement betwixt God and it: whereof it commeth, that God taketh exceeding delight and pleaſure in the ſoule of man, the faculties of it being orderly diſpoſed and endued with that bewtie of holineſſe, which God created in it, and therefore may

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iustly require of it) as in a most pleasant garden and paradise, shining with all varietie of the most faire flowers and colours. The other respect, which appropriateth the loue of God to the reasonable creature, is, for that as it onely hath in it matter of exceeding pleasure and delight to God, so it onely is capable of the rebound, recourse, and reciprocation of the said pleasure from God, in the which as hath beene said the chiefe part of loue doth consist. For howsoeuer God may doo, and doth many waies good to the other creatures, in that hee feedeth and preserueth them in their seuerall kindes, yet they not knowing GOD, cannot acknowledge those good things, which they receiue from him, to come from him, and to proceed of that fauour which hee beareth vnto them: whereas the soule of the reasonable creature, being as it were filled with the sweete blessings of God, taketh greater pleasure in the giuer then in the gift, and reioyceth yea glorieth more herein, that God the great King of heauen and earth, vouchsafeth to set his heart vpon it, and to take pleasure in dooing it good, then in any other thing whatsoeuer. This sense of the goodnesse of GOD, as it is to them the most sweete happinesse that can be imagined, so it stirres vp in them a

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mutuall loue towards God, whom although they cannot by any meanes eyther profit or pleasure, yet they endeuour with all care to glorifie him by their holy obedience, and so to testifie that vnfained loue which they beare vnto him. But the vnreasonable creatures wanting this sence of the loue and goodnesse of GOD, and so the reciprocation of loue which should bee in them, wherein the force of loue consisteth, are for this cause not to bee admitted into the participation of the loue of God.

Besides, the loue of God as it is eternal, so it hath this vertue, that on what subiect soeuer it seazeth, it maketh it eternall, preseruing it from perishing: but this cannot bee done in the other creatures, the which must bee dissolued and come to nought: onely the reasonable soule, being possessed and as it were filled with the loue of GOD, is by it preserued for euer. For these causes it hath pleased GOD of his goodnesse to make choise of the reasonable nature of man, whereunto to ioyne himselfe in the bonde of perfect loue: and in this respect to compare himselfe to a carnall louer, enamoured of the bewtie of some fayre young woman, delighting himselfe exceedingly in the fruition of her,

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and desiring nothing more then to please & pleasure her, yea by all meanes possible to procure her good: as wee may see in the song of songs, in the Prophet *Ezechiel*, & in diuers other places of scripture. In the second place wee are to consider, that not any measure of goodnesse in the reasonable creature, will serue to procure the loue of God, for then God should loue the wicked, in whom wee knowe that there are diuers reliques of his image, yea euen the diuell himselfe and all his wicked spirits, whose nature and naturall faculties are good, and not corrupted with sinne in respect of their substance, but God doth not loue and embrace these with this affection of loue: for what fellowship or agreement, much lesse intire loue, can God haue with *Beliall*, or light with darknesse? Nay rather wee knowe, that God doth most iustly hate and abhorre them, for that their persons are not in regard of these reliques of goodnesse to bee accounted good, because it doth not preuaile in them, but is ouercome and captiuated, or rather abolished by the contrarie corruption of sinne, the which hauing the possession and commaund of them, ought of right to haue the title and name of them. But God loueth the godly and their persons, yea though they bee in part defiled

with ſinne, becauſe not ſinne and euill, but holineſſe and good preuaileth and beareth ſway in them, ſinne beeing captiuated and kept vnder. So that in man good and euill do in a manner contend for God, the one laboring to procure his loue, and the other his hatred, in the which conflict the ſtronger and the predominant qualitie preuaileth, and pulleth to the perſon in the which it is, the affection of God, eyther of loue, or elſe of hatred. *Gem.* I had thoght that one, and that the leaſt corruption or ſinne in a man, had beene of ſufficient force to make the whole perſon hatefull & abhominable in the ſight of God, as a little leuen ſowreth the whole lumpe, according to that of the Apoſtle *Iames*, hee that breaketh any one poynt of the lawe, is guiltie of tranſgreſsing the whole, notwithſtanding there bee in him many good parts of holineſſe: euen as wee ſee in ciuill iudgements, that one ſingle crime condemneth a man, yea though in other reſpects his life bee neuer ſo iuſt and vnreproueable.

Sch. That is true you ſay, according to the exact rule of Gods iuſtice, the which requireth the full perfection of holineſſe without any exception, and reiecteth the whole, if neuer ſo litle of it be wanting: but the loue of God taketh another courſe, for it looketh on

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men with an amiable and fauourable countenance, and (what maruell is it that the loue of God doth that which the loue of men is enioyned to performe) couereth the multitude of sinnes. Lastly, the loue of God neuer commeth emptie, but as God is the fountain and full treasure of all pleasure, so he bringeth with him whither soeuer hee commeth, all good, pleasure and happinesse, by the which his loue and affection towardes any person is known and felt. Yea hereof it followeth, that as any nature or person is indued with a lesse or greater measure of this goodnesse which is so pleasing to the wil, and so agreeable to the nature of God, so it procureth to it selfe a lesse or greater measure of the loue of God, and so consequently of that pleasant and happie good which doth continually accompanie it: yea that as God himselfe is the best and most excellent nature of all other, without any comparison, so hee loueth himselfe farre more then he doth any other thing whatsoeuer, and procureth to himselfe more pleasure & happines, thē he doth to any creature. Yea it is his will, that according to this rule, this affection of loue in the godly be squared, to wit, that they loue those most, in whom they see a greater measure of goodnesse and godlinesse, and bee more inclined towards them, to doo any manner of good vnto them,

then to any other, as it is *Pſal.* 16. 3. *All my delight is in the ſaints on earth, euen to thoſe that are excellent.* And ſo *Gal.* 6. 10.

Sect. 4.

BY this doctrine of the loue of God, wee may eaſily gather, what hatred the contrary affection is, to wit, a motion or act of Gods will, declining and abhorring the perſon wherein euill doth preuaile. And firſt, for the cauſe or ground of Gods hatred, wee muſt hold, that God doth not hate or abhor any creature, vpon the meere motion of his owne will, for his will neither doth nor can mooue eyther towards or from any creature, but vpon good and iuſt cauſe taken euen from his owne nature. Wee know that God of himſelfe loueth all his creatures, euen becauſe they are his owne workmanſhip, and therefore good and woorthie to bee both liked and loued, as immediately after the creation, hee behelde them, and ſeeing them to be good and excellent, euery one in his proper kinde, he powred downe his fauourable bleſsing vpon them, euen as the deawe and raine falleth vppon the hearbes and flowers of the fielde, whereby they waxe faire and flouriſh. Neither did God eyther play the diſſembler,

diſſembler, in pretending loue to all his creatures, whereas hee hated many of them, or yet is he a changling, to turne his loue into hatred, but as once hee did, ſo alwaies hee doth both loue and bleſſe the creature which hee ſeeth to bee good. Yet if the creature at any time become euill, and bee not as it was made by him, but as it hath beene marred by it ſelfe, not bearing any longer his excellent and glorious image, but ſome other mõſtrous ſhape, then it cannot bee loued any longer, but muſt incontinently be hated of God. Yet God is the ſame that hee was, and not a whit altered, but the creature hath chaunged his place and condition, and is remooued, and as it were tranſplanted out of Gods pleaſant paradice, in the which it did flouriſh amidſt the foure riuers of the bleſsings of God, into a wide & wilde deſert, where it being ſcorched with the burning beames of gods curſe, withereth for want of water, and beeing cleane dried vppe, is become moſt deformed.

Gent. I could well agree, that loue ſhould haue place in God, both in his nature and in his actions, for as hee is the chiefe, and the very fountaine of all goodneſſe, ſo it ſeemeth very meet, that hee ſhould extend his goodneſſe to all his creatures, by doing good vn-

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to them all according to their seuerall kinds: but for this affection of hatred, I do not see how it can so well agree to the nature of God, it being by nature euill, and contrarie to the loue of God, for the which he is so renowmed. And therefore mee thinkes it were better for you, to passe ouer in silence this head of doctrine, & as it were to scrape it out as a foule blemish, which in my minde disgraceth this faire picture of Gods nature, which you haue so carefully drawne.

Sch. If you graunt the one, you cannot deny the other, for as God is good, so hee must maintaine and vphold his goodnesse against euill, by hating and abhorring it, yea by confounding all the maintainers and vpholders of it. For it is as necessarie & naturall to God, to abhorre euill in generall, and to hate it in the particular subiects, as it is to him to incline to good, and to loue it in his creatures.

Gent. You will haue much ado to perswade me, that God hateth any, although I confesse you make a shew of argument to proue it: but before we argue the matter, I would knowe whom, and how God hateth.

Sch. Indeed the state of the question would bee agreed vpon before disputation, and it may easily be known if you call to mind that which hath been said of the loue of God: for

firſt the reaſonable creature onely is the ſubiect, as of the loue, ſo alſo of the hatred of God, for of all the creatures in the world, the reaſonable onely can be and is euil. The reaſon hereof is, becauſe all other things as they were created good, ſo they continue in that ſtate of goodneſſe (and in reſpect of it, are in ſome ſort loued of God) although not in that degree of perfection and excellencie, God hauing (for the ſin of man) withdrawne from them ſome part of it: But man hath cleane forſaken that ſtate and ſtanding wherin he was placed by God, and loſt that goodneſſe for the which hee was ſo beloued of God. Yea not onely ſo, but alſo hee hath made an exchange of the ſaid goodneſſe, for the contrarie naughtineſſe, of knowledge & obedience, for ignorance, errour, rebellion and contempt, yea of the whole image of God, for the vgly ſhape of Sathan, and ſo is iuſtly become odious to God, to whom before he was dearely beloued.

Gent. Belike man was created in a woorſe eſtate then the reſt of the creatures, for they were ſure to continue in the ſtate of the loue of God, and in happineſſe) from the which we ſee that man is moſt miſerably fallen, and that into ꝑ hatred of god, as you wold haue it.

Sr. I cõfeſſe, ꝑ (as now ꝑ caſe ſtãdeth with him) man is

is in a farre woorse estate, then any vnreasonable creature. And that it were farre better to be a brute beast, or a senceless stone, then a man out of the fauour of God: for who had not rather (without any comparison) with the want the sweete sense of the loue of God (as all the reasonable creatures do, which eyther haue no sence at all, or at the least no sence of God) then to feele the heauie burthen of the wrath of God, and would not chuse, not to bee happie with them, rather then to bee miserable with man. Yet if we compare their first estates togither, we shall find that mans estate was farre more excellent then theirs, in that hee was created in the fruition of all pleasure and happinesse, of the which their nature is not capable. And what though hee were created in the possibilitie of being miserable, from the which the other creatures are exempted? Who would refuse the offer of riches, honour, fauour and loue, made by his Prince vpon this condition, that if hee were found to bee traiterous, rebellious and disloyall, hee should not onely bee depriued of all the aforesaid benefits, but also be most shamefully and miserably tortured and tormented to death?

Gent. That is it I lookt for, you haue made a very good reason against your selfe: for I protest

proteſt vnto you, I haue alwaies carried this minde, that I had rather liue in a meane and lowe eſtate, from the which one cannot fall, then in the higheſt toppe of flattering Fortunes wheele, in the which there is no likelihood that I ſhould continue. And this I may be bold to ſay, beeing ſo well backt with the authoritie of wiſe *Salomon* himſelfe, ſaying: *That a dinner of hearbs with quietneſſe, is better then a ſtal-fat oxe with feare and trouble.*

Sch. I am of your minde for that, that he is vnwiſe, that will aduenture where hee is like to miſcarrie, or that will accept an offer of all the pleaſure and happineſſe that can be imagined, with a forfaiture of extreame paines and miſerie, if hee breake ſuch and ſuch conditions, which hee knoweth himſelfe vnlike to keepe. But I pray you, were the conditions of mans felicitie ſo many to bee remembred, or ſo hard to be performed, that in reſpect of the great danger of falling into eternall miſerie (which was the forfaiture if hee failed) you would refuſe the fruition of Gods preſence, (& in it of eternall happineſſe) and chuſe to be a dead and ſenceleſſe ſtone, which hath neyther the poſſeſsion of pleaſure, nor the poſsibilitie of paine, rather then an happy man in ſo tickle an eſtate? who is ſo weake or intemperate, that would not for a ſmall com-

moditie aduenture the ſuffering of a thouſand deaths and paines, vpon the abſtaining from any one kinde of fruite, hee hauing plenty beſides, both for neceſsitie, and alſo for pleaſure?

Gent. Indeed I muſt needes confeſſe that the condition of mans happineſſe in the beginning was ſo eaſie to be kept, that his conditionall eſtate of happineſſe may be accounted as good & ſure, as if it had been abſolute without any condition: and therefore I will yeeld vnto you, that the impoſsibilitie of happineſſe in the vnreaſonable creatures, was a farre woorſe eſtate then the poſsibilitie of miſerie in man, the which (but that wee ſee & feele it to be alreadie come to paſſe) might well haue beene accounted impoſsible. But now to bring you backe againe to the matter in hand, from the which I haue made you by my doubting, or rather by obiecting thoſe doubtes which came into my minde, ſomewhat to digreſſe: I do eaſily graunt that no ſenceleſſe thing can bee the ſubiect of Gods hatred, for that they wanting the power of moouing or changing themſelues, do perſiſt (for they could not leaue it) in their naturall eſtate of goodneſſe and of the loue of God: yet mee thinkes that the brute beaſtes, (the which, as I noted before, you graunt to haue

freewill

freewill in their kindes) are as deep in naughtineſſe and peruerſeneſſe of nature, and ſo in the hatred of God, as man himſelfe. For I cannot thinke that they were created ſo violent, rauenous and bloodthirſtie as wee ſee & feel them, being more like helliſh feends, then earthly creatures. Yea, wee read *Gen.* 9. 5. that God will require the bloud of man at the hands of the beaſts which ſhedde it, as we know that in many caſes beaſts were by the Iudiciall lawe of *Moſes* condemned and put to death.

Sch. Sometimes you obiect in good earneſt, as I eaſily perceiue by you, but now I ſee you ſport and dally: for I am ſure you do not thinke that brute beaſts do ſinne againſt God, whom they cannot know. I doo not think but that rauenous beaſtes were created with the ſame weapons, both for offence and defence, the which now they vſe in purſuing their pray, and alſo in the ſame complexions and conditions which now they haue: but man in his innocencie was protected from them, not by the tameneſſe of their natures, but by a maieſtie inherent in his perſon, the which was of ſufficient force to amaze and controle the vnrulieſt of them. But wee will leaue the brute beaſts to their praies, & come to mē, whō this doctrine of gods hatred doth

concerne in reſpect of the ſinfulneſſe of their natures, into the which they haue tranſformed themſelues from that image of Gods holineſſe, wherein they were created. Yet not any meaſure of euill is ſufficient to procure this perſonall hatred, for then God ſhould hate the godly, in whom there are reliques of euill, as there are in the wicked of good, but onely raigning and preuailing euill. It is true indeed, that God hateth the leaſt ſinne that can be cõmitted or imagined, yea almoſt the ſhew of it, and euen the garment ſpotted with the fleſh, yet hee hateth not the perſon in regard of it, it beeing ſuppreſſed and kept vnder, for godlineſſe is ſtronger in them that are ſanctified (thogh imperfectly) & hauing ouercome ſinne, hath wonne the full intereſt of God and his loue. The other thing which you deſired to know before you would come to the queſtion it ſelfe, was the manner of Gods hatred, the which is twofolde, inward, and outward. The firſt is the true maner of it: the other is the ſencible declaration of the inward, & is indeed the effect of it, as amõgſt men, outward harme is a ſigne and alſo an effect of inward hatred. Now for this inward maner of fauor in God, we are not to imagine any boyling affections of anger, or any inueterate ill will towards any creature, but muſt know

know it to be the generall and eternall antipathie and contrarietie of his nature, which is absolute puritie, goodneſſe and holineſſe, to the pollution and naughtineſſe of ſinne preuailing in man: for as God doth approoue, loue and embrace his owne nature, as the absolute perfection of goodneſſe, yea and the very image or likneſſe of the ſaid goodneſſe, eyther created or reſtored in man, ſo he cannot but miſlike and abhorre whatſoeuer is contrarie vnto it. Then followeth the outward manner, which is the effect and declaration of the inward hatred by bringing or doing euill to the perſon thus polluted with ſinne, from whom God hauing once turned away his face and fauour, it cannot bee, but that all maner of euils, as it were whole legions of diuels ſhould inuade him, as finding him not onely out of Gods protection, as a traitor & rebell, but alſo by gods iuſt iudgement appointed to many kinds of moſt fearfull iudgements. *Gent.* Now I pray you let me aſke you a queſtion: are we according to Gods example, to hate wicked perſons, or rather (if it be vnmeete to make our ſelues preſidents for god to follow) is it not moſt true, ꝙ he doth not hate ꝙ wicked, but doth rather as he willeth vs to do, loue their perſons, and hate onely the ſinnes of men. For although

our duties do not belong to God, yet by that which he commaundeth, wee may gather what his nature is, for that all his commandements are iuſt, pure and agreeable to his nature. Yea to vrge this reaſon a little further, wee haue the expreſſe commaundement of Chriſt, *Math.* 5. 44. 45, *To loue and to do good to our enemies, euen as God doth both to the iuſt and to the vniuſt.*

Sch. Wee are not yet come to ſpeake of humane affections, yet this I ſay, that by this queſtion you do plainly ſhewe, what maketh this doctrine of Gods hatred ſeem ſo ſtrange and bee ſo harſh in your eares, namely becauſe hatred amongſt men is ſo corrupt a thing, bringing with it ſo many euils & miſchiefes. But we muſt not meaſure God by man, nor the one kinde of hatred by the other: for God hateth firſt by deteſting ſinne, and then by puniſhing the rebellion of him that hath committed it.

Gent. Belike you make this hatred onely the execution of iuſtice done by God, as by a righteous iudge vpon malefactors, or as by a ſoueraigne king vpon open rebelles, and ſo a ſuppoſed hatred, for that hee that inflicteth puniſhment, ſeemeth to hate, as it is 1. *Cor.* 4. 21. *Shall I come to you with a rod, or in loue?* and if it bee ſo, me thinkes it were bet-

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ter to call it iuſtice then hatred, the one word ſignifying a moſt corrupt, the other a moſt commendable thing.

Sch. The outward and actuall manner of Gods hatred, which is by doing euill to the ſinfull perſon, being in nothing diſagreeing from the rule of iuſtice, may not vnfitly bee ſo called, yet we need not feare to aſcribe hatred and deteſtation both of ſin in generall, and alſo of the particular perſons polluted with it, vnto God, hee hauing ſo often in ſcripture taken them vnto himſelfe. Otherwiſe if wee take hatred as it is vſually in and among men, then man is freed from all hatred of God, both by the goodneſſe of Gods nature, the which can neyther will nor doo euill to his creatures, but onely ſo farre forth as is needfull for the ſatiſfying of his iuſtice, and manifeſting of his glorie, and alſo by the baſeneſſe of his owne nature and eſtate, for what is man (a worme rather then a man) that god ſhould hate: the leaſt ſpark of whoſe anger is of force to conſume to nothing a thouſand worlds?

Sect. 5

LIke vnto the aforeſaid affectiõs, are pleaſance & anger, the which alſo are often in ſcripture atributed to god, yet in truth

they haue no place in his nature, but onely are as reſemblances borrowed from man to declare the actions of God. The former doth better agree, and may more fitly bee attributed to God then the other, for it is an eſſentiall thing in God, to like or miſlike as things are good or euill. But as it is vſually taken for a ſuddaine & temporarie contentment or reſt of Gods will, hauing beene before ſtirred vp and moued to anger, in this ſenſe, God cannot be properly ſaid to be eyther pleaſed or appeaſed, for hee was neuer diſpleaſed, it being impoſsible that any thing proceeding frō any creature (or indeed from himſelf) ſhuld worke any change or alteration in him. Likewiſe for anger, thogh it be in infinit places of ſcripture attributed to God, yet that he cannot by any meanes be prouoked vnto it. Onely hereby is ment, firſt, for the nature of God, that as he liketh and approoueth the obedience and puritie of the godly, ſo hee miſliketh the impuritie of the wicked as greatly, as men doo thoſe things whereat they are inflamed to anger, which is a certaine ſigne of diſcontentment. And ſecondly, for the outward and ſenſible actions of God, that hee vſeth as great ſeueritie (yet not paſsing ꝑ limits of iuſtice) as mē do being angrie, who vſually are rather too rigorous,

and

and paſſe the boundes of moderation in this behalfe: yea if we ſuppoſe (the which wee need not, it beeing ſo common a thing) the moſt outragious blaſphemies and horrible villanies which can be imagined to bee committed by men, yet God is not thereby prouoked to anger, or any whit chaunged otherwiſe then he was before. He doth indeed abhorre ſinne, and puniſh ſinners as they do deſerue, but not in choller, or any violent paſsion, but by the eſſentiall and eternall motion, or rather immoueable act of his will, ſo affected to theſe obiects, as they doo eyther agree or diſagree from his diuine nature: and therfore this affection in God may more fitly be termed hatred, it being ſo conſtant and inueterate: to wit, eternall, not a ſudden and momentanie anger. Thus God ſaith, *Exod.* 23. 10. *Let me alone and I will be angry at this people and conſume them*: that is, I will conſume them as if I were angry: but if this affection of anger had bene truly ſtirred vp in God, he would haue ſaid I am angry, not, I will be angry. Likewiſe for ioy & ſorrow theſe affections alſo are attributed to God in ſcripture: yet no man is ſo ſimple, as to thinke that they do belong to God in truth: for nothing can happen to him eyther profitable or vnprofitable, nothing eyther pleaſant or vnpleaſant:

or rather nothing, but that which is not pleaſant vnto him, becauſe nothing can bee done againſt his will. But as for pittie and compaſſion, which is a ſorrow and greeuous ſenſe of the miſerie of an other, that the ſcripture doth ſo earneſtly aſcribe to God, and God in ſcripture ſo carefully challenge to himſelfe, as that wherein his cheefe glory doth conſiſt, that it may ſeeme very hard and not to bee admitted, that ſuch great matters ſhould bee turned into ſhadowes and reſemblances. For ſo we reade, *Exod.* 33. 19. That when as God would at the earneſt ſute of *Moyſes* ſet forth himſelfe and his nature in his greateſt glory, hee defineth himſelfe by this one attribute, ſaying, *I will make all my good to go before thee, and I will proclame the name of the Lord before thee*, to wit, *I will haue mercie on whom I will haue mercie, and I will ſhew compaſſion, to whom I will ſhew compaſſion*. And without queſtion, if any humane affection may bee truly ſaid to bee in God, it is this of pittie, the which of all other is moſt excellent and commendable, proper to gentle, noble and royall mindes, as nothing is ſo baſe and ſauage, as is vnmerciſulneſſe and crueltie.

But the truth is, that there are no manner of paſſions in God, his nature beeing impaſsible

paſsible: onely by the pittie of God in ſcripture is ment, that God as hee is infinitly and onely good, yea the fountaine of all goodneſſe, ſo he is moſt prone and ready to impart and extend the ſame to all his creatures, eſpecially vnto thoſe which being miſerable, doo ſtand in greateſt need of his helpe and comfort.

This may be plainely ſeene in thoſe iudiciall lawes, which hee gaue to his people by *Moſes*, wherein it may worthely bee noted how carefull the Lord is for the helping and releeuing of all thoſe which are any way diſtreſſed, as namely the poore, the widowe, the orphane, and the ſtraunger, that men ſhould not onely take heede of iniurying them any way, (for ſaith he, *Exod.* 22.27 although thou bee cruell in oppreſſing thy poore brother, yet *I am pitifull* and cannot abide it, but will puniſh thee for it) but alſo be carefull to releeue them with the crop and vintage of the ſeuenth yeare, and by leauing them ſome gleanings in the yearely harueſt, by ſetting them free out of bondage at the ſeuenth yeare. Yea this compaſſion of the Lord extendeth it ſelfe euen to the brute beaſt, and therefore he commanded, that they ſhuld not be ouerwrought, but be ſuffered to reſt the 7 day,

day, that the seuenth yeares crop should bee left for them in part, that the young Kid should not be sod in the mothers milke, nor the damme taken in the neast with the yong birdes: and so in many other particulars, we cannot but see in reading these lawes, what great care and compassion God had ouer all his creatures, which were in miserie, or any way distressed.

CHAP. V.

Of the attributes of God, called his vertues.

Sect. 1.

Gent. OU will not, mee thinkes, admit into the nature of God any sudden and momentanie motions, & therfore no affectiõs: but what say you to constant habits of good, as iustice, goodnesse, and such other excellent vertues? will you exclude these also out of the nature of God, or admit them onely in name and in shew as you do the affections?

Sch. These

Sch. These things, and whatsoeuer else, is not onely indifferent as are the affections, but euen simply good, haue place in the nature of god, not onely truly, but also primarely, as in their roote and first fountaine, from the which, they are deriued to the creatures.

Gent. I pray you declare them in particular.

Sch. It is more meete if not needfull, to breake off our conference for this time: I dare say, I haue wearied you with speaking so long of one matter.

Gent. Of one matter? cal you this one matter? nay it is all in all. Alas god helpe vs if one afternoones cõference of God do make vs wearie: this being the onely lesson, in the learning whereof, all that hope to bee in Gods kingdome, must make account to spend, not houres, daies, years or ages, but eternities, that is, time which is endlesse, and will neuer bee spent.

Sch. It is true that you say, yet you see our weakenesse to be such, that wee are soone wearied and cloyed with hearing still of one matter, although it concerne vs neuer so much, especially if it be thus rudely and rawly handled.

Gent. Well, well, I can assure you, there is

no

no such matter, and (but that I hope to haue your company to morrowe and the next day also) I should wish (the which I thinke fewe trauellers do) to haue the way lengthened, and that we had many houres riding to our lodging, as now we haue not aboue one. But if your selfe be wearie of speaking and of my vnskilfull questioning with you of this, and that, you may be the shorter: and I will promise you not to trouble you with any moe questions, but to suffer you to speake and to holde your peace at your owne pleasure,

Sch. Your questioning hath bene no trouble but a great ease and profit to me. I will (if there be no remedie) shew you breefely the nature of some of this kind of attributes, which may not vnfitly bee called the vertues of God. You may by them gather the nature of the rest.

Gent. I pray you do so: I would be loath we should leaue this daies conference imperfect: but make an end of it once in, & thē I wil say, that we haue made, a good daies worke of it.

Sch. I wish wee had many Gentlemen of your minde, so desirous of knowledge, especially of the knowledge of God: wee may well wish it, but it were folly to think it, and in vaine to hope it: but to the matter,

You

You know that those good and commendable dispositions of the minde, which are commonly called morall vertues, are of two sortes, whereof the one looketh inwardly toward our selues, the other outwardly toward others.

The first kinde consisteth in the moderation of the desire and vse of worldly pleasures, as of meate, drinke, ease, pastime, riches, honour, and whatsoeuer else is pleasant in the life of man.

These vertues are not to bee attributed to GOD, because his nature is not capable of these pleasures. He indeed liueth or rather existeth in the perfection of pleasure, for hee doth continually and eternally delight and reioyce in himselfe and in no other thing (in comparison, as no other thing is to bee compared to him in goodnesse) for although hee take pleasure in the goodnesse of his creatnres, whereby they resemble him, as in their knowledge wisdome, puritie, bewty, and whatsoeuer else is good in them, yet all this is nothing to that infinit goodnesse which is resident in himselfe, affoordiug vnto him matter of vnspeakeable pleasure, the which is not to be limitted within the bounds of any vertues, for it cannot haue either defect, moderation or excesse, and al, for that it is infinit.

And

And what maruell is it, if God be exempted from theſe vertues, and the pleaſures which are the obiects of them, when as the Angels, which are creatures, are not ſubiect vnto thē: for they cannot be ſaid to bee eyther temperate in regard of meate and drinke, or continent in reſpect of bodely pleaſures, for that their nature is not capable of thoſe pleaſures, no more then are trees or ſenceleſſe ſtones. Yet their nature is capable both of vertue and alſo of vice: for as by vertue ſome of them ſtand in happineſſe; ſo by vice many of them fell into miſerie: to wit, through ambition, as it is thought, for deſiring to be higher, they became lower then they were created. This vice (as alſo the vertue of it, which being but the moderation of it, muſt needs be of the ſame kinde with the vice) is incident into all excellent natures: as wee knowe that euery nature doth deſire to increaſe in that good, wherewith it is already endued: yea the more it hath of it, the more it doth deſire, becauſe it feeleth ſo much the more the ſweetneſſe of it, and ſo we ſee it to come to paſſe, that none are ſo deſirous of riches, as is the richeſt, of knowledge, as are the beſt learned: and of excellencie: as thoſe that are alreadie moſt excellent, euen as the fire, the pureſt of all the elements, doth neuer reſt, till it be aboue all

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the reſt, and in the higheſt place of dignitie. Yea as the vertue which is care of credit and honour, and alſo the exceeding extreame, which is ambition, ſo alſo humilitie (which may ſeeme to be the lower extreame, but is in truth, the higheſt and moſt excellent vertue) may be moſt plainely ſhewed, and fully exerciſed in that nature which is moſt excellent. For as none can haue ſo great a fall, as he that hath the higheſt place, ſo none can ſhewe ſo great humilitie, as he that is moſt excellent, becauſe none can debaſe himſelfe ſo far, as he that is higheſt in excellencie. Whereby it may be gathered, that although God cannot be ſaid to bee ambitious in deſiring greater honour then is due vnto him: for that he hath by right, all honour that can bee either had or deſired, yet we may truly ſay that he may haue both the greateſt humilitie in laying aſide the greateſt excellencie, and alſo a due care of credit and of maintaining his iuſt honour againſt al vniuſt vſurpers whatſoeuer.

Thus the ſcripture teacheth vs, that God is not onely carefull, but euen curious, as wee may ſay, and as it ſelfe ſaith, iealous of his honour, the which he cannot abide that it ſhuld bee any touched or impared, as hee doth openly profeſſe of himſelfe, *Eſ.* 48. 11. *My*

glory I will not giue to any other. Neither indeed will he suffer any to take it, or any portion of it, but doth straightway confound them all with all their deuices, whosoeuer do any way obscure it, much more such as haue most impiously, yet more fooliſhly sought to vsurpe or participate it.

Thus were the aspyring spirits throwne from heauen into the place and pit of darkenesse, to the which man also (treading in the same steps of sacrilegious pride) was sent out of paradise to beare them cõpany. Thus were the vaineglorious builders of the Tower of *Babel* confounded in al their deuises, and thus the Lord slewe 50000. of the presumptuous Bethsemites, who by looking into the Arke brought the name and presence of God into contempt. Thus he made proude *Nabuchadnesar*, who thought that hee might with the maiestie of his person and Pallace outface the sunne in heauen, yea God himself, whose glory filleth both heauen & earth, to become as a silly and miserable beast: and thus he confounded *Herode* by a filthy disease that tooke to himselfe the glorious tytle of God, which the flattering people ascribed vnto him. Neither need we maruell, that God is so carefull in maintaining his honour and glory, it being the last and chiefe end of the creation of all things,

things, all which tend to this one end, and euen bend their whole forces to maintaine & vphold the glory of God as of the higheſt and greateſt good, euen as we ſee loyall ſubiects to endeauor nothing ſo much as to maintaine the maieſtie and honor of their Prince: as we read, Rom. 11.36. *Of him, by him, and for him are all things, to him be praiſe for euer.* For if God ſhould ſuffer any falſe or fained God, any man or Angell to vſurpe any royall prerogatiue belonging to the godhead, and ſo himſelfe to be diſgraced, and his maieſtie diminiſhed, the confuſion of all things (as of the ſtreames the fountaine being troubled) muſt of neceſsitie follow. And yet god is not ſo deſirous of aduancing his name and glory, but that he can on the other ſide debaſe himſelfe, when hee thinketh meete as beeing endued with humilitie in as great, or rather in greater meaſure.

Gent. me thinks, that humilitie doth not well agree with the nature of God, and that there is ſmall vſe of humiliation in his doings.

Sch. As God doth aduance others beeing humble, ſo he doth by his humilitie, not debaſe, but honour and magnifie himſelfe: for as wee ſee it to come to paſſe in Princes and other great perſonages, that nothing doth make them to bee loued, honoured and

extolled, ſo much as doth their gentle and familiar behauiour with their ſubiects and inferiours: ſo God is exalted in his humilitie, and made moſt glorious in it. Pſal. 113. *The Lord is aboue all Nations, and his glory aboue the heauens, who is like vnto our God, that hauing his habitation in the higheſt heauen, doth debaſe himſelfe to behold things on earth?* Yea not onely to behold them a farre off, but alſo to haue a hand and a part in them. Princes do not vſe to conuerſe much with their ſubiects, but that any of them ſhould ſo farre debaſe himſelfe, as to take vpon him the condition of a ſubiect, and to ſuffer his owne ſubiects, to rule and inſult ouer him, yea to vſe him deſpightfully and contumeliouſly, that is a thing neuer heard of neither ſuppoſed to be poſsible to be brought to paſſe, but that they wold rather looſe both their kingdomes and their liues, then ſuffer ſuch a diſgrace eſpecially at the hands of their ſubiects. But God the King of Kings did leaue his Throne of maieſtie in heauen, and made one litle Caue or hole of the earth (all which before was but his footeſtoole) his chayre of eſtate: yea he tooke to himſelfe the forme of weake and fraile man, not of a Lord or King, but of a baſe ſeruant, yea of a vile and loathſome ſinner: hee ſuffered himſelfe to be taunted and reuiled,

reuiled, yea which is the greateſt diſgrace in the world) to bee ſpit on, as a moſt vile and filthy thing: who can imagine, muſt leſſe alleadge an example of ſo great humilitie? yet herein God is moſt glorious.

This one inſtance of his extreame humiliation, maketh it needleſſe to alleadge his familiar conuerſing with men heere one earth, his familiar conferring with *Moſes* face to face, as one friend doth with another: his anſwering them to all their demaunds, as it were comming at their call, whereof wee haue many examples in the ſcripture, as namely in *Abraham*, pleading ſo hard for *Sodome* and in the ſtory of *Dauid*, 1. *Sam.* 29. 8, who there aſketh one queſtion after an other of God about his worldly affaires, as if he had bene aduiſing with ſome familiar friend: but that one example of his vnſpeakeable humilitie ſhewed in his incarnation, and in ſuffering all the miſeries of our life, and in the ende, that moſt ſhamefull death, is ſo notable, that it can neuer bee ſufficiently admired.

Sect. 2.

THeſe two onely which haue bene declared, of all thoſe vertues which concerne our ſelues, are attributed to god: but of thoſe which tend and reach to others, many may very fitly and truly be aſcribed vnto him, to ſhew the manner of his dealing with men, as namely iuſtice in recompēcing, indulgence in forbearing, faithfulneſſe in performing promiſes, and goodneſſe in dooing good to men. For the firſt, namely iuſtice, it doth belong vnto God, in reſpect of that ſouereigne authoritie, which he hath ouer al the creatures in the world, as well Princes as ſubiects, as well men as Angels, hee beeing by vertue of the creation, wherein hee made them all of nought, their moſt naturall King, and the onely abſolute Monarch of the world: all other Kings and Rulers whatſoeuer, being but his ſubſtitutes and vicegerents, holding their Crownes and Kingdomes of him, as vaſſalles of their liege Lord and maiſter: and ruling by him, from him, and in his name and ſteed, yea and by his lawes. For howſoeuer God haue permitted the ordering of their ſubiects in great part to their will and diſcretion, yet he hath giuen and publiſhed

shed to the whole world, his owne supreme and vniuersall lawes, to the obseruing whereof, all without any exception are bound by his commaundement and the violating whereof he doth most seuerely punish. But as no state or Common-wealth can stand by penal lawes onely, which restraine vice by threatnings, and punish offences committed by due paines, because it is needefull that there should also be rewards appointed, whereby the vertuous endeauours of good subiects may be recompenced and encouraged, in the right disposing and distributing whereof iustice hath place as well as in inflicting the deserued punishment vpon offenders: so is the iustice of God, whereby he administreth the Kingdome or Common-wealth of the world, of two sortes, the one in *Pœna*, the other in *Premio*, the one in due punishment, the other in meete rewards. For the first kind, the lawes which concerne the punishing of sin are not many, for they are but one, giuen to all mankind in the person of *Adam*, Gen. 2. 17. *In the day that thou shalt eate, thou shalt die:* And Rom. 6. 23. *The wages of sin is death:* The which is the onely punishment (yet diuersly inflicted according to the diuersitie of sins) appointed for al sins and offences committed against God, as well for the least, as for the greatest,

This death beginneth with out life, during which God layeth vpon the sinner, many euilles and miseries, all which are forerunners of that eternall death and miserie, which abideth in the world to come. And that mē should know and acknowledge, that these temporal euilles come from God as punishments of their sinnes, hee doth vsually punish them in the same kind wherein they haue sinned, that so the likenesse which the punishment hath vnto the sinne, may shew it to bee the sonne of that father, and the fruite of that tree, *Gen.* 2 17. *Because thou hast eaten of the forbidden fruite, thou shalt all the dayes of thy life eate in toile, and in the sweat of thy browes.* And Gen. 20. 8. *The Lord had shut vp all the wombes in the house of* Abimelec, *because of* Sarah Abrahams *wife.* And Iud. 1. 7. *And* Adonibezek *said, seuentie Kings hauing the thumbes of their hands and of their feete cut off, gathered vnder my table, as I haue done, so God hath rewarded me.* And 1. Cor. 1. 21 *After that the world wold not by the wisedome of God knowe God, it pleased God* (as a iust punishment) *by the foolishnesse of preaching, to saue the beleeuers.* All which actions of God, as wel in his temporal, as in eternal punishmēts we are not to doubt, but that they are squared according to ꝑ rules of iustice, from the which it is impossible that God would swarue.

Gent. It were impietie to thinke and blasphemie to speake the contrarie: and yet to tel you plainly, I haue been more troubled with doubts about this point of Gods iustice, then in any other: and but for troubling and hindering you in your course, I would declare them vnto you, in hope to bee more fully resolued in this.

Sch. You shall not hinder but further mee. I will willingly doo my best to satisfie you.

Gent. I haue often thought vpon occasion of hearing this doctrine, that the punishment due vnto the least sinne, is by the iustice of god eternal death, that some Atheists might say of Gods lawes, as it was saide of *Draces* lawes giuē to the Athenians, ỹ they were written with blood, & wold accuse God of cruelty, for inflicting so great or rather so endles and infinite a punishmen vpon small sinnes, yea vpon those which may be doubted whither they be sins or no, as namely to let passe the inward thoughts and desires, (the which although they bee actuall, yet they are in the lowest degree of act that can bee) originall sinne in infants, the which is eyther *alienum*, another mans, and therefore not iustly imputed to thē, or if you take it as it is inherent in themselues, it is but an inclination to sinne,

not ſinne indeed and in act. Beſides how ſhould wee thinke that ſo greeuous a puniſhment as is eternall death, can without extreame rigor bee inflicted vpon many thouſands of men, that did neuer heare tell of god or of his word, eyther in the lawe or in the goſpell, as are thoſe poore Indians, which haue in this laſt age beene diſcouered, whom in all reaſon ineuitable ignorance ſhould excuſe, howſoeuer wilfull ignorance bee made damnable. Theſe doubts and diuers other, wherewith I will not trouble you, haue often runne in my minde, yet I doubt not but that God is iuſt in all actions, or rather I doubt whither God can bee ſaid to be vniuſt, whatſoeuer hee doth to his creatures, yea though he ſhould inflict extreame puniſhment vpon the moſt righteous man in the world, for hee hath abſolute power ouer the all, as the potter hath of his claye to diſpoſe of it as hee liſt himſelfe, and wee know, that it is lawfull for a man to do to his owne what he will.

Sch. I am not of your opinion, or rather that opinion which you name, that it were not iniuſtice in God, to puniſh a righteous man altogither voyde of ſin: for not to alleadge the promiſe and couenant of life, which god hath made to man beeing righteous, but to ſuppoſe that God had not bound himſelfe by a-

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ny ſuch promiſe, the abſolute power of God ouer his creatures, will indeed bee a warrant vnto him, not onely to diſpoſe of them according to his own pleaſure, but euen to conſume thē al to naught, as in the beginning he made them all of naught, but yet not to inflict extream puniſhments where there is no ſinne: for ſo God ſhould doo that which is contrarie to his owne nature, the which doth neceſſarely incline it ſelfe towards the goodneſſe of the creature, by doing to it not euill but good, and therefore hee ſhould doo euill and that which is vniuſt, or rather hee ſhould do that, which it is impoſſible for him to do. But as touching your obiectiōs againſt the iuſtice of God, I anſwere, that wee muſt not thinke ſinnes committed againſt God to be ſo ſmall, as they ſeeme in themſelues and when they are committed againſt men: for the greatneſſe of the maieſtie of god maketh the leaſt ſinne to bee moſt hainous, euen as wee knowe that the leaſt indecent behauiour towards a Prince, is thought woorthie to bee puniſhed with death: and not onely outward & actuall rebelliōs, but alſo the very thoghts and purpoſes of the mind tending to treaſon, are accounted moſt hainous crimes, yea ſo hainous, as for them not onely the offendant himſelfe, but alſo all his poſteritie for euer are thought worthie to be depriued of all thoſe

dignities and commodities, whatsoeuer they did enioy by the liberalitie of the Prince, or yet within his dominions. Yet wee need not say, that God doth punish infants for *Adams* sinne, for they haue in themselues sufficient matter of damnation, their whole nature being actually corrupted in respect of ꝑ image of God, for the which cause it is woorthely loathed and abhorred of God. As for the infidels which haue not the word of God, whereby to learne and know God, you may remember how the Apostle *Rom.* 1. in the latter part or half of the chapter, doth plainly proone that they do wilfully sinne against the light of nature shining in the creatures, yea that they do obstinately contemne god, whom they might learn out of the creatures, to be most maiesticall & woorthie, to whom all obedience, honor and thankfulnes should be performed. And lastly, I say that as none in this world can charge God with crueltie, so in the world to come, the wicked themselues shal cõfesse al their punishments to be most iust. *Gen.* What say you thē, to thē that accuse god of iniustice, in respect of his partial dealing with men, in that he reiecteth and condemneth some to eternall death, and yet electeth and spareth others, who are euery way as sinfull, and as vnworthie of fauour?

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Sch. I am ſure you will not call that Prince partiall or vniuſt, that ſheweth fauor and giueth life to ſome malefactors, for a teſtimonie of his goodneſſe and clemencie, although hee ſuffer others to bee put to death for the ſame offence: no more is God vniuſt in ſauing ſome from eternall death, the which the reſt are to ſuffer, and which all of vs do moſt iuſtly deſerue. Yea if we do conſider the maner and the meanes, by the which God doth ſaue theſe his elect from the death which they deſerue, we ſhall bee farre ynough off, from imagining any partiall dealing in him. For howſoeuer hee did fully determine, and moſt earneſtly deſire, to ſaue ſome from eternall death, yet his iuſtice would not in any caſe ſuffer that to be done, vnleſſe and vntill the death and puniſhment due vnto their ſinnes, were fully ſuffered by ſome other in their behalfe. Wherof it came, that (no creature beeing able to ſuſtaine it) God himſelfe was faine to do it, and ſo did debaſe himſelf to a ſhamefull death, the which what was it elſe but the confuſion of all things, that God ſhould lay aſide his glorie & maieſtie, to ſuffer ſhame & ignominie? and yet al this hee did becauſe his infinit iuſtice would admit no partiall dealing. Yea ſo great is the iuſtice of God, that it cannot bee peruerted

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by that moſt tender loue which he beareth to his elect, beeing now both redeemed by the death of Chriſt, & alſo ſanctified by his own ſpirit, but that hee doth ſtill lay vpon them greeuous puniſhments for thoſe ſins, whereby they do diſpleaſe and diſhonour him. 1. *Pet.* 4. 17. *The time is come that iudgement ſhall beginne at the houſe of God, and if it do beginne with vs, where ſhall the wicked appeare*, that is, he will be farre leſſe partiall and more ſeuere with them? For ſin is as ſeed caſt into the ground, which multiplyeth it ſelfe, and commeth foorth with aduantage to the ſower, yea although hee bee otherwiſe a godly and iuſt man. Thus God dealt with *Dauid*, a man according to his owne heart, repaying him the iniuries done to *Vriah*, from whom hee tooke both his wife, and alſo his life, in full yea in ouerrunning meaſure, making his owne ſon to take from him his wiues, crown, kingdome, children, and well nigh his life alſo. Yea this aduantage or ouerplus, which *Dauid* receiued at the hands of God beſides the principal, is noted 2. *Sam.* 12. 12. *Thou diddeſt ſinne ſecretly, but I will pay the before all* Iſraell, *euen in the face of the ſunne.*

Gent. Doo you call this iuſtice, or is it not rather iniuſtice, to make the faithfull beare in their own perſons the puniſhment of their ſinnes,

sinnes, which Christ hath already borne to the full.

Sch. It is without question, that God bringeth euen vpon the godly, for those sinnes whereby they dishonour him, most bitter and fearefull euils, yea (as I haue heard that a godly man vseth to say) that God neuer suffereth any great sinne committed by any of them, to scape vnpunished: and that not only for their chastisement and amendement, which is the vsuall end of their afflictions, but also euen for this end, to make them testimonies and examples of his seueritie, iustice, and vnpartiall dealing, for hee doth often punish them in their posteritie after their death, as he did *Eli* his negligence in not correcting the misdemeanor of his sonnes, & the idolatrie of *Salomon*, by taking away ten of the twelue tribes from his successours. Yet there is a difference betwixt their suffering, and the suffering of Christ, who did suffer for this end, to satisfie Gods iustice for the sins of the elect, the which they cannot do either in whole or in part: for if they were put to satisfie Gods iustice but for the least of their sinnes, they should suffer not onely temporally, but also eternally, and so should perish: but Christ onely suffereth for the satisfaction, and they for the declaration of Gods iustice.

Sect 3.

Sect. 3.

BVt wee may not stay any longer in this part of his iustice, wee must now briefly consider the other, to wit, the remunerative iustice, by the which hee rewardeth the goodnesse of his reasonable creatures.

Gent. You need not be long in this point, for I thinke there is small vse of it: not but that God is most bountifull in rewarding those that do deserue, but for that none (except the Angels) doo or can deserue any reward at the hands of god, for their obedience and good, being imperfect and polluted with sinne, are so farre from deseruing rewardes, that they cannot possibly stand before the seate of Gods iustice and iudgement, but are reiected as filthie menstruous cloutes, as the scripture speaketh.

Sch. You say true, that according to the stricte rigor of Gods law and iustice, our best works are so far from deseruing reward, that they deserue eternall death. But there is a time and vse as for the rigor, so also for the mitigation of Gods iustice, in the which it pleaseth God of his mercie and goodnesse to passe ouer & ouersee the imperfections and sinfulnesse of mans obedience and workes,

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and both to promiſe in word, & to performe in deed competent rewards, as he ſeeth moſt meete, and that not onely to the godly, but euen to the wicked. For the firſt, the retribution of good to the godly, hath place both in this life and alſo in the life to come. Not that God doth alwaies reward the godly with temporall benefits, for that is not alwaies good for them for their eternall ſaluation, in reſpect whereof god ſeeth it often to be needfull that they ſhould liue, yea and end their daies alſo vnder the croſſe in greeuous afflictions: yet this temporall retribution is neuer wholly wanting, but is found if not at one time, yet at another; if not in their life time, and in their owne perſons, yet in their graues, and in their childers children, euen to the thouſand generation: if not ſo fully as fleſh and blood deſire, yet ſo that they may plainly acknowledge the goodneſſe & rewarding hand of God. Thus God promiſeth at large, *Deut.* 29. that they which feare and obey him, ſhall euen be compaſſed about with all maner of bleſsings, that euery thing ſ belongeth vnto them, and that they take in hand, ſhall proſper and haue good ſucceſſe, as the Apoſtle witneſſeth, 1. *Tim.* 4. 8. *That godlineſſe is profitable in all reſpects, hauing the promiſe both of this life, and of the life to come:* and

Christ himselfe *Math.* 19, 29. *Hee that forsaketh any worldly thing for my sake and the gospels, shall both inherit eternall life, and also receiue an hundred folde euen in this life.* Thus God did from one generation to another, & thus hee will doo euen vnto the ende of the world, both remember and also recompence the godlinesse of his seruants, *Abraham, Dauid* and others: and thus he made a couenant with *Phinees*, in regard of that his zealous loue of his glorie, to blesse and honour both him and his posteritie from age to age. Thus God hath done, and thus he will do in all ages: yet with this difference, that the greater measure of spirituall graces the godly haue, the lesse need they haue of temporal blessings to confirme and cherish their faith: and the nearer they come to the fruitiō of eternal glorie, the more they may & ought to contemne worldly pleasures: whence it is that this temporall retribution is not so plentifull, and so apparant in these ages of the gospell, which flow in abundance of spirituall graces, as it was before when they were scant.

But that which is wanting and doubtfull in this life, shall without doubt bee fully performed in the life to come, where the obedience and good workes, the afflictions and patience of the godly, shall be rewarded, not

only with iuſt praiſe & commendation, (the which reward is deſerued, and agreeable to the nature of their workes, and is mentioned 1. *Cor.* 3. 14. 15. *If any mans worke ſtand, hee ſhall haue wages or recompence, but if it faile, he ſhall want that recompence, and yet be ſaued*) but alſo with eternall happineſſe: the which although it paſſe by a thouſand degrees, the deſert, or rather although it cannot in any part or reſpect bee deſerued by any obedience of the faithfull in this life, becauſe all their obedience is imperfect, yet it pleaſeth God in mercie to call it a reward, yea to bee content that they looke for it in that name, as wee ſee that the Apoſtle doth, 2. *Tim.* 4. 7. 8. *I haue fought a good fight, and haue kept the faith: from hencefoorth I am to expect that crowne of righteouſneſſe, which the Lord that righteous iudge ſhall giue me.* And ſo *Rom.* 8. 8. although the afflictions of this life bee not worthy to haue ſuch a reward, as is the glorie of the life to come, yet hee maketh the one to depend on the other.

Gent. Mee thought you ſaide, that the rewarding iuſtice of God is ſo great, that it extendeth it ſelfe euen to the reprobate, recompencing their good deedes (if they may be called good) with bleſſings:

but what fruite can bee looked for from the roote of infidelitie, but corrupt, the which if God ſhould reward, what ſhould he do elſe, but bolſter and maintaine them in their ſinne

Sch. God doth reward with good, not the wicked deedes of vngodly and vniuſt men, but the honeſt & vpright actions of ſuch as are ciuilly and morally vertuous, yea & perhaps affected with ſome blind zeal of religion: the which although they cannot merit before Gods iudgement ſeat, being not onely imperfect and in part ſinfull, as are the actions of the godly, but alſo wholly ſinfull, in that they come from an euill roote, yet they haue reſpects of good, the which God rewardeth with temporall bleſsings, as hee did *Achabs* outward repentance and humilation, with immunitie frō thoſe temporall plagues, which belonged to his ſinnes. And thus did God reward *Iehu* *Achabs* ſucceſſor, for executing his anger & vengeance vpon *Achabs* houſe, with the honour of the kingdome to the fourth generation. Thus you haue heard ſomewhat of Gods iuſtice, the which although it ſhall without doubt haue the full ſway at length in puniſhing and confounding the wicked, yet for the time of this life, it is ſuſpended and kept frō executing the full force vpon them, that ſo there may be place, vſe,

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and declaration for another vertue of Gods, called patience and long suffering, the which who cannot but admire, that considereth the horrible outrages, blasphemies, cursings, and all manner of contemptuous and spiteful impietie, which the vngodly do daily spew out against God & his holy trueth, and yet they go not onely vnpunished, but also prosper and flourish as if they were blessed of God, who doth by this patience onely harden them to their eternall destruction.

Sect. 4.

THere remaineth now to be considered in a word or two, the last knot of diuine vertues consisting in Gods naturall inclination to do good vnto his creatures: they may be called by the generall name of goodnesse, to the which his generall fauour to all, his particular friendshippe with some fewe and his fidelitie or faithfulnesse both to the one and to the other, may bee referred. For as hee is onely good, that is, the first fountaine and full treasure of all good things, so he doth not enuiously keep it wholy to himself, but doth graciously impart it to others, euen to all liuing things, base and excellent, good and euill, reasonable and vnreasonable, one

and other, all of them doo eyther drinke or taste of this sweet cuppe of Gods goodnesse, and blessings. Hee suffereth his raine to fall vpon the iust and vpon the vniust: hee feedeth and filleth all thinges liuing with a plentifull hand, there is no ende or measure of his goodnesse. For why, he hath a fauour vnto them, as a father hath to his children, and as a skilfull workeman to the workes of his owne handes, wherein his nature and Image, or his skill and cunning do plainly appeare.

Yea, so great is his goodnesse towardes them, that hee vouchsafeth to enter into bondes and couenants with them, binding himselfe to them by promises and oathes, for the performance of that good vnto them, which commeth from him, not as of necessitie and by constraint, or yet by their desert, but onely of meere fauour and his naturall goodnesse. In the performance whereof hee is so sure, yea so carefull as wee see honest men to bee in keeping their promises, that the whole worlde shall sooner faile, then any iot of that which hee hath promised. Whereof we may gather, how odious to God is the impietie of those men or rather blasphemous monsters, that are

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not ashamed to call into question, if not flatly to denie, the trueth of that which God hath from time to time promised to his Church, as touching eternall happinesse in the world to come: yea, and that the faithfull themselues, while they often doubt within themselues of the trueth and fidelitie of GOD, in making good whatsoeuer hee hath spoken, doo no doubt greatly both displease and dishonour God.

But most of all in this kinde, wee are to admire the friendshippe and familiaritie which it pleaseth God to haue with men, yea with sinfull and mortall men, to some of whom hee vouchsafeth not onely this generall fauour, whereof all the creatures in the world are partakers, and that eternall loue which bringeth with it eternall saluation, but also a more speciall fauour, admitting them into his secret counsell and acquaintance, as men doo some speciall and approoued friends.

Thus wee reade that *Enoch* walked with GOD, that *Moses* did ordinarely talke and conferre with him face to face, as one friende doth with an other: thus he did (as it were in sporte) familiarly wrastle with *Iacob*, and continually

both accompany and assist him: thus he was to *Dauid* as a Counseller, to direct him in all his affaires, and thus hee tooke *Paul* vppe to heauen, and shewed him things not to be vttered. But of all other, most notable in this respect was *Abraham*, called often in Scripture by the name or rather by the most honourable and glorious title of Gods friend, as 2. *Chro.* 20. 7. *Esa.* 41. 8. *Iames* 2. 23. And in trueth so might hee well bee called, for God did both make and keepe with him very solemnely all the lawes of true friendship. For first hee made a couenant of perpetuall loue, with him and with his seed for euer, calling *Abraham* Gods friend, and himselfe *Abrahams* God. Secondly, hee did bestowe vpon him all his blessings both temporall and spirituall, yea the greatest honour that could bee, namely to bee as it were the foundation of his Church and chosen people, and the first of the progenitours of Christ. And lastly, hee did impart to him his purposes and counsels in all things that did any way concerne him, or might make for his good.

Yea, wee reade that God was so carefull in the performance of this dutie (for so it pleaseth God to binde himselfe in duties to men) of friendshippe, that beeing

about to destroy those wicked Cities of *Sodome* and *Gomorra*, he thought it needfull to impart the matter to his friend *Abraham*, yea to haue his assent for the doing of it. Thus it pleaseth God of his mercie and goodnesse to exalt wretched men to this highest degree of honour, which indeed is so high, as that the Angels in heauen do seldome attaine vnto it. So that in this respect, and in many other heretofore mentioned, wee may well burst forth with the Prophet Psal. 8. 5. And say, what is man that thou that art the great God of heauen and earth shouldest remember him, or the sonne of man that thou shouldest thus visit him.

Sect. 5.

Gent. I Am thinking with my selfe, what facultie there is in the soule of man not yet mentioned: for if there bee any, I doubt not (considering the great likenesse betwixt the soule of man & the nature of God, in those faculties common to them both, which you haue already handled) but that it is either truly belonging to God, or at the least, will giue occasion to consider something in his nature. You know that men conceiue things by imagination and retaine them

by memory, are these faculties in God? likewise, conscience in man is a distinct facultie, or rather an act of the mind, and there are in him diuers affections, as ioy and greefe, and diuers vertues not as yet mentioned, what are we to thinke of these things?

Sch. I hope you do not looke to heare at this time, whatsoeuer might be said of the nature of God: you are not now so desirous, but if that were taken in hand, you would bee as wearie of hearing, ere it were halfe done: if the cheefe matters be declared, they will giue sufficient light, whereby the rest may be perceiued, and so by those which haue beene handled, you may easely vnderstand the nature of the rest of those good affections, and vertuous dispositions, which are in scripture attributed to God. So for the essentiall faculties of the soule, you say very truly, that they are most like to the diuine nature, and euen a plaine and expresse Image of it: yet this difference must be noted, that whatsoeuer thing is in them that argueth weakenesse or future possibilitie, that hath not truly place in the diuine nature, which is a perfect and complete act. As in these particulars which you haue named, imagination is but a possibilitie or meanes of knowledge, but the knowledge of God hath beene said to bee eternall and actuall.

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It is hard, I confesse, and euen impossible for vs to see or imagine how all the particulars in the world should exist actually in any vnderstanding from all eternitie, but wee must not measure the infinitnesse of Gods vnderstanding by our shallow braines. But as touching the question which you moue of imagination and the meanes and manner of knowledge in God, how the idea or notions of things enter into his mind, or rather how they exist eternally in it without any entering in or beginning, first it must bee helde, that although they exist eternally in GOD, yet they are not essentiall to him, that is, so naturall and necessary as that without them he could not exist, as is the knowledge of himselfe and the idea of his owne nature, yea all the rest of Gods essentiall attributes, of all which if wee should detract but one from God, wee should quite destroy and ouerthrow his whole nature and essence.

But the knowledge of the creatures is not of that kinde, for God beeing in himselfe absolute and all sufficient, might haue (if it hadde so seemed good vnto him) existed without euer eyther making or knowing any creature, and therefore the knowledge

knowledge of them in God, must be thought to arise not from the absolute necessitie of his nature, but from the free libertie of his will, mouing (yet eternally) his vnderstanding to this actuall knowledge of the creatures. Yea that as the knowledge or idea of his own nature is (according to order of nature, not any difference of time) first in the essentiall vnderstanding of God, and then in his will, so the knowledge or idea of the creatures hath his beginning not in the vnderstanding but in the will of God. This difference we haue and see more plainely in our selues, for as we haue some generall notions engrauen in our mindes by nature it selfe, and so in a manner both bred and borne with vs without any helpe of our wils, so the knowledge of other things hath the beginning in the will, disposing and inclining the minde to this or that knowledge, as it seemeth best vnto it. Secondly as touching this (in a manner accidentall) knowledge of God, it must bee held that God hath it of himselfe and not by the meanes, or from the creatures, as we haue, that by sence and imagination get the resemblances of things into our mindes, the which way of knowledge if it were admitted to bee in God, it would follow, that his knowledge of the creature doth not go before, but follow-

eth after it and so is not the cause but rather an effect of it, and not eternall but temporall, whereas wee holde that the will and eternall foreknowledge of God are the cause of all things.

Gent. I haue heard it said, that the diuine nature is as it were a Glasse, wherein al things that do at any time exist in the world, may be seene and knowne, and that by the Saints and Angels in heauen, much more then by God himselfe, who knoweth all things by his owne essence, it being the similitude of all things.

Sch. Some haue thought as you say, but it is a mere fable to say that eyther the Saints or the Angels do or can see the essence of God, much lesse all things in it. It is true that God knoweth all things, and that by his essence, if thereby we meane his essentiall vnderstanding, and that by the similitude which his essentiall vnderstanding hath to the creatures, if thereby wee meane the similitude which is betwixt the generall idea or notion and the particular instance. For as it is essentiall and naturall to God to know himselfe, so it is essentiall and natural to him to know the generall differences of things, without the knowledge whereof he could not knowe himselfe. As namely it is essentiall to God to know

what

what is reasonable, infinit, knowledge, wisedome, good and eternall, for otherwise hee could not know his owne nature, which consistesh in these differences. By the same meanes also hee knoweth what is vnreasonable, finite, errour, folly, euill and time, which are contrary to the other, for one contrary cannot bee knowne without the knowledge of the other.

This is the essentiall knowledge engraven in the very nature of GOD, and as wee saye of our naturall notions, both borne and bred with him, but it doth not extend it selfe any further or descend into particulars: for it is not essentiall to GOD, to know *Peter*, *Paule*, or any other man, nor yet to know the nature of man, nor yet to knowe this worlde wherein wee liue, for GOD might haue existed though none of these hadde euer beene. But the knowledge of these particulars, is by the free will of GOD deducted from those generall notions, which are essentiall to God: who hath thought good to make by the creation a particular instance, example, and as it were an experiment of his essentiall and vniuersall knowledge.

Gent. You seeme to bee of their opinion,

that

that thinke that God knoweth no particulars, becauſe there is no *medium*, no means or way by the which the ſimilitudes of them ſhould bee carried from the things to the nature of God, for that there muſt be a conuenience betwixt the things knowne and the minde: which is not betwixt the creatures and the vnderſtanding of God.

Sch. I am far from that abſurd error, and I hope from any ſuch: I do not doubt but that God knoweth euery particular thing in the world ſeuerally and diſtinctly from all other, yea, that hee hath in his eternall counſell diſtinguiſhed them, as namely men, of whom he hath appointed ſome to glory and others to confuſion: yea, that he knoweth euery particular thing farre more diſtinctly and truly then we do, that ſee and feele them: for hee knoweth them in their cauſes, and eſſentiall formes, the which only is the true knowledge, whereas we do but geſſe at their natures by their qualities and effects. *Gent.* Yet perhaps you doo thinke that God knoweth the particulars of this world which now exiſteth, more then he doth a 1000. other worlds, which neuer did nor ſhal exiſt indeed, altho they exiſt in the vniuerſal notions of Gods vnderſtanding, and ſo may be as wel knowne to God as this particular world, which is brought forth into act.

Sch.

Sch. We cannot say, if we speake properly, that God knoweth any particulars, but those which do sometime exist. He knoweth himselfe able to make such particulars, if it were his will, but they are not particulars, vntill his will do bring them into act: for as vniuersall notions are in Gods vnderstanding as in their first fountaine, or rather in their proper place, so particulars come from the will of God: And therefore wee must needs thinke that God knoweth those particulars which do or shal exist, or haue existed otherwise, then those which doo neuer exist, for hee knoweth the one and not the other.

Gent. Let me trouble you once more, and no more, for this is a poynt that I could neuer vnderstand, to wit how God getteth the knowledge of these things: doo you thinke that he knoweth those things which hee hath decreed to exist no otherwise, when and while they doo exist, then he doth before, and after; or that the existance of them maketh some kinde of impression, or alteration in his minde, which was not before?

Sch. No surely, the existence of things doth no way alter or affect God: obiects do worke vpon our sences and minde, but Gods vnder-

vnderſtanding is merely actiue not paſsiue: yet wee cannot doubt, but that as God maketh vs to perceiue things by ſence, and the Angels by ſome other meanes, ſo hee is able by meanes to make himſelfe capable of the qualities of particular obiects, but of himſelfe and in his owne nature, hee is altogither vncapable of them, or of any knowledge by them.

Gent. You haue no liſt to anſwere me directly to the queſtion: I do not thinke that God doth ſuffer from the obiects, but that is all one, I would know whether that hee doth not know and ſee vs, as we go here otherwiſe then he did, when we were in the loines of our firſt father *Adam*, and whether that he doo not plainely ſee vs two particularly and diſtinctly, whether he do it *intromittendo*, as we doo, or which is more agreeable to his nature being impaſsible) *extramittendo*, that is not the queſtion: but I cannot be perſwaded but that although hee knoweth vs fully and certainely before we exiſt, yet when once we do exiſt in nature, he then doth ſee & behold vs after an other manner.

Sch. You ſay true, I haue no minde to wade farre into this matter, for it is very hard, yea impoſſible for vs to know the manner of the actual knowledge of God: and therfore I did

passe it ouer in the proper place, neither wold I haue mentioned it but that you vrge mee so hard: for I thinke it sufficient for vs to know that God knoweth all things, euen the most secret thoughts of our mindes, although wee be ignorant how he commeth to that knowledge. But for your question I haue told you my opinion, that howsoeuer you seeme to thinke that God knoweth things not existing and seeth thē as it were with eyes, when they do exist, yet it seemeth more consonant to the truth to say, ꝑ the creatures whither existing or desisting, are all alike knowne to God, and I pray you rest in this answere, for this time. Now as touching memorie, as God hath no vse of imagination, because he hath nothing to learne, so he hath no need of memorie, for that he cannot loose any thing by forgetfulnesse, all things being present vnto him both past & future. Likewise for conscience, which is the testimonie giuen by the minde in the presence of God of the innocencie and integritie or of the guiltinesse of this or that reasonable creature, and so eyther of the want or of the desert of blame, it may in some sort bee attributed to God, and that in respect both of himselfe as also of the creature: for first, God as he is in all respects most pure and innocent, yea most holy and good, so before himselfe

himselfe and in his owne presence, hee both knoweth and acknowledgeth himselfe so to be, and for that cause not onely to be free frō all desert of blame, but also to deserue most worthely al praise and glory. But more plainly this facultie hath vse in respect of men, who do often charge God with euill, iniurie, iniustice, crueltie, and many other greeuous crimes, in the which plea this facultie of conscience doth cleare and absolue God, from all those blasphemous reproches which wretched men spew out against him. Rom. 3. 4. *Let God be true and euery man a lyer that thou mayest be iustified in thy sayings, and ouercome when thou art iudged.* Thus much of the faculties of the minde, which you thought omitted in the former discourse: as for the affections and vertues, as ioy greefe, and diuers other, which in scripture ate often attributed to God, their nature may be knowne by those which haue bene handled.

CHAP. VI.

Of the externall attributes of God.

THus I haue declared vnto you, those things which for the present I could call to my remembrance as touching the nature of God, his existence, essence, and attributes, eyther truly taken or typically borrowed from the faculties of a reasonable soule. To the which if you adde the externall attributes which are borrowed from the body or outward person of man, as is the eternitie of GOD from the age or continuance of man, his vbiquitie from the greatnesse or stature of man, his omnipotencie from the strength of man, with others of the same kinde, you haue a perfect picture of the nature of God shadowed out, though rudely and imperfectly, vnder the shape of man.

This last kinde of attributes hath beene touched already in speaking of the infinitnesse of God, the generall and essentiall difference

ference of his nature, from the which they doo neceſſarely flowe, and therefore wee are here to make an ende of this conference: and ſo wee may of our iourney alſo, if you thinke good to light and leade along this long cauſey: it will be a great eaſe both to our ſelues and to our horſes, and wee may (now that wee are in ſight of the Towne) talke of our lodging, for it is meete that wee haue ſome care of our bodyes, that ſo wee may be able afterward to ſerue God by meditation, conference, and ſuch other Chriſtian exercitſes.

Gent. Nay by your fauour ſir, I muſt needes deſire you to make an ende of the taſke, which vpon agreement, though vnwillingly you tooke in hand: It would bee a great greefe (I will not ſay a ſhame) for a man that hadde toyled all the day long many a long mile through thicke and thin, to giue ouer at the laſt caſt, in the ſight of the place whither hee goeth: if you haue perhappes touched theſe attributes by the way vpon ſome occaſion, it followes not, that they ſhoulde bee denied their proper and due place in this worke, the which without them would bee maimed and imperfect.

I like well that we light and leade, for

so we shal haue the more time for conference but for our lodging wee will not trouble our selues as yet, but rather take it as we finde it, and therfore I pray you let mee heare and knowe somewhat of these also in particular, and first why you call them externall attributes.

Sch. I hope your meaning is not that we shall go reasoning into the towne, for so we should haue moderatours inow to cut vs off: but to shut vp these things breefely: They are called externall, not as if there were any such difference of externall & internal in god as in man, consisting of an outward body and an inward soule; for in God there is neither without nor within, but all alike: but they are so called in GOD because they are so in truth in man from whose nature the resemblance is taken. Yea further they may bee so called, howsoeuer they bee as essentiall as the other: for that they doo not come so immediately from the roote of Gods essence, which is an infinit vnderstanding, neither so properly belong to the nature of it, but are as it were, begotten by the coniunction of the difference which is infiniteneſse to the essentiall vnderstanding of GOD: the which bringeth forth knowledge, wisedome, will and the rest

reſt of the aforeſaid attributes, more naturally and properly then it doth eternitie and vbiquitie, the which are found onely in this one vnderſtanding, whereas the other are common to al vnderſtandings, both finite and infinit. And therefore we may truly ſay that the infinit knowledge of God is more inward and neare the vnderſtading which is the roote of Gods eſſence, then is his infinit continuance, although not more eſſentiall: euen as we ſee that thoſe parts of a tree, which are nearer the roote, may be ſaid to be the inner parts, and the ſmal twigs the vtter parts, altho the one bee no more eſſentiall to the tree then the other. Now for the particulars: and to begin with the eternitie of God which is his euerlaſting age or continuance, repreſented to vs, *Dan.*7.9. by an old aged man, whoſe head and haire are as white as ſnow, or ꝑ whiteſt wolle, the which teſtifieth that hee is no babe of yeſterdaies birth, but that he hath liued and continued in the world many yeares: euen ſo it is with god, or rather ſo it is not with god, for the oldeſt man that is had a time of birth and beginning, tho long ſince, and ſhall haue a time of end euen hard at hand: but god is without father or mother, and hath neither beginning of dayes nor end of life, but is the ſame this day, yeſterday & for euer. He is not

the gray or white hayres of olde age summoned to the court of death, for he is alwaies in his fresh and flourishing youth: his substance doth not weare and waste away, for it is not as are the bodyes of men, as a Kingdome deuided in it selfe, which therefore cannot stand but is simple without mixture or diuersitie, and therefore without iarring, yea all perill and peraduenture of ruine.

So then this eternitie of God is to bee defined, the euerlasting existence of his essence without eyther beginning or end. For if it had beginning, then it did not alwaies exist, for it could not exist before it hadde a beginning: And if it did not alwayes exist, then sometime there was nothing, but that cannot bee, for if there were time, there was distinction of motion which made that time, but where there is nothing, there is no motion, for nothing cannot mooue.

Besides, if the time euer were, wherein there was no thing nor nature existing (for if God were not existing there was nothing, for whatsoeuer did then exist was god, because it did primarely exist) nothing should euer haue existed: for if the Philosopher could not see how the most mightie and omnipotent

God

God could make the first matter of the world, for that hee had nothing whereof to make it, and iust nothing saith hee, (though falsely) is made of nothing, what would hee say to this paradoxe, that nothing did of nothing make something, yea all things, not onely materiall bodies, but euen the most pure and operatiue formes? But wee knowe that God is eternall, that is, hee euer was, and neuer was not, hee was not made by nothing, for nothing makes nothing, not by any thing, for that which could make God, was before god and greater then God; and therefore onely God: but God made himselfe, not by giuing or rather by taking a beginning to himselfe, but by being himselfe, as he doth still, and shall for euer make himselfe. Hee was alwaies, as hee will bee euermore, neuer beginning, nor euer ending, but alwaies being. Hee existeth not of nothing, but of himselfe, not by another, but by himselfe, in no other but in himself, and for no other but for himselfe, and so hee is to himselfe all in all. Yea as God is eternall, so euerie eternall is God, for no creature can bee eternall, because with the creature there comes in generation and motion, & with motion time, and so eternitie is abandoned: for time and eternitie are contraries, as are finite and infinite,

the measure and that which is vnmeasurable. But (you may say) how could God exist without the creature, for how could hee exist without working and doing something, he being a most actuall and operatiue forme, and how could hee worke, if hee had no matter to worke on? how could God extend his goodnesse, there beeing nothing to receiue it, or how could hee haue glorie and honour, there beeing none to giue it, for honour is in the giuer, not in the taker? or what disparagement would it haue beene to God, if hee had made the creature to exist from all eternitie, more then it is that hee will make it to existe to all eternitie, as wee knowe that hee hath promised in holy scripture? yes surely, God is not pind vpon the sleeue of the creature, that hee could not exist and that in perfect happinesse and glorie, without the helpe or company of any creature, the which howsoeuer it do set foorth the glorie of God after another manner, then that wherby God was glorious in and to himselfe from all eternitie, yet it addeth nothing to the perfection of Gods glorie, which before was absolute, although not in the same manner. Neyther can wee doubt but that this eternitie of the creature would bee a great blot to the glory of God, wherof his eternitie is now a notable

part,

part, but should not bee if that the creature were eternall as well as God. And therefore it must bee content to bee a degree beneath him, rather then to striue in vaine to fetch the pedigree from so auncient a stocke: eternitie must be left to God as a royall prerogatiue proper to his house and crowne, for the antiquitie of a fewe thousand yeares may serue to make ỹ creature noble. Now that obiectiõ which saith, that God could not exist without the creatures, because without thẽ he could not worke, is easely answered: for before the creation, God did no way mooue or worke: yet he was not idle, for hee did as hee doth still, giue himselfe to the contemplation of himself, euen of his own infinit essence and glorie.

Sect. 4.

NExt to the eternitie of GOD, commeth to bee considered his vbiquitie which concerneth the stature and greatnesse of GOD, as the other did his age and continuance. For as in time, so also in greatnesse God must bee knowne and acknowledged to bee infinite, not incloſed or comprehended within any creature or place eyther in heauen or in earth, but filling all creatures, and all places both in heauen and earth, yea

yea ſtretching and extending himſelfe beyond the compaſſe of the world by infinite degrees, and that not onely by his power (his eſſence beeing in ſome ſet particular place) as wee knowe that Princes ſitting and being contained in a little chaire, ſtretch their power & authoritie ouer whole countries and kingdomes farre diſtant from them: but it is not ſo with God, who as in power, ſo alſo in his ſubſtance and eſſence is euery where, in al things and in all places, for hee is not by any thing either kept or put and as it were iuſled out and diſpoſſeſſed of his place, but is in all places euen where the groſſeſt bodies are, as well as where is neyther place nor bodie. We ſee how the ayre (to the which wee haue before compared the vbiquitie of God) is deſirous to inlarge his dominions, and therefore aſſoone as euer it findeth any place emptie, it ſtraightway taketh poſſeſsion: but if there be any bodie in it to keepe poſſeſsion, it is kept out a doores, and can haue no title to it: and ſo in all other bodies wee ſee that the weaker giueth place to the ſtronger, for it is impoſſible that two bodies ſhould bee togither in one place. But it is not ſo with God, for no creature is able to put him out of any place; hee doth ſuffer the creatures to haue their ſeuerall places, but not to vſurpe his place, the which

which is euery place, as well where the creatures are, as where nothing is. For their being in place doth not hinder him from being there, for he is there as well as they, and euen where they are. Hee is where the earth is, for hee is in the earth, and both heauen and earth are in him, and subsist in him as in their subiect and foundation, vpholding and containing them. And therefore his title is better to that place which they haue, then is theirs, for hee was there in peaceable possession of it, before they were any where existing, and so he will bee there when they are consumed to ashes and gone.

Gent. I do easely beleeue that God is euery where, and that his exceeding greatnesse is more then sufficient to fill a thousande worlds: but I pray you shewe mee how God is present euery where, whither he bee partly in one place, and partly in another, or rather as I haue heard them say, wholly in euery place, as it is said of the soule, that it is *tota in toto corpore*, and *tota in qualibet* parte, wholly both in the whole bodie, and also in euery part or member of it.

Sch. That is indeed the vsuall saying and similitude, according to the which god is to bee thought to be wholly in euery Church & house, yea in the least thing that is, as well as

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in the greatest. It is sure, that the essence of God is most simple and vniforme without any distinction of partes, but the very same euery where: yet that common saying is hard to bee vnderstood, and therefore may easely by the simple bee peruerted to their own destruction: who hearing God to bee wholly in euery place, will readely suppose him to bee contained in that place, and so to bee finite, yea to bee diuided into infinite Gods, as the Heathen imagined euery house and person to haue his proper god attending on him. And therefore wee may more safely and truely imagine God to bee one whole vndiuided and vniforme essence, containing and inclosing in it selfe all bodies as doth the ayre, yet not excluded out of any place where any body is, as the ayre is out of all such places, and that God is not in this or that place, Church, or house, but that all places, houses, churches, yea the earth, ayre, & heauē it selfe are in God, & that in quantitie euen as a pins poynt is in respect of the whole compasse of heauen, and that in him the whole world mooueth and hath his beeing. Yea, his essence extendeth it selfe infinitly without the compasse of the world, and aboue the highest heauens, and so is to

bee

bee thought to bee totally or wholly in any one place, and that equally, as much in one place as in another.

Gent. I pray you shewe mee that, for I haue alwaies thought God to be after a speciall manner there, where hee professed himselfe to bee, as namely to bee present with the Arke and the propitiatorie seate, more then in the Idoles of the heathen, in the temple of *Ierusalem*, more then in any other: so likewise to bee in the godly more then in the wicked, in heauen, the which the scripture doth vsually make the place of Gods dwelling and residencie, more then in hell, or on the earth: and most of all, to bee in the humanitie of Christ, wherein the Apostle saith. *Col.2. 9. That the fulnesse of the Godhead doth dwell bodely.*

Sch. If you thinke the essence of God to be in any one place more then in another, you are greatly deceiued: it is euery where alike, neither can it possibly bee otherwise, for it cannot be gathered or compacted togither into any other forme, then is that infinite greatnesse, which filleth all places.

God may indeede shewe his presence by outwarde actions, more in one place then in another, and so saye and

professe

professe himselfe to bee there onely, and no where else, speaking according to the erroneous conceit of men, that thinke him to be no where present in essence, but where he sheweth himselfe and his power by some outward signe. Thus God was present in the Temple of *Ierusalem*, and more specially in the holy of holiest, and in the propitiatorie seate more then in other places, not by his essence but by his mercie and goodnesse, the which hee did there reueale and shew to the Iewes more then to any other people. Thus God is present in his spirit in the faithfull, more then in the carnall man, not by the essence, but by the effectuall operation of it, renewing in the his owne image of holinesse and trueth, the which thing hee doth not in the other. Thus God is present in heauen more then in hell or heere on earth not in essence, but in glorie and maiestie, the which shineth more in heauen, then any where else. For euen as a man hauing been kept all his life in a darke dungeon from the light of the sunne, and the sight of the creatures in the world, if he were on a suddaine brought vppe into the open ayre, and suffered to behold all these glorious creatures, would not sticke to say and affirme, this world to bee the very dwelling place and pallace of God: so doth

heauen

heauen seeme in respect of this inferiour world wherein wee liue. But the greatest doubt is of the humanitie of Christ, with the which (without doubt) the Godheade is present farre otherwise, yea farre more excellently then euer it was with any creature, or in any place eyther in heauen or earth: yea so, that if it were possible for the diuine essece to be in any one thing or place more thē in another, it would without question bee more in the humanitie of Christ, then euer it was any where. For God did neuer before vouchsafe such vnspeakeable honour to any creature, as to take it into his own person and to himselfe, yea to bee himselfe. Yet for all this, the essence of God is no more in the humanitie of Christ, then in other places and creatures, and yet it is ioyned, yea vnited to it, so as it neuer was to any creature.

Gent. How is that straunge coniunction of the humanitie of Christ to the diuine essence?

Sch. For that I must craue pardon of you, it is not so soone done as desired: it is well if I can get done the taske which you exact of mee, thogh I do not meddle with other matters, especially with such as being very hard and intricate, require seuerall and large treatises:

premises: it is better that wee hold our selues to the matter in hande, and so seeing in part the trueth of this poynt, to proceede to the rest of the externall attributes of god, as namely to the omnipotencie of God.

Sect. 3.

Gent. I did not thinke it to haue beene a matter requiring either long time, or any greate labour, and then I am sure you would not haue stucke with me, but I pray you hold on your course, seeing you will not bee intreated to digresse.

Sch. The omnipotencie of God is resembled in man by the strength of his bodie, or the power of his person, yet there is as great difference, as is betwixt the age of man and the eternitie of God, or the stature of man, and the incomprehensible greatnesse of god. For as God is, so is his power, by the which hee is able and sufficient to doo whatsoeuer pleaseth him, as it is defined *Psal.* 135. 6. *The Lord is great aboue all Gods, and hath done whatsoeuer hee woulde in heauen and in the earth, in the sea and in the deeps*: & what needeth there to bee more power then will, or to what purpose is that power, which is without the will. So that the obiect of Gods power,

wer, is the whole world, in the which, and ouer the which, God hath ſo ample and abſolute authoritie, that neither the greatneſſe, ſtrength, nor multitude of the creatur is able to reſiſt his wil and power, who is able (if hee were willing) to turne all things vpſide down, to make the heauen & the earth change places the one with the other, ſo that the heauen ſhould reſt in the middeſt, & the earth turne about in the circle.

Yea as hee made both heauen and earth, and all things in them contained of nothing, ſo hee is able to turne them all to nothing, and that without any labour or difficultie, euen by the breath of his mouth, and the meer inclination of his will.

But howſoeuer this power of God cannot bee matched by any creature, yet it doth both match and ouermatch it ſelfe, reſtraining it ſelfe ſo, that it is not able to doo any thing againſt it ſelfe, for that which God by his power doth at any time, hee cannot by his power make it to be not done or vndone at the ſame time, for ſo the power of God ſhould bee contrarie to it ſelfe. And therefore if God by his power make the ſunne to ſhine at any time, hee cannot by his power make that it ſhall not ſhine at the very ſame time.

If he make mã free, he cãnot make him boũd, if hee giue him will, he cannot compell him to be willing, for ſo hee ſhould not giue, but take away will from him: and ſo in all other inſtances, it is impoſsible to God to make contradictories to bee true, becauſe he being perfect vnitie, cannot bee contrarie to himſelfe. And if God cannot make any repugnancie in the nature of the creatures, much leſſe can hee doo it in his owne nature, and therfore he cannot do any thing cõtrarie vntõ it, as namely to iuſtifie a wicked man, or to condemne the righteous, to loue one that is ſinfull, or to hate him that is indued with his owne image of holineſſe, to diminiſh, deſtroy, or any way to alter himſelf, who is vnchangeable. Theſe things God cannot do, beeing hindered not by any creature but by himſelf, and therefore the impoſsibilitie of dooing them, is not to bee accounted weakneſſe or impotencie, but ſtrength and power: otherwiſe nothing is impoſsible to bee done by God, that can poſsibly be imagined by man. How then can we ſufficiently wonder at the groſſe errour and ſottiſh ignorance of thoſe men, who in reſpect of the difficultie or rather impoſsibilitie (as they thinke) of performing them, call into queſtion the trueth of thoſe promiſes which God hath made to his

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Church of the reſurrection of the bodie, although conſumed to nothing, and of eternall glorie. But as they erre, not knowing the ſcriptures nor the power of God, ſo we ſeeing theſe things to bee moſt eaſie to God, are to bee confirmed in faith and in the reſolute perſwaſion of the trueth of them.

Gent. I am I thanke God fully perſwaded, that God both can eaſely, and will vndoubtedly reſtore vs to life, though we were conſumed to nothing, by burning a thouſande yeares in the hoteſt fire that can bee made or imagined. Yet I pray you tell me one thing, doo you thinke it poſsible that the very ſame *individuum*, and as you ſay in the Schooles, *idem numero*, hauing beene conſumed to nothing, can bee reſtored, as namely the ſame candle after that it is conſumed?

Sch. I perceiue you meaning: it is certaine that God both can and will raiſe vs to life againe, not in any other, but in theſe very ſame perſons, which now we are: but what the Schoolemen meane by that quidditie of *idem numero*, & many other of the ſame kind, as I neuer did, ſo I do not now mean to trouble my ſelfe with them.

Sect. 4.

Sect. 4.

WEe will rather come to the reſt of theſe external attributes, the which (as I am of my ſelfe not vnwilling) ſo you ſee that we muſt of neceſsitie knit vp in very fewe words. Firſt for the ſimilitude of the diuine eſſence, the which muſt be graunted to bee a moſt ſimple and pure forme, altogither voyde not onely of all mixſture of diuers matters or contrarie qualities, as wee knowe the elements to bee, but euen of all manner of compoſition whatſoeuer, euen of that which is the ſimpleſt, to wit, of matter and forme, whereof all creatures do neceſſarely ſubſiſt, for that neyther matter nor forme can in them exiſt the one without the other. But there can no kinde of matter bee admitted into the diuine eſſence, no not that whereof as being moſt pure, ſubtile and ſimple, the heauens, or the Angelles themſelues (more ſubtile then the heauens, if more may bee) do conſiſt. For ſo wee ſhould pull downe all that wee haue built vp, and gaineſay all that hath hithertoo beene affirmed of the nature of God. For we cannot make him both eternall, and alſo compounded of matter and forme, for in compoſition there is motion, & in motion time, and time taketh away eternitie, yea wee muſt graunt the matter wher-

of

of hee is compounded, to haue beene before him, the which muſt ſubſiſt in ſimple, before it bee brought into compoſition. Againe if hee bee materiall, he is locall, for all matter is in place, and ſo hee is not infinite, but finite and circumſcribed. Yea thus wee ſhall take from him his omnipotencie, which ariſeth of the puritie of his ſimple forme beeing mere actuall, becauſe it is inmateriall, whereas if it were compounded of matter and forme, it ſhould be compounded of impotencie and of power, of paſsion as well as of action, for it muſt participate the nature of both the parents, taking from the one operatiue power, and from the other paſsible impotencie, and ſo bee not a pure act, but clogged and blunted with the groſſeneſſe of matter, and by it made vnable to worke, yea as like and readie to ſuffer it ſelfe, as to worke in others. And therefore in the building of this pallace for the great God of heauen, wee muſt reiect all corruptible matter, yea all matter whatſoeuer, becauſe al matter is corruptible, and ſo make the diuine nature to bee a pure forme, wholly actiue and in no reſpect or part paſſiue. *Ge.* I haue ofte heard men ſpeak, & haue red mens writings of theſe pure abſtract formes, of the which kind many do hold not only god, but euē the angels, which are meer creatures to bee: yet it could neuer ſinke

into my head, how a forme ſhould ſubſiſt of it ſelfe without ſome matter to vphold it: and as I remember, you ſaid before, that ſome ancient diuines (I thinke you named *Tertullian*) were of the ſame opinion, or rather dulneſſe of conceit, and did therefore allowe bodies wherein to ſubſiſt, not onely to the Angels, but euen to God himſelfe.

Sch. It is hard for vs, who conſiſting of groſſe bodies and braines, eſteeme other natures by our own, to imagine how any forme ſhould ſubſiſt without ſome materiall ſubiect to vphold it. As touching the Angels, if you cannot thinke, or will not beleeue them to be pure and abſtract formes, altogither voyde of materiall compoſition, you ſhall (for mee) continue in your error or opinion: but if you will not admit God to ſubſiſt in this manner, to wit, as a ſubſtantial forme vpholding both it ſelfe, and alſo all things whatſoeuer do any way exiſt, you will marre all. Neyther ought the difficultie of ſuppoſing it, breede in vs any doubting of the trueth of it, it hauing beene often alreadie ſaide, that the maner of Gods ſubſiſting in his eſſentiall forme, is altogither vnſearchable and incomprehenſible. Let it bee ſufficient that wee haue it prooued by moſt neceſſarie demonſtrations, that God is a moſt pure,

pure, substantiall, immateriall & actiue forme without any cōposition of matter & form or distinction of parts, but euery where alike and the very same. Yea I do not see but that this prærogatiue of being a mere and pure forme must be reserued to God, and in no case cōmunicated to any creature as the grossenesse of matter must be left to the creature and in no wise ascribed to God. And so matter, or materiall subsisting (the which bringeth with it motion and time, passion, alteration, limitation and impotencie) shall bee the badge or cognizance, which the creature shall weare that so it may appeare, that he is not his owne man, or maker, but that he serueth and depēdeth on an other, by whom he was made and is maintained. And on the other side, mere simplicitie and pure formalitie (to the which eternitie, rest, identitie, operation, infinitnesse and omnipotencie are annexed) is to bee accounted the royall diademe, which aduanceth God in his Throne of glory aboue all creatures whatsoeuer. With this simplicitie of the diuine essence we may ioyne the vnitie of it, for as it is simple without partes, so it is one without kindes, neither can we imagin it to be moe then one for many causes. For if we suppose two infinits, wee make no infinit, for each of the two is the limit of the other, for it

keepeth the other from comming into it ſelfe (otherwiſe it becommeth one with it, and is no longer two but onely one) and ſo from extending it ſelfe into infinite. Beſides, wee know that the diuine eſſence beeing the firſt fountaine from the which all things flowe, and the laſt end to the which they tend, muſt bee the abſolute perfection of reſt altogither voyd of motion: for otherwiſe things ſhould moue not to reſt but to motion, and the *termini à quo* and *ad quem*, ſhould be not fixt, but moueable, and ſo vncertaine: but if the diuine eſſence bee many or moe then one, there is not abſolute perfection, which is onely in vnitie as motion is in number.

So that as it is in ciuil ſtates, the which are neuer counted ſure and ſetled in the abſolute perfection of gouernment, till the whole authoritie be deuolued from the people to many, from many to a fewe, from a few to one, becauſe where there are moe then one in authoritie, there is matter of continuall diſcord and diſorder, but in vnitie there is perfect concord, for no man diſagreeth with himſelfe: ſo much more we are to thinke that the ſoueraigne Monarchie of the world is not in motion or poſſibilitie tending to perfection, but already and euen for euer eſtabliſhed in perfect vnitie:

but

but we neede not insist any longer in prooving the vnitie of the god-head, which of it selfe is manifest, and therefore we will now shut vp this conference, with the last of these external attributes, which is the immoueabilitie, if we may so speake, of God.

Sect. 5.

THis attribute giueth vs to vnderstand, that god is not subiect to motiō, which is the mutation of state or place, but is in all respects immutable and immoueable: he doth not shift his dwelling place, wandring vp and downe like a Pilgrime, this day in one countrey and to morrow in an other, at one time in heauen, and at an other time on earth, but continueth where hee is and where hee hath bene alwaies, more firme and steadfast then the hugest mountaine, or the whole earth, like to a Rocke in the sea, against the which though the waues do beate, and so breake themselues, yet they cannot either moue it in or remoue it out of the place where it is: euen so it is with the creatures in the world, the which doo continually tosse and tumble themselues from one estate to an other, but the Lord remaineth the same for euer.

For why, as we our ſelues muſt not ſit downe, but go on till we come to the end of our iourney, euen ſo the creatures, when they are in their beſt eſtate, are not there to reſt in theſelues, as if they had made themſelues for themſelues, but they muſt moue and go on towards God and his glory by performing thoſe duties, which do naturally belong vnto them, and ſo continually better their eſtate. But it is not ſo with God, whoſe perfection is and euer was in complete act, not in hope & poſſibilitie, and therefore hauing all the perfection, that he can haue, he need not ſtir for the obtaining of any more, or mooue for any mans pleaſure: his laſt ende and cheefe good is in himſelfe, and in no other thing whatſoeuer, and therefore hee need not by motion purſue that, which he enioyeth already in reſt, or ſeeke that from an other which he hath in himſelfe. Yea it is needefull that God ſhould be immoueable, hee beeing the foundation, whereon all things whatſoeuer do any way exiſt, do ſtand and rely: ſo that if it did moue and were fickle and wauering, there muſt neceſſarely enſue vniuerſall confuſion & diſorder in nature: in the which reſpect (as was noted in the former attribute) God being both *terminus à quo*, and *terminus ad quem*, all naturall motion motion is made,

muſt

must needs be supposed to bee vnmoueable. for otherwise both disorder would ensue, and also motion should be made to motion, as it were in an endlesse iourney, and with bootelesse labour.

Lastly how should wee suppose God to moue, whom we know to haue no place whither to moue: for hee himselfe is euery where and therefore whither soeuer he moueth, hee moueth to himselfe, or rather he moueth not at all; because he is still where he was, euen in himselfe. Now sir, I haue as I could, endeauoured to satisfie your request, neither can you require any more of me, saue only thanks for your gentlenesse and curtesie in attending so patiently these simple and rude discourses: your wisedome is such, that I am perswaded, you did not expect any perfect declaration of the nature of God, especially at my hands, and at this time: in the which respect I hope that you will take in good part, that which hath bene said, how rudely and rawly soeuer.

Gent. If I should tell you how much I thinke my selfe beholden to you for this days worke, you would thinke that I did but flatter you: I know not when I learned so much good diuinitie in one day, but I hope to haue ere we part, better occasion and cause too of thanking

you.

Sch. There is no ſuch cauſe ſir, theſe are but ordinary matters.

Gent. Well I would giue any good I might haue had your company vp to *London*: I would thinke to bee by your meanes a good diuine ere I came thither.

Sch. So you are already, otherwiſe it were ſtrange, that I ſhould make you a good diuine in halfe a ſcore of dayes, that could not make my ſelfe one in a whole ſcore of yeares: but to deale plainely with you, my purpoſe is to trauell as farre as *London*, though I tolde you not ſo much at firſt: but I doubt that my litle weak nag wil not hold out, and I am ſure, that hee cannot hold foote with your ſtrong gelding.

Gent. I am right glad of it, take no thought for your nagge, I will aſſure him to *London* for the paines that you haue already taken in inſtructing mee: and when wee come to our iournies ende, if I might entreate you to go with mee to my houſe, which is not farre off, you ſhould be as welcome as your ſelfe could wiſh, and command any thing I haue.

Sch. You may ſoone haue a bolde gueſt of me, but we will talk of that ſixe or ſeuen dayes hence. In the meane time for that I perceiue y you are a ſtranger in this countrey, I will be ſo

bold

bold, as to bid you welcome to this Northern Towne.

Gent. I thanke you heartely, but doo you know of any good lodging in it?

Sch. No doubt sir, but that we may in many places here in *New-castle* bee both heartely welcome, and honestly vsed for our money: but you know that the countrey is plaine and rude, and therefore your entertainment will bee but course and homely in respect of that curious ciuilitie that is besouth: yet their meaning is good and better then it seemeth.

Gent. You speake worse of your countrey, then there is cause, I like plaine dealing best, let vs get on, and I pray you lead vs to some honest house where you are knowne or acquainted.

FINIS.